Venezuela: an election-only exit is impossible

CARACAS – It is possible that the military uprising of April 30th did not change anything in Venezuela. But the events of this day revealed two aspects that could be decisive: the existence of a crack in the armed forces and the extent of the complexity of the Venezuelan crisis and its possible solution.

Often in forums, editorials and international debates, the idea of ​​an exclusively electoral solution to the Venezuelan crisis is defended. But this proposal may be naive, which we can not afford in Venezuela: it is generally vague and too optimistic. Often, it is unclear how to guarantee the desired election without risking a fraudulent process, as was the case on May 20, when Nicolás Maduro was re-elected to the presidency without an international election observer or national or foreign credibility.

In the days following the April uprising, it was reiterated that the solution to the crisis was to be an election, as the International Contact Group repeated. This is a precise way, but it can not be ignored that the permanence of Maduro will make it impossible to hold free and reliable elections.

Therefore, the question facing Venezuela is not whether elections are the best method to return to democracy (what they are), but when the best is to celebrate them. That is, should the transition to democracy begin with elections or should Maduro's exit from power be the precondition for holding elections?

Election precedents have allowed the transition to democracy, as the researcher Staffan I. Lindberg has studied. This was the case of Brazil: after demonstrations by citizens and a serious economic crisis, the military junta, which came to power by a coup in 1964, called for elections in 1985, won by a opposition candidate, Tancredo Neves. This electoral victory enabled Brazil to restore a civilian regime. But in Venezuela, it does not seem possible to meet the conditions for free and fair elections leading to democracy.

The National Assembly (NA) understood it well. In February 2019, it approved a law governing the transition to democracy and part of the non-electoral route: it should be noted that the first stage of the transition should consist of a political change which, in a second phase, allows real elections.

The solution provided by the statute of the NA is pragmatic: the cessation of the usurpation must take place before the elections. Once Maduro leaves power, a union government will have to be formed to guarantee free and fair presidential elections. This implies recognizing the legitimacy of a non-electoral political change allowing an immediate and effective response to the humanitarian emergency that the country is going through and recovering the institutional character and the autonomy of the various governmental organs, including including the National Electoral Council.

This reasoning is correct because with Maduro in power, it will no longer be possible to guarantee free elections in Venezuela without saving the minimal conditions of electoral integrity that were wiped out after the creation of the National Constituent Assembly in 2017. It is a dilemma that must be remembered: elections can only produce a political change if the conditions for celebrating them are guaranteed.

A brief review of our recent history can confirm that the reasoning of the NA status is correct. In Venezuela, there has already been an attempt to promote transition through the ballot box. But all failed. The Maduro regime, with absolute control over government institutions, dismantled the powers of the democratically elected National Assembly, promoted the fraudulent election of the National Constituent Assembly and intervened in elections 2017 – during which the opposition denounced various frauds. The final act was the presidential election of 20 May 2018, during which Nicolás Maduro was re-elected without respecting minimum guarantees of electoral integrity.

It should be kept in mind that the transition to Venezuela will not only be from authoritarian rule to democracy. If this were the case, the electoral route could perhaps be repeated. But the Venezuelan reality, unfortunately, is more complicated. Venezuela today has a bankrupt state that is unable to guarantee the supply of electricity or control of the territory. This state must be cured before calling elections. And this requires managing two other dimensions of transition simultaneously: the transition from a fragile state to a functional state and, at the same time, the transition from a mafia state to an institutional state.

The non-electoral change that would work in Venezuela requires, among other things, to break the loyalty of the army to Nicolás Maduro's regime. In the law, a strategy has been devised to achieve this peacefully and peacefully: negative incentives (such as sanctions and other measures of coercion on the international scene) and positive ones (amnesty, transitional justice and guaranteed participation of the armed forces in the democratic transition process).

The efforts of the opposition and the citizens must therefore aim to promote a non-electoral change based on the ignorance of Nicolás Maduro's regime. That is to say, to break with the duty of obedience to the regime, especially on the part of civil and military officials. In addition to being peaceful, this disobedience is also legal: the army may reject a president attached to articles 333 and 350 of the constitution, following what Francisco Rubio Llorente called the "right to resistance against unfair power ".

And if anyone has any doubts, just attend the badault of the Maduro regime in recent days: it ended with the de facto closure of the seat of the National Assembly by military personnel and the opening of prosecutions against opposition MPs. The proposal to hold free elections under these conditions is not an alternative.

José Ignacio Hernández G. is a lawyer and professor of law at the Central University of Venezuela and Andrés Bello Catholic University. He is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Growth Lab.

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