All is not what it seems between the United States. and Venezuela

Despite the flamboyant anti-imperialist rhetoric it has launched against the United States since 1999, the Chavez regime has never failed to maintain intense commercial ties with the world's leading power. If the relations between the countries were subordinated to the discursive, the existence of the least exchange could not be explained in any case.

Over the past two decades, the Venezuelan regime has also followed the manual of practical procedures to really irritate the White House: it supported governments and left-wing parties in the region, provided valuable badistance to Cuba and strengthened ties with Russia , China and Iran. None of these affronts led to the total breakdown of relationships.

However, the situation entered a new phase from January 2019, when Donald Trump seized the accounts of the Venezuelan State under the jurisdiction of the United States and confirmed that they were under the control of the United States. opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, recognized as legitimate president. This measure includes the US subsidiary of PDVSA (Citgo), which is the hardest hit so far against the flow of funds to the Chavez regime.

This decision is a variant of a much more radical measure that, thanks to the appearance of Guaidó, the White House magnate was able to avoid: the total suspension of Venezuelan oil imports, which currently stand at 500,000 barrels per day sent by Caribbean countries to the North American market.

The applied alternative also leaves the indispensable stock of oil dollars to the Maduro regime, which is becoming increasingly expensive to finance the importation of food, medicine and equipment.

Faced with the embargo on PDVSA funds, Maduro could halt crude shipments to the US in search of other options, albeit more expensive and with lower profit margins. The side effect less desired by Trump is that the new destination of 500,000 barrels per day destined for the North American market is Russia and China, which would increase the influence of these countries in the region.

For the United States, it would be very disadvantageous not to be supplied with Venezuelan heavy oil for refineries, although its own production is less dependent on its purchases in recent years. The rise in the price of gasoline in the US domestic market, due to a drop in supply from abroad, could therefore be more easily amortized.

Enemies, but partners

During Chavismo's two decades of power, Venezuela's exports were mainly destined for the United States, while Venezuelan products made up the largest share of Venezuelan imports. When the Chávez regime was in full swing, the demonization of its northern partner did not prevent it from sending up to 1,500,000 barrels of oil a day to the US market, as it did in 2004.

A February 2013 report, circulating on the Web on behalf of the Venezuelan Embbady in the United States, is totally at odds with Chavismo's stubborn anti-American rhetoric: "Trade relations with the United States. is solid and continues to grow Over the years, Venezuela has been a reliable and valuable business partner, and in 2012 it was once again the third largest trading partner of the United States in Latin America and the fourteenth largest in the world. 39, oil. "

This document is based on actual data from official US agencies, which in 2012 place merchandise trade between the two countries at over $ 56 billion. From 2006 to 2013, Nicolás Maduro was responsible for leading Venezuela's international relations as Minister of People's Power for Foreign Affairs.

The statistics of relations between Washington and the Chavez regime show that, from 1999 to the present day, the bilateral trade balance was very deficient for the United States, which imports much more from Venezuela than it exports to that country. Another important detail is that 85% of Venezuelan exports to the US market consist of crude oil, while 33% of its imports are refined fuel that can no longer produce the disintegrated Venezuelan infrastructure (the rest comes from the agricultural sector). , machines). and electronics products).

Trade flows between the United States and Venezuela have recently dropped significantly from 2015 and deepened in 2016 to reach $ 16,100 million in trade. This was the lowest level since 1998 (the year of Chávez's election).

According to data from the US Department of Commerce's United States Census Bureau website, a slight recovery was observed in 2017 and 201, although far from the peak reached in 2008, when bilateral trade reached $ 64 billion. At the beginning of this year, Chávez proposed in his TV show Aló Presidente the "revival" of the main guidelines of his government.

Political tensions and the weakening of trade with the United States finally complicated the Venezuelan panorama. The crisis was fueled by the sharp decline in oil production, compounded by mismanagement and corruption in the state-owned oil company PDVSA: according to data released by OPEC, the South American country has produced in 1999 3,500,000 barrels a day, which were gradually reduced until reaching a production of one million barrels per day in 2018.

Exchange: Venezuelan oil

Venezuela is the fourth largest supplier in the United States.

500,000 Daily barrels are what Venezuela sells to the North American market, a highly oil-dependent economy.

In the past: 2004 crude sales

Venezuela's export to the United States was superior

1.5 million barrels of oil was the daily amount that the Hugo Chávez government sold to the United States.

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