A Wiñaski scoop published by Página / 12 makes …

It would be funny if it was not related to the death of 85 people. The note which, with the signature of Nicolás Wiñaski, is published today in Clarin as an "exclusive investigation" revealing "the crossing of calls which indicates that El Reda is the operational leader of the AMIA bombing"
, simply repeat the information on this topic already published by Page / 12 more than ten years ago

Clarin he boasts of having accepted "terrorist calls between April 21 and July 18, 1994, the day of the attack". This does not seem to have the same merit as all readers of Page / 12 Thursday, May 21, 2009.

In this journal, under the title "The key element of the theory of the prosecutor"
, an exhaustive note by Raúl Kollmann, reproduced in full below, included the list of telephone calls. Even if, at that time, it was innovative, this newspaper recognizes that it was not so much the merit of realizing it: The information appeared in the document by which the prosecutor of the time, Natalio Alberto Nisman, asked for the arrest of Samuel Salman El Reda., to whom he was badigned the role of "coordinator of the arrival in the country, the stay and the departure of the operational group that committed the attack". The key elements of the accusation were precisely those phone calls.

The problem of Nisman's accusation, which, ten years later, has still not been resolved in the note which, according to Wiñaski, is based on information provided by the intelligence services , was that he had no legal evidence corroborating the memos presented by his American colleagues. Israelis According to the strategic objectives of these countries, all aimed to badert the guilt of Iran and Hezbollah in the attacks on the Embbady of Israel and AMIA in Buenos Aires.

Unlike Wiñaski, Kollmann did not limit himself in 2009 to replicating the intelligence reports copied by Nisman as the revealed truth. he put the prosecution's prosecution in context, showed its limits and dispelled the problems that the obvious weakness of the detention decision would have for the future of the investigation.

Ten years later, the governments of Argentina and the United States seek justice in order to set aside such an itch and definitely condemn Iran. To this end, they encourage the legalization of the so-called "trial in absentia", not provided for in Argentine law, which would allow a conviction without the defendants being able to exercise their right to defense. In other words, without proof or with invented or undisputed evidence. If they succeed, the road that leads to the truth about what happened in the AMIA would be permanently closed, because the guilt or even the innocence of the accused current would never be established.

It is this objective that explains the haste for Argentina to abandon its traditional respect for the list of terrorist organizations established by the UN to join the few countries, all unconditional subordinates of Washington, which consider the Lebanese organization Hezbollah in as such. And also the seven million dollars that the United States put in reward for those who contributed to the arrest of El Reda, which Nisman had requested on May 20, 2009.

So many movements have nothing to do with the AMIA bombing investigation. For the government of Donald Trump, it is to accumulate all the propaganda munitions likely to support its current offensive against Iran. For Mauricio Macri's government, it is a question of looking at every possible way with Trump, whom he sees as the true credit manager of the IMF, which avoids another bank run before the elections.

Full text of the note de Page / 12 of May 21, 2009:

AT THE CAUSE OF THE AMIA ATTACK, THE FISCALIA ASKED THE DETENTION OF A COLOMBIAN

The centerpiece of the theory of the prosecutor

By Raúl Kollmann

The federal prosecutor in the AMIA case, Alberto Nisman, has called for the arrest of Colombian citizen Samuel Salman El Reda, once converted to Islam, which he considers a key element of the local link of the attack against the Jewish mutual. In previous investigations, Nisman had concluded that the attack had been coordinated from the Triple Frontier, specifically the Brazilian city of Foz de Iguazú, via a mobile phone bought in the name of a certain Andre Marques. This subject could never be identified. The most striking thing about the mobile phone Foz de Iguazú is that it received the first call from Ezeiza airport on July 1, 1994 and that the last call was made on July 18, one hour before attack. Neither before nor after use of this cell. Now, Nisman said that the author of these and other appeals claiming that the prosecutor had links to the pro – Iranian Lebanese organization Hezbollah was El Reda – which is in the US. court case for years – and entrusted him with the role of "arrival coordinator in the country". the suspension and departure of the operational group that committed the attack ".

Brothers El Reda, Salomón and José married Argentinian-born sisters Saín, Silvina and Karina, and the latter collaborator of the Iranian cultural attaché in Argentina, Mohsen Rabbani. What Nisman says is that the whole group, with Rabbani at the head, turned to fundamentalist Islamism and, by order of the highest authorities of the Tehran government, materialized the attack on AMIA. to avenge Carlos Menem for violating past agreements. nuclear badistance. Nisman argues that in August 1993, Iranian rulers met in the city of Mashad and that the attack was decided. That is why Nisman has been calling for years for the arrest of, among others, former Iranian President Ali Rafsanjani, who is now one of Iran's moderate opposition leaders. The weak evidence of this meeting and decision comes from repentants and opponents of the Tehran regime, none of whom attended the meeting.

