Malvinas: the aviator admired by the English who refused to surrender out of respect for his fallen comrades

The memorable performance of Argentine pilots during the South Atlantic conflict is largely due to the air strategy developed on the continent by a discreet man, later chosen for his democratic commitment as leader of the Atlantic. army of the air. Raúl Alfonsín. This veteran of the Falklands War, a parable of Mendocino unaffected by praise, was the brigadier Ernesto Crespo, died one month ago at the age of 89 years.

Crespo led Argentine pilots to defeat enemy ships and prevent them from landing in the Falklands at first. The short runway at Puerto Argentino airport limited the operations of the fighter-bombers. This is why the attack on the continent's maritime objectives and, later, against terrestrial targets during febrile flights with a margin of 3 or 4 minutes for the attack. Time was pressing and we had to come back to earth with the last breath of fuel.

It's the "secret" story

It was on 14 June 1982 that the United Kingdom dispatched the certificates of surrender. The original was written in English, there was a copy in Spanish and any change in the terms of the badignment was to be monitored at 10 Downing Street.

On that day, Brigadier Ernesto Crespo was at his command post at Comodoro Rivadavia when received a call from the Falkland Islands. A member of the Air Force of Argentina informed him that the British demanded their surrender and that they included it in the act of capitulation.

Before cutting off the phone unexpectedly, Crespo was clear:

-We will not give up in any way. We will continue to attack. I already bear the burden of having sent many people to fight. I can not say as well as "I give up".

After a few minutes, the phone rang again.

"Sir, the English have changed their minds and ask you for your word of honor not to attack further.

Crespo badyzed the scenario with his staff: the Argentine military component in Malvinas surrendered, surrendered its armament and all the elements that interest the enemy. To continue the fight, with the cost in human lives, was sterile.

With pain, he agreed and gave his word of honor that he did not want to attack. This verbal promise was the only word of honor given to put an end to the hostilities.

L & # 39; Admiral Sandy Woodward commander of the task force during the landing I was ordered to neutralize the air force. Even if it forced the continental bases to be bombed.

It's the Falklands War that has forged the FAA's reputation for prestige in the world. Many powers have implemented profound changes, rewriting their manuals of doctrine, strategy and military tactics when studying the performance of Argentine aviation.

The role played by airmen can only be evaluated by comparing the results obtained with the difficulties encountered during the enlistment and the formation of the attack force, to which are added the disadvantages encountered by the armed forces during hostilities. Technological, technical and material gaps in the face of the superiority of the enemy.

This asymmetry could only be corrected through effort, ingenuity and creativity. And this was reflected in the spirit and courage of the pilots and crew who attacked the surface ships of the British fleet: in 44 days it was inflicted on the Royal Nayy greater damage in proportion to the damage done to the navies that occurred during the Second World War.

All of this pushed back the operational force, causing serious damage and forcing the British to move away from the islands and ask for reinforcements.

Crespo said at the time: "If anyone thought that the phrase" Defend the homeland until death "was only a statement, it is the moment of truth."

His oath was blood, he was based on his training and his commitment to honor the homeland. The SAF official claimed that he had to fight "until the last man, even who speaks to them". This ideology also implied a strong sense of responsibility and commitment to the men and women who worked under him. There are countless testimonials that have praised his advice and support, both technically and logically, as well as morally and spiritually. In high-risk missions, Crespo did not choose pilots, but asked for volunteers. And there have always been some.

On his return, even in the most difficult moments when he had to regret the losses (there was 37 deceased pilots), went on the track to find out the conditions under which his subordinates and I consoled them with the loss of life.

He had promised to leave no one in the air force, whatever the circumstances, a word he kept to the end. Even in the years following the conflict, the accompanying widows and relatives of the people killed in the battle have arranged for nothing to be lost so that their children can be educated and live.

What are Crespo's qualities and qualities that led his men to continue fighting until the end without hesitation, even knowing that the chances of a military victory were minimal?

Ernesto Horacio Crespo (1929-2019) graduated as an aviator from the School of Military Aviation in 1952. Those who knew him remember him as a strict and upright person with extreme dedication to work. Pragmatic, temperate and at the same time firm in his decisions, he was a meticulous planner who respected and listened to the professional in his work. He understood the contributions of others, whether they contributed and knew how to delegate responsibilities. His subordinates remember him as a fair and accessible leader. His well-known style contributed to his dedication, after his performance at FAS, as FAA Chief of Staff.

He was later appointed Commander of the Air Component of the South Atlantic Operational Theater (TOAS): it was to implement all the bases of operations and deployment established by the Strategic Air Command (CAE) in Patagonia, in addition to receiving the necessary equipment and personnel.

They had badured him, at first, that if the war broke out – he was convinced – the FAA would not have to fight because it was not their primary responsibility..

In accordance with Resolution No. 01/69, the army would be responsible for the land theater, navy and FAA airspace located 12 miles maximum of the coast.

They should not fly over the sea except to carry out distant exploration tasks. Therefore, the air force should not train, acquire weapons or aircraft to fight at sea.

So, despite having flown intensely for several years, for FAA pilots, the profile of a ship at sea was unknown: they did not know how they were painted, how long they had, how much they could attack, nor how the rain or the fog had influenced the ocean. With a short time, the FAS leader immediately set out to organize and prepare the new force of attack.

The navy provided a destroyer with modern batteries of anti-aircraft missiles and radar systems similar to those of the British fleet, so that the Mirage III, the M-5 Daggers and the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk FAA can perform workout exercises.

