Why does China continue to persecute Hong Kong so much?

Hong Kong officials on Sunday charged 47 pro-democracy activists with “conspiracy to subversion” against the Chinese government, under the National Security Law it imposed on the city last summer. . Beijing should be happy with the move which, with a single indictment, encompasses both supporters of full Hong Kong independence and opposition to the old school loyal to the city. The People’s Republic of China is now safe. Glory to your leader.

However, what exactly was the crime these criminals committed? Organize or participate in the primary elections in July before the legislative elections initially scheduled for September and dare to strategize. At the time, some participants argued that if the pro-democracy camp won a majority, it could reject the government’s budget in a vote, possibly forcing it to resign. Under Hong Kong law, the CEO must resign if the budget is refused twice.

Eventually, authorities postponed the elections, citing the health risks of the pandemic (the opposition claimed the real reason was fear of devastating defeat). In addition, now the government says this electoral strategy which was perfectly legal amounts to an act of subversion against Beijing, which can be punished with life imprisonment … which could be served in China.

The assault continues in other ways as well. Journalists have been arrested for criticizing the Hong Kong government or for investigating police brutality. Radio Television Hong Kong, the public broadcaster, can no longer broadcast programs from the BBC. A student union is silenced for its political views. The government is considering requiring district councilors – the vast majority of whom are from the political opposition – to pledge allegiance to Beijing, otherwise they will be disqualified.

Why does Beijing continue to persecute Hong Kong so much if the repression generates rejection from much of the world?

One explanation is that there is a gap between China’s national interests and the personal ambitions of its leader, Xi Jinping.

Xi appears determined to remain in the presidency after his second term ends; In 2018, he carried out maneuvers to eliminate the time limit. His many titles and powers today – he is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China – surpass those of any of his predecessors, even Mao, who founded the Communist Republic. However, to stay in power, Xi has to do something monumental.

And it is not up to par.

The claim that Xi had eradicated the poverty in china fue desmentida ni más ni menos que por el primer ministro Li Keqiang, quien el año pasado aseguró que el ingreso de unos 600 millones de personas —casi el 43 por ciento de la población— ni “siquiera alcanzaba para rentar una habitación en una ciudad medio of China “. corruption has worsened despite Xi’s aggressive anti-corruption campaign, according to some international scales. Chinese GDP growth has been steadily declining since 2010.

In the absence of major achievements at the national level, Xi has tried to redouble efforts on flagship projects abroad, with ups and downs in its results.

The Belt and Road Initiative, Xi’s flagship project, has prompted some participating countries to seek debt relief, although major Chinese banks appear to be reducing their investment in the project. His government’s growing ownership claims over part of the South China Sea have generated antagonism with countries in the region and caught the attention of US fleets and its allies.

The trade and technology wars waged by former President Donald J. Trump have put Xi on the defensive. Huawei, having been carefully promoted as a hub of China’s tech industry, is in free fall and is selling assets. The European Union may have been criticized for signing the Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CAI) with China in December despite human rights violations in Xinjiang, but anyone reading the fine print will note that the Beijing’s agreement contains significant concessions, in particular access to its market for manufactured goods.

Then there is the big price closer to home: Taiwan and Hong Kong. Any forceful military maneuver against Taiwan would be risky and failure would derail Xi’s career. The simplest task is to bring Hong Kong back into Beijing’s fold: the Chinese president sticks to it.

However, even this is tricky because it could destroy Hong Kong’s position as the freest channel for goods, capital, and people between mainland China and the West. This loss would be colossal for Beijing, and there is evidence that Xi’s opponents in the Chinese Communist Party, especially President Jiang Zemin’s political heirs, reacted with concern and made Xi feel threatened.

An implicit indication of the latter is the resistance of the president. Here’s a telling example: in mid-December, the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, posted a critical commentary against “revered osteomalacia patients in America,” calling them “capitulationists,” a Mao-era term used to denounce the disloyalty of party members suspected of having accepted the ideology of the West.

A fundamental strategy of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader from 1978 to 1989, was to rule Hong Kong relatively smoothly until the city was fully restored under Chinese control in 2047 and in the meantime to exploit what Hong Kong could offer to the continent, before turning his back on it. the west. However, Xi, who is eager to achieve a historic victory before his term ends, is speeding up the plans.

However, No matter how fast he is, Xi will not be able to quell opposition in Hong Kong. It will only transform her.

Indeed, the National Security Law has put an end to protests, clamped down on blatant calls for Hong Kong independence or simply its right to self-determination, and silenced much of the formal opposition. Yet a wing of the pro-democracy movement is rapidly growing abroad, encouraged by the influx of political migrants who have left the city. This diaspora will help maintain resistance in Hong Kong, however moderate this branch of the movement may seem.

Over the past decade, the motivation to redefine an identity of Hong Kong that is politically, culturally and linguistically independent from the mainland has grown and will only accelerate. The pro-democracy movement should move further away from the values ​​of the Umbrella Revolution of 2014, with its Gandhian pacifism and calls for respect for political rights.

Many activists I know may not say it so openly for fear of repression, but it seems that there is a new spirit animating them, especially the younger ones: the right to rebel by violence. force against an unjust rule, in a very similar way, for example, to what happened during the Thirteen Colonial Revolution against the British at the end of the 18th century.

The means of mobilizing the resistance in Hong Kong continue to adapt to the repression in Beijing. Like insects with weapons based on information technology; like self-sufficient swarms: an ever-growing collection of small units, each with its own purpose and plan of action, but all determined to fight the puppet regime and replace it with a democracy.

Many of these swarms are multiplying abroad. Many are pressuring host governments to impose sanctions on the Chinese Communist Party; others are establishing networks among Hong Kongers in the diaspora. Some want to create a shadow parliament.

However, there are more activists overseas working in silence … and many in Hong Kong have remained silent, even going underground.

Of course, the Hong Kong authorities know this and leave nothing to chance. For example, they are considering criminalizing the possession of firearm components after some Hong Kong people have received weapon parts in the mail from abroad. In other words, the authorities are concerned about an armed rebellion. However, if an armed rebellion were to break out, all the blame would fall on Beijing, and in particular on Xi.

© The New York Times 2021