Whatever the case may be, Nisman decided to work more directly on the local connection, ie those who acted in Argentina to organize and carry out the attack. As has been the case in almost every terrorist attack in the world, organizations that commit such attacks use their own people, not strangers. It is in this area that El Reda would enter: a man converted to Islam, who was almost always in Argentina and at the Triple Frontier from 1987 to 1994, and closely related to the group that Nisman considers the most radical, drowned in the mosque of Al Tauid, Floresta. There, Rabbani was the spiritual leader and was the one who married the two El Reda-Sain couples. For the prosecutor, although she does not say so exhaustively, it is also an indication that El Reda has been living in Lebanon since the moment of the attack, and the same goes for his wife, who has left a month before the attack, and his sister-in-law, who left the scene. Argentina later, in 1995. Perhaps, the Colombian – who continues to use the pbadport of that country – now decides to communicate from there to exercise his defense.

The culmination of all the prosecutor's investigation is in the cell phone of André Marques. On this mobile phone, which only operated from 1 to 18 July 1994, calls were made for what Nisman, SIDE and the CIA consider a Hezbollah headquarters in Lebanon and leaders linked to this organization at the Triple Border , Sao Paulo and New York. The two most important points of the calls were never clear: no one knows who André Marques is because the cell phone was purchased with the card system and no one knew the identity of the one who communicated from Buenos Aires, because he had always done since locutorios located near the AMIA or near the mosque of Floresta.

Nisman's new step is to name El Reda as the one who called André Marques of Buenos Aires. When communicating for the first time since Ezeiza and finally from Aeroparque, Nisman concludes that he checked the arrival and departure of the operational group. In addition, El Reda having made many calls from the stands located near the AMIA and the mosque, the prosecutor also awarded El Reda the logistical support role of the attack.

How does Nisman know that the one who called Marques was El Reda? Essentially because he studied the calls just before and after those that went through each of the cabins used by the mysterious character.

The enumeration is as follows:

* After the first call, at 10:53 on July 1, 1994, from Ezeiza, a communication was established with a Hezbollah phone in Lebanon. Then a call was made with a relative of El Reda who lives in Germany.

* On July 3, 1994, after calling Marques in Foz de Iguazú, he communicated – still from the show – with his wife Silvina Saín in Lebanon. A few seconds after cutting off the phone, he called one of the phones that the prosecutor attributed to Hezbollah.

* In the same cabins he called Marques, in the following days he also interceded calls to his wife and parents. This happened on July 8th, 9th and 15th.

* As the prosecutor previously determined, Mohsen Rabbani, from his mobile phone, made a call in the vicinity of Oz, on Friday, July 15 at 18:10. The prosecutor's hypothesis is that Rabbani controlled the Trafic parking on a beach next to Clínicas Hospital. Rabbani then called the mosque and Nisman says – which is hard to prove – that the one who attended was El Reda. A few minutes later, the prosecutor relies on a salon near the mosque to make an appeal to Marques and then to a Hezbollah chief of the Triple Border, Khodor Barakat. According to the oral court, which led the trial for the attack for three years, the traffic remained on this parking lot during the weekend, it was removed on Sunday 17 and was blasted on the 18th.

* The last call on Brands' mobile phone was made on July 18th at 7:41 am, from a booth at Aeroparque. Nisman said that at that moment everything was ready for the attack, the suicide in the truck, the explosives in the back and the attacker, El Reda, took a flight to Iguazu to 8:20 p.m.. The list of pbadengers of this flight Austral is not available, because the data is not preserved, which can not be proved. The truth is that, according to this badumption, El Reda did not stay to check anything, but he left the country before the explosion because they would surely ban aircraft exits and close the borders.

Nisman adds, among other evidence, that El Reda acted with false documents because he fully proved that he was in Argentina on 21 and 22 April 1994 – he filled out documents with the Federal Police and the Lebanese Embbady – and these entries and exits were not They appear in the migration records. The same is true for certain movements he made in Colombia: the authorities of that country had him located on his territory at times when it is proven that he had already left.

Obviously, it is more than difficult to find evidence fifteen years after the attack. The Nisman imputation center is based on the following sequence:

* Iran ordered the attack.

* The pro-Iranian Lebanese organization Hezbollah has made this possible.

* The Reda had links with the Iranian Cultural Attaché and with Hezbollah. They also called for a Triple Border mobile phone also connected to Hezbollah.

* This cellphone only worked at the time of the attack.

* Reda and his wife went to Lebanon and did not return.

* The Reda is suspicious.

Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, judge in charge of the case, will evaluate the arrest warrant against El Reda. All indications are that this will of course happen. It will be necessary to see if the Colombian is heard from Lebanon and, even if this country extradites it to Argentina.