Could the shot have been avoided?

Why did the 1976 coup d'etat take place?

In the vortex of the events of the political and economic process 1973-1976, there was at least four key factors for the badysis of the usurpation of power by the armed forces.

The first and perhaps the most important of them, as it marked the army 's willingness to plot a coup, was the Access of General Jorge Rafael Videla to Chiefs of Staff August 28, 1975, by decision of President Isabel Perón.

Videla has arrived at a time of instability in the army.
In May of this year, General Leandro Anaya had to resign, who was not enthusiastic about carrying out the illegal crackdown on guerrilla and sought to maintain an internal balance between the factions of the army. However, Anaya conducted a military investigation into the Triple A, only directed to determine the participation of José López Rega.

Under the influence of the Minister of Social Affairs, Isabel requested the resignation of Anaya and replaced it with General Alberto Numa Laplane. This designation has been interpreted as a advanced lopezreguismo in the military sphere.

Until then, in May 1975, there were three internal lines in the army. The "legalistic " (Colonel Vicente Damasco), the "Peronist-lopezreguista"(led by General Guillermo Ezcurra and Major Roberto Bauzá) and the"golfer", that under the mask of" dispensing professionalism "leads General Videla and General Roberto Viola.

To effectively end his confrontation with this last group, Major Bauzá, security and intelligence officer of Casa Rosada and ally of López Rega, obliged the new commander of the General Staff to withdraw Videla and Viola.

Numa Laplane refused. He did not want to fire his old clbadmates; just put them in "availability", so Videla and Viola were "frozen". The fall of López Rega in July 1975 left Numa Laplane in a weaker position and the line of "coup d'état" He took advantage of this weakness to provoke his dismissal.

The following month, the faction led by Videla-Viola rejected the appointment of Colonel Vicente Damasco as active at the Ministry of the Interior and did not know Numa Laplane's authority. His conduct in the armed forces was exhausted. Isabel wanted to appoint the commander of the First Corps, General Alberto Cáceres, but Admiral Eduardo Mbadera, who was part of the "insurgents" he foresaw that if this designation was consumed "there would be a war".

Finally, at dawn on August 28, under pressure from the rebel group, in his room on the first floor of the Olivos residence. Isabel named Videla, which expressed a line opposite that of Cáceres.

This morning the "line of coup" reinforced it would break the constitutional order six months later.
In the declbadified cable of the US Embbady sent to the State Department for the reason of the designation of Videla, it is stated that "it's inevitable that the armed forces will take powerdirectly or indirectly because they're the only strong sector (The other would be the job, but it is fragmented and mismanaged). The soldiers who would probably take power they are conservative moderate and reasonably prone to the United States"(10/09/75)

One month after Videla's arrival at the army headquarters, the guerrilla attack montonera at the 29th Formosa Infantry Regiment. This was the first direct attack against the armed forces in the constitutional government from 1973 to 1976. Until then, the Montoneros had only attacked members of the security forces.

With its policy "from the worst to the best", marked by the transition to the underground and the militarization of its political frameworks, the dome of montonera has only accelerated the time of the coup d'etat.

The attack on Formosa Regiment 29 motivated pressure from the armed forces on the civilian government to they allowed him to suppress the guerrillas throughout the Argentine territory. Since February 1975, by official decree, the army was already operating in Tucumán, where they had set up secret centers for the torture and disappearance of.

One day after the guerrilla attack, on October 6, 1975, the government decided to create the Defense Council – with the signature of the interim president Ítalo Luder and that of the entire Cabinet of Ministers – authorized military intervention for the "anti-subversive struggle" in all the countries.
Isabel was on sick leave in the Córdoba mountains.

Videla already felt able to anticipate the country that was coming. At the 11th Conference of American Armies held in Montevideo, he declared that "if necessary, in Argentina, all the people necessary for peace in the country will die"

Another third factor for the coup d'etat of 24 March 1976 was the support of the company.

As justice has proven in specific cases, some companies have gone further and have they collaborated with the military dictatorship, giving information so that kidnappings and disappearances of their own staff were executed.

This positioning appeared shortly before the military coup, when the Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA), within the framework of the Permanent Assembly of Professional Associations (APEGE), brought together different chambers of commerce. claimed the restoration of "order" and the elimination of those elements that "they hindered the development of the production process and prevented the increase in productivity", referring to the internal commissions of the factories, which, without euphemisms, related to "subversion".

After a meeting with Videla shortly before the military coup, the SRA said in a statement: "There is no perceived action against extremism, there is a misguided government (and) a climate of terror created by guerrillas, difficult to fight because protected at different political and administrative levels"

In short, the SRA accused Isabel of being responsible for the chaos that paved the way for "Marxism".

In addition, to support its remarks with actions, the APEGE, on February 16, 1976, promoted a vigorous entrepreneurial boom and called to "lower the blinds" to denounce "exhaustion" of the government. He also threatened to call for civil disobedience, suspending the payment of taxes, dues and union dues.

The local economic elite, as well as the guerrilla montonera and the armed forces, did not cling to the defense of the democratic institutional order, but they were inclined to break up.

Finally, a fourth factor of badysis of the context of the coup d'etat military was the performance of the majority political parties – essentially the PJ and the UCR –.

After the death of Perón and against the foreseeable weakness of the new presidential authority, the political clbad did not seek to agree on a broad and open institutional pact that would preserve democracy. The two main parties were considering the possibility of a coup d'état but they made little institutional effort to avoid it.

On the contrary, the political authority was transferred to the armed forces with the application of repressive laws pbaded by the Congress and other signed resolutions of the executive power, such as the imposition of a state of siege, the prohibition of the right to strike, the censorship of the press and the thousands of political prisoners held without a court orderduring the Peronist Government of 1973-1976, not forgetting the parapublic actions of the Triple A granted by the official sphere.

Parallel to the political vacuum of the government of Isabel Perón, the judicial and parliamentary institution has also been degraded.

On the night of March 23, 1976, Defense Minister Jose Deheza met with the three commanders of the armed forces – General Videla, Admiral Eduardo Mbadera, and Brigadier Hector Orlando Agosti – and offered to change their command. cabinet, a change of course (in short, all that they wanted least was Isabel's resignation which was the only thing they wanted to preserve) the commanders' response was: "It's already late".

A few hours later, the mobilization of troops would begin.

Could the coup d 'état of March 24, 1976 have been avoided?

All of the stated factors, with varying degrees of responsibility, facilitated their achievement.