Behind the collapse of the Afghan army: illicit agreements and massive desertions

The dramatic collapse of the Afghan army that allowed Taliban fighters to reach the gates of Kabul on Sunday despite 20 years of training and billions of dollars in US aid It started with a series of deals negotiated in rural villages between the militant group and some of lower-ranking Afghan government officials.

Offers, initially offered at the beginning of last year, are often were described by the Afghan authorities as a ceasefire, but the leaders taliban In reality they offered money in exchange for the handing over of arms by government forcesaccording to an Afghan official and an American official.

Over the next year and a half, meetings progressed to the district level and then rapidly to provincial capitals, culminating in an impressive series of deliveries negotiated by government forces, according to interviews with more than a dozen Afghan, police, special operations officers. troops and other soldiers.

Over the past week, more than a dozen provincial capitals have fallen to the Taliban with little to no resistance. In the early hours of Sunday, the government-owned town of Jalalabad surrendered to militants without shooting, and security forces in neighborhoods surrounding Kabul simply disappeared. Within hours, Taliban forces arrived unopposed at the four main entrances to the Afghan capital.

The pace of the military collapse surprised many US officials and other foreign observers, forcing the US government to dramatically speed up its efforts to withdraw staff from its embassy in Kabul.

The Taliban have capitalized on the uncertainty caused by the February 2020 agreement reached in Doha, Qatar, between the militant group and the United States calling for a full American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some Afghan forces have realized that they will soon be unable to rely on American air power and other crucial battlefield support and have become receptive to Taliban approaches.

“Some just wanted the money,” an Afghan special forces official said of those who first agreed to meet with the Taliban. But others saw the US commitment to full withdrawal as a “guarantee” that militants would return to power in Afghanistan and wanted to secure their place on the winning side, he said. The officer spoke on condition of anonymity because, like others in this report, he was not authorized to release information to the press.

The Doha deal, designed to end the war in Afghanistan, instead left many Afghan forces demoralized, underscoring the corrupt impulses of many Afghan officials and their tenuous loyalty to the country’s central government. Some police officers complained that they had not been paid for six months or more.

“They saw this document as the end”the official said in reference to the majority of Afghans aligned with the government. “The day the agreement was signed, we saw the change. Everyone was paying attention to themselves. It was like (the United States) was letting us fail. “

Deliveries negotiated to the Taliban gradually accelerated in the months following the Doha agreement, according to a US official and an Afghan official. Then, after President Joe Biden announced in April that US forces would unconditionally withdraw from Afghanistan this summer, surrenders began to escalate.

As militants expanded their control, government-occupied neighborhoods were increasingly left without a fight. Kunduz, the first key town to be overrun by militants, was taken a week ago. Days of negotiations led by tribal elders resulted in a surrender agreement that handed the last government-controlled base to the Taliban.

Soon after, negotiations in the western province of Herat resulted in the resignation of the governor, senior officials from the Ministry of Interior and Intelligence and hundreds of soldiers. The deal was done overnight.

“I was so embarrassed,” said a Kabul-based interior ministry official, referring to the handing over of senior interior ministry official Abdul Rahman Rahman to Herat. “I’m just a little person, I’m not that big. If he does this, what should I do? “

During the past month, the southern province of Helmand has also seen a massive surrender. And when Taliban fighters locked themselves in southeastern Ghazni province, its governor fled under Taliban protection before being arrested by the Afghan government on their way back to Kabul.

Several competent and motivated elite units participated in the fight of the Afghan army against the Taliban. But they were often sent as reinforcements to less well-trained police and army units that repeatedly withdrew under pressure from the Taliban.

An Afghan special forces officer stationed in Kandahar who had been assigned to guard a critical border crossing recalled being ordered to surrender by a commander. “We want to fight! If we surrender, the Taliban will kill us. “said the Special Forces officer.

“Don’t fire a single shot,” the commander told them as the Taliban invaded the area, the officer later said. Border police immediately surrendered, leaving the special forces unit alone. A second officer confirmed the memory of his colleague’s events.

Not wanting to surrender or fight for the lowest, the unit lowered its weapons, donned civilian clothes and fled its post.

“I am ashamed of what I did,” said the first officer. But he said if he hadn’t fled, “my own government would have sold me to the Taliban.”

When an Afghan policeman was asked about the apparent lack of motivation of his force, he explained that they did not receive their salary. Several Afghan policemen on the front lines in Kandahar before the city fell said that they hadn’t been paid for six to nine months. The Taliban’s rewards have become increasingly attractive.

“Without the United States, there was no fear of getting caught up in corruption. He took the traitors out of our army, ”said an Afghan policeman.

Several officers from the Kandahar Police Force said that corruption was more responsible for the collapse than incompetence. “Honestly, I don’t think this can be fixed. I think they need something completely new, ”said Ahmadullah Kandahari, a Kandahar police officer.

In the days leading up to the capture of Kandahar earlier this month, the death toll in the police had become visible. Bacha, a 34-year-old police commander, had been in constant retreat for more than three months. He was hunched over and his outfit more tattered. In an interview, he said repeated withdrawals had bruised his pride, but he was not getting paid, which made him feel desperate.

“The last time I saw you, the Taliban were offering $ 150 to any member of the government to surrender and join them,” he told a reporter at the end of the interview. “You know, what’s the price now?” “

He didn’t laugh and several of his men leaned forward, eager to hear the answer.

(c) The Washington Post

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