Afghanistan: why the overwhelming Taliban advance took place and what are the global consequences

I was trying to understand what was going on in the discussion between two commanders of the village of Pol-i-Sakh when I heard that They hammer a Kalashnikov behind me. When I turn around I see a boy no older than 15 trying to charge his A / 47. I was lucky. No shots were fired at him and another more experienced militiaman lowered his gun and sent him outside the tin, wood and adobe shed where the negotiations were taking place. It was December 2001 and the Taliban were fleeing Kabul towards the mountains of the Hindu Kush range. Those who argued harshly were the leader of a local pro-Taliban armed force of about 30 or 40 men and a pro-Western Northern Alliance column that persecuted Islamist extremists who two days earlier had lost. power in Kabul. The translator was trying to tell me what was going on, even though the attitudes were clear. A “change of jacket” was taking place there.

Fifteen minutes later, everything was settled. The commanders shook hands and smiled for the first time. Local militiamen who until then had supported the Taliban now they joined the ranks of the Northern Alliance and would fight alongside them and their command. A traditional arrangement among the Pashtuns, the majority ethnic group among Afghans. If you can’t beat them join them. The key is compensation. In this case, it is about surviving and receiving food in exchange for continuing the fight under the command of the “enemy”. In many other cases, there is money at stake or continue the hashish trade or a local post for the commander and his men. Religious, political or ethical issues are not addressed.

This is the same situation that occurs today in Afghanistan and that somehow explains the relentless advance of Taliban forces to regain power in Kabul. They already control 75% of the country’s territory. In three days, they conquered the second and third cities, Kandahar and Herat. Ghazni too, 150 kilometers from the capital and very close to where I could see the negotiation twenty years ago. The speed of the Taliban’s advance surprised many. Regional capitals fell like dominoes. The Afghan government, the product of an alliance backed by the United States after the 2001 invasion, is already struggling without much force to maintain control of power. A leaked US intelligence report estimated that Kabul could be attacked in a few weeks, and that the government could fall in less than 90 days.

Government forces of some 300,000 troops have been trained by the US military and its NATO allies. This includes the Afghan army, the air force and the police. But, despite the fact that in Washington they continue to ensure that they have left “a well-armed and trained army”, has a long history of victims, desertions and corruption, with some commanders adding hundreds and thousands of “ghost soldiers” to the payroll to keep their salaries. In his latest report to the United States Congress, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan expressed his “serious concern about the corrosive effects of corruption… and the questionable accuracy of the data on the actual strength of the force ”. Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) told the BBC that “Even the Afghan army does not know, nor has it ever known, how many soldiers it has.” The Afghan “air force” has 211 combat aircraft and its pilots have been trained at American and European bases. But the reality is that half of the devices are in bad condition and they are taken apart to use the operable parts; pilots fail to work in UAE commercial aviation.

Afghanistan is a mosaic of ethnic groups (Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.) who preserve their traditions and maintain their loyalty only to their group. For example, it is difficult for a Pashtun to obey the orders of a superior of another ethnicity. And when they send a soldier to areas where he has no cultural or family connection, most of the desert to return to their families. There are other very well trained and high morale special army commandos, but there are only about 2,000 or 3,000.

The Taliban’s hard core is around 60,000 fighters, but with the sum of the regional groups they reach the 200,000 and they continue to recruit forces in every territory they conquer. Mike Martin, a former Pashtun-speaking British army officer and conflict historian, says the Taliban cannot be defined as one monolithic group. “They are more of a coalition of independent, loosely affiliated, and most likely temporary franchise holders.” They are fragmented into local groups which frequently change sides. Taliban militiamen have basic equipment still preserved from when they fought the forces of the Soviet Red Army which had invaded the country in the 1980s. Much of this weaponry was even provided by the American CIA. They also have more sophisticated weapons delivered by the Pakistani secret service, as well as by its Iranian, Russian and Chinese allies.

Ahmed Rachid, the Daily Telegraphy’s correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, is probably the man who knows the most about the Taliban. 21 years ago he wrote a classic about global geopolitics, “The Taliban. Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism”, translated into over 20 languages ​​and sold over 1.5 million copies. I remember that at that time all the journalists who came to Afghanistan carried Rachid’s book in the language of the case under our arms. Now, in a must-see interview with UK newspaper The Independent, he explains the situation like this:

“The Taliban’s strategy has been brilliant. They convinced the Western powers, especially the United States, that they wanted to negotiate with the government in Kabul. And it wasn’t like that. It was wrong. They just wanted to rule out the western powers and they got it right. Second, no one expected this offensive: neither the US army, nor the UN, nor NATO, nor the EU … And it is clear that the strategy is not the work of the Taliban alone, but rather have the support of Pakistan. It reminds me a lot of 1996, when the Taliban devised a new strategy and did it with the help of many elements in Pakistan. They surprised everyone. And everything indicates that the government will fall. If they take all the cities around Kabul and the ports, it is difficult for the government to survive. They depend on importing food from abroad. They will block the access and if they do, the situation will be very serious and the government will fall. If they cannot guarantee access to food, the population will be indignant and rebellious”.

The money needed for such an offensive, the Taliban are receiving its allies, Iran, Russia, Pakistan and China. Iran sees itself as a regional power and sees Afghanistan in its own sphere of influence. The town of Herat and the entire southwestern Afghan border have a long persian tradition. Russia also has similar aspirations and builds on the former Soviet republics which reach the border of this country like Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, whose majority ethnic groups extend in the region. China, which has tried to mediate for the Taliban to share power with the current Afghan government without success, but which maintains its key alliance with the mullahs that it received with great fanfare a few days ago in Beijing. Its interest is above all the exploitation of the important Afghan mining wealth. China risks being the big winner of this new Great Game. And there is always Pakistan, which also has aspirations for regional power and which is officially involved and not so much in Afghan affairs. Its main objective is contain india so that it does not expand or enter with its economic interests in Afghanistan.

And the most visible direct consequence to the west of the Taliban offensive will surely be a new wave of refugees who will inevitably reach the gates of Europe creating a new and serious migratory conflict in Greece and Italy. Young university students, women and professionals know that they will not be able to live freely under a new Taliban regime and will try to reach lands with better prospects.

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