The task was to simulate bombings against the destroyer who claimed to defend himself against a missile and would perform evasive maneuvers. The results were not encouraging: the pilots found it difficult to find the national fleet, although they had defined in advance the coordinates, the location and the frequencies to be used.. Before the psychological shock that all produced, we worked to reverse the mental situation and generate the confidence necessary for the pilots to face the challenges imposed in each mission.

Brigadier Crespo also planned and executed logistical support tasks for the troops stationed at Malvinas, a situation he badyzed from an aerial point of view so that pilots could spot enemy ships. Here's how he selected three positions: San Carlos, Darwin and Pleasant Bay.

Consulted naval advisers in the FAS command, they concluded that it was impossible for a landing or for the fleet to use these places because it was shallow and stony waters. However, the staff stayed with these places.

Fragmented Orders (OFs) were prepared for the three locations, so that the units could fulfill certain missions. The OFs were delivered to the units in mid-April, so pilots exercised during their reconnaissance flights over locations that, from an aerial point of view, were supposed to be used. Shortly after, it would be revealed that the British had determined, a priori, about twenty possible landing positions, remaining then at eighteen and finally choosing three: San Carlos, Darwin and Pleasant Bay.

Prior to intervening in the conflict, Brigadier Crespo and his staff had to face countless problems:

* The FAA had only two tanker aircraft (KC-130) to supply the entire air and naval component.The attack force was therefore limited to small flights, usually four aircraft at a time, for the required refueling.

* The daggers Mirages III and M-5 were not prepared for refueling in flight, which has greatly reduced their ability to attack when providing combat coverage. The lack of autonomy of the aircraft limited their permanence on the objectives to 5 minutes; furthermore, the Mirages III aircraft and the Daggers were unable to use their supersonic speed (Mach-2) because such fuel consumption would not be enough to return to the base, which would have been a great advantage against the British subsonic Harriers.

* The lack of long-term observation was another of the difficulties. Although the effectiveness of the attacks has been considerably reduced by the number of bombs that struck and did not explode, as the train had not been prepared for naval targetsnor for the form of attack used, the only possibility to launch one's own weapons with a certain probability of survival before modern anti-aircraft weapons.

* FAA aircraft generally had obsolete avionics for long-distance navigation but by April 1982 only one third of the planes had been modified. Meanwhile, the runway at Puerto Argentino airport, the only hard surface runway, was quite short and suited only to transport planes such as the C-130 (with a capacity of 39). landing and short takeoff). Thus, the totality of logistics and reinforcement efforts depended on this airport.

After May 1, when the air force had already entered the conflict, Crespo ordered to avoid high altitude attacks and urged pilots to use the tactic of attacking in low flight, as this allowed them to take advantage of one of the British's most notable weaknesses: the lack of a long-range early warning system to identify enemy planes arriving at low altitude.

This was also of great help when the Argentine pilots approached the ships of the British fleet: Shooting directors of ships could not detect if planes were coming to the attack and, if they detected them, they were confused with the echo coming from the land and the sea.

However, this had something against: the Malvinas CIC – the FAA's surveillance and control system mounted with a radar at Malvinas – could not protect them: the pilots were exposed to all possible risks and had to literally cross the boats, resulting in loss of life and aircraft.

These losses did not prevent the fighter pilots from fighting aggressively until the end, such as when the Group 5 Skyhawks and Trelew Canberra bombers attempted to launch firefighting missions. air support for the Argentine army, the resistance on earth has collapsed in Puerto Argentino.

The transport command also played an admirable role. During the month of April, nearly 8,000 soldiers and 5037 tons of equipment, weapons, vehicles and supplies were mobilized..

Even after the arrival of the British fleet and the total air blockade, the transport vehicles continued to fly at night to Puerto Argentino, carrying cargo and evacuating the wounded, as these operations were carried out under hazardous conditions. serious for the forces employed in this task, but they have responded to the vital needs of the media deployed in the Falklands.

For its part, anti-aircraft artillery and radar operators have done their work with commendable satisfaction throughout the campaign. Seven British planes, including four fighter jets, were shot down by ground anti-aircraft defenses. The Puerto Argentino radar operators were the only effective resource for locate British planes and ships. During the aircraft attacks, the operators monitored enemy movements and learned about the proximity of their aircraft. Many lives and aerial equipment were saved thanks to the exceptional performance of those who operated the radar stationed at Puerto Argentino.

A separate chapter would merit the use of the improvised Phoenix Squadron, which used business jets as lures to distract British Air Patrol (PAC) patrols.

In the final report, as the head of the FAS in the Malvinas conflict, Brigadier Crespo did an exceptional job with the available means and forces, especially in view of the fact that he had three weeks to organize and train his strike force for the naval air campaignThis did not prevent him from learning from his mistakes and making the necessary adjustments so that his commanders would have the best chances against the disadvantages presented.

Years later, when he became Brigadier General and Chief of the General Staff (JEMG), Crespo would face another major conflict, this time of a different nature, but in which firmness and decision will be decisive offer support to President Raúl Alfonsín, who was to calm rebel forces in Campo de Mayo during Holy Week in 1987.

At that time, it was interpreted as a threat to the consolidation of democracy in the Argentine Republic. There, Crespo demonstrated its strong commitment to democratic institutions accompany the former president of the nation to the presidential helicopter for his meeting with the rebels in Campo de Mayo. Crespo badured Alfonsin that the FAA would act with all its staff and resources if necessary.

In 1989, Crespo retired. Although he continued to participate in the Aeronautical Leadership Council, with his wisdom and experience on issues relevant to the future of the FAA. Always with humility and respect, without asking anything to change. This drove him to stay in the institution to which he was proud to belong.