A former Obama adviser for South America said that "it is unlikely that Maduro will leave power unless faced with a national uprising"

The Venezuelan crisis is approaching a point of inflection. The interim president, Juan Guaidó – recognized by the United States, most Latin American countries and Europe – announced February 23 as the day of mobilization of a ton of humanitarian aid on the territory.

Maduro has rejected the aid and warned that she was not planning to allow her entry several times. Ensuring that Venezuela is not in crisis and is not a "beggar", has denigrated the initiative to consider that the aid was "made in Washington" to "intervene" in Venezuela.

However, the dictator announced Tuesday that a plane with 300 tons of humanitarian aid will arrive from Russia. "Yes, we have paid with dignity, Russia, China, Turkey, the whole world, the UN, all the UN agencies with whom we have technical badistance" , did he declare.

The opposition, however, remains firm in its intentions, supported by the support of the international community, which puts the United States in the forefront. As did Guaidó, the president Donald Trump directly called the Venezuelan army in a speech on Mondayby calling them to allow the entry of humanitarian aid.

"They risk their future, They risk their lives and the future of Venezuela for a man controlled by the Cuban army and protected by a private army of Cuban soldiers, "said Trump.

In this context of tension and waiting, Infobae he's been talking to the director of the Latin America program at Woodrow Wilson Center and former director for Venezuela and the southern cone of the Barack Obama National Security Council, Benjamin Gedan, to know his badysis of the Venezuelan situation and the consequences that the events of next Saturday could have for the country, according to the way in which they developed.

The effects of an American invasion, the role of Uruguay and Pope Francis in the conflict and the potential approach that the Obama administration would have taken are some of the problems Gedan is addressing .

– What do you think it will happen on February 23?

Despite his international support, Juan Guaidó has no firm ground on which to stand. Nicolás Maduro controls the army, security services, intelligence and all Venezuelan territory.

– What do you think of the decision, from a strategic point of view?

– Given the tragic humanitarian conditions in Venezuela at the moment, it is logical that Guaidó confronts the authorities for humanitarian aid. By insisting that Maduro reject donations of food and medicine, Guaidó emphasizes the regime's cruelty, the suffering of his compatriots. Some members of the armed forces may even be embarrbaded to the point of distributing supplies, a clear manifestation of insubordination that may lead to defections.

-Although what can happen this weekend, what does Guaidó need to maintain the momentum?

– Unless there are defections in the high command of the army, the most important factors of this Venezuelan politician are the frequency, the size and the power of persistence of the demonstrations. Although the role of international actors is important, It is unlikely that Maduro will step down unless confronted with a national uprising.

-Do you think Maduro gave an interview to the BBC Why do you feel stuck?

– Venezuela long ago abandoned the influence it had under the Chavez era, when its charisma and the country's oil wealth gained in visibility. Maduro, however, retains a handful of important allies, including China, Russia and Turkey. With his bravery, Maduro seems to rebadure his allies on his commitment to defend his regime.and that he will use his support to challenge the United States.

The Vatican is in favor of dialogue in Venezuela and has an admirable desire to immerse itself in its wild political environment in order to contribute to the prevention of a civil conflict. But on the international scene, calls for dialogue are not neutral. Given the nature of the Venezuelan regime and its reluctance to make significant concessions, foreign offers to facilitate dialogue in recent years have only served to divide the Venezuelan opposition, carry momentum to protest against the movements and to make opposition leaders who reject the proposal seem uncompromising.

Despite his strong commitment to democracy at the local level and his painful experience with the dictatorship, Uruguay rarely played a positive role in the Venezuelan crisis. Reluctantly, he agreed to suspend Venezuela from Mercosur, despite its flagrant violations of the Ushuaia protocol; does not participate in the Lima group; at the OAS, he abstained in the vote that decided to condemn the fraudulent elections; and he refused to recognize Guaidó. Now Uruguay is leading another international effort to intimidate the Venezuelan opposition into another counterproductive dialogue.

-On February 12, US Senator Marco Rubio said at an event at the "Heritage Foundation" that he would not be willing to grant an amnesty to Maduro or Diosdado Cabello. What do you think of this statement? Do you think that if Maduro intervened in a country with which he had signed an extradition treaty, the United States would resort to universal jurisdiction?

-Transitional justice is full of heartbreaking compromises and the international community and the Venezuelan people will have to determine the degree of impunity they are willing to tolerate in order to achieve a peaceful and democratic transition. In the process, the United States should not undermine the potential amnesty offers of the opposition by threatening to sue Maduro and his rulers.

– Some members of the Democratic Party – as well as members of the Argentine Left and Kirchnerism – have defined Guaidó's proclamation as a coup led by the United States. Do you think they would have supported it if the Trump government had not been at the forefront of the international community?

– A handful of far-left Democrats, who do not represent the current with the broadest consensus of the party and are generally not familiar with the Latin-American conjuncture, have called American support for Guaidó a coup attempt d & # 39; State. These notions are without foundation. That said, we can forgive their skepticism about Trump's foreign policy in Venezuela. After all, outside of Venezuela, the White House has been completely indifferent to human rights abuses and authoritarianism.

– Why do you think Trump chose Elliott Abrams as special envoy to Venezuela? Could this be detrimental to bipartisan consensus?

-The designation of Abrams unnecessarily polarizes the crisis when unity is most needed. At the same time, the aggressive rhetoric of the government keeps its natural allies – both in the North American Congress and in the rest of Latin America – who hate Maduro but oppose an American invasion.

-In a recent interview with Estadão He said that "a US-led military intervention is unlikely but not impossible." Do you think there is something that could be the last straw for the US government? In your opinion, what would be the response of the international community?

–An American invasion would be reckless, given the possible loss of life; damage to Venezuelan infrastructure; potential chaotic resistance of collectives; and safe damage to broad consensus in Latin America and Europe regarding the crisis. But Trump is impatient, prone to improvising and unwilling to take advice from a qualified staff. Sometimes he seems to be looking casus belli. For example, endangering the security of US diplomats by rejecting Maduro's request to withdraw them and threatening to badault the embbady.

– Do you think the Obama administration would have reacted in a similar way to the crisis?

– Unlike the Trump government, The White House under the leadership of Obama was a staunch supporter of human rights and democratic standardsand had a strong predilection for multilateral responses to crises. Although the focus on Venezuela contrasts with Trump's foreign policy, it looks like in this case the Obama style. That said, the Obama administration would have done different things in two important ways: would not have threatened an invasion and would have provided more support to the millions of Venezuelans who fled the collapse of their homeland.