Before the crash in Ethiopia, Boeing resisted the pilots' call for an aggressive 737 Max



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A few weeks after the first fatal crash of the 737 Max, American Airlines pilots asked Boeing executives to urgently work on a solution. At an in camera meeting, they even argued that Boeing should urge the authorities to take an emergency measure that could result in the stranding of the Max.

Boeing executives resisted. They did not want to find a solution to the situation and indicated that they expected the pilots to be able to handle the problems.

Mike Sinnett, Boeing's vice president, acknowledged that the builder was evaluating potential aircraft design flaws, including the new anti-stall software. But he hesitated to take a more aggressive approach, saying it was not yet clear that the new system was at the origin of the Lion Air crash, which had killed 189 people .

"No one has yet concluded that the only cause of this was this function in the aircraft," Sinnett said, according to a recording of the Nov. 27 meeting reviewed by the New York Times.

In a statement, American Airlines said it was "confident that the imminent software updates, as well as the new training elements developed by Boeing for the Max, will soon lead to the recertification of the aircraft".

The November meeting, which lasted an hour in a windowless conference room at the headquarters of the American Airlines pilots' union in Fort Worth, was sometimes confrontational. At the table were Mr. Sinnett, accompanied by Craig Bomben, one of Boeing's leading test pilots and one of the company's leading lobbyists, John Moloney. They have been confronted with several union leaders, many of whom are angry at the company.

Michael Michaelis, an American pilot, argued that Boeing should push the F.A.A. to issue what is called an emergency airworthiness directive.

F.A.A. had already issued a directive after the Lion Air crash, asking airlines to revise their flight manuals to include information on how to respond to a malfunction of the anti-stall system called MCAS. But Michaelis urged Boeing to consider asking for another to update the software.

Such a procedure would have forced Boeing and the US airlines to take immediate steps to ensure Max 's safety, and would likely have put the plane out temporarily.

"My question, as a Boeing, is this: why would not you say it's the smartest thing to do?" Said Mr. Michaelis. "Let's say that we will do everything in our power to protect this traveling public in accordance with what our pilots' unions tell us."

Sinnett did not hesitate, saying it was not clear that the new software, which automatically pushes the aircraft into a dive, is responsible for the crash of Lion Air. He added that he was convinced that the pilots had received adequate training to deal with a problem, especially now that pilots – who were not initially aware of the new system – were aware of it.

"You need to understand that our commitment to safety is as strong as yours," Sinnett said at the meeting. "The worst thing that can happen is a tragedy like this, and the worst thing would be another."

The pilots expressed their frustration that Boeing did not inform them of the new software in the plane before the Lion Air crash.

"These guys did not even know that this damn system was installed in the plane, nor anyone else," said Michaelis, union security officer.

Another US pilot, Todd Wissing, was frustrated that no mention of the system was included in the 737 Max training manual.

"I would think it would be a priority to explain what could kill you," Wissing said.

Sinnett and Bomben, Boeing executives, explained that the company did not think the pilots needed to know more about the software because they were already trained to deal with scenarios such as the one of the accursed Lion Air flight. All pilots need to know how to take control of an aircraft when the aircraft's tail begins to move uncontrollably due to a malfunction that has pushed the aircraft to the ground.

"The assumption is that flight crews have been trained," Sinnett said at the meeting. He later added, "Rightly or wrongly, it was the design criteria and that's how the plane was certified, the system and the pilot working together."

When the pilots pressed Boeing to consider encouraging the company F.A.A. to issue an emergency airworthiness directive, Mr. Sinnett argued against moving too fast.

"We do not want to rush and do shit work to fix the good things and we do not want to fix the bad things either," said Sinnett, adding later: "For flight-critical software, I Do not think you want us to hurry, hurry up quicker.

Mr. Sinnett acknowledged that the company was studying potential errors in the design of the jet.

"One of the questions will be, is our hypothesis wrong?" Said Sinnett. "We are going through this whole process of thinking, were our assumptions really valid when we did it?"

But he remained convinced that pilots should know how to handle a malfunction of the new software in the plane, given their existing training.

At the end of the meeting, Dennis Tajer, spokesman for the union, asked Boeing's leaders if they were still confident in the Max.

"Do you feel comfortable with the fact that the situation is under control today, before implementing a hotfix?" He asked.

Mr. Sinnett immediately replied, "Absolutely."

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