Concern over BCRA reserves: more than $ 7 billion lost since PASO

However, he warns that this "The dynamics seem worrying, not only because of the speed of the fall (of the reserves), but because of the succession of" unexpected "events: elections, President's reaction, inability to repay short-term debt, REPO payment, etc. ".

In this sense, the report of Álvarez Agis states that "although the foreign exchange market can stabilize around 55 USD / USD, this is the stated objective of the BCRA, the reserve position of the BCRA weakens ". In this regard, he points out that it is the Central Bank, in recent days, the only player to sell and has already lost $ 7.416 million of its reserves since the PASO.

Net reserves, ie those that give the Central Bank the ability to intervene in the market, are a key fact. Pxq defines them as the difference between the gross reserves minus the exchange with China, the dollar reserve deposits, the open position on the futures and Treasury sales for the next six months (which is considerably lower by nowadays and could improve the estimation margin). Since yesterday, he calculates them at $ 14,760 million.

The dynamic exchange rate – IMF – short debt – the change of government will mark the economy until the end of the year, anticipate the report. He considers that the problem of short-term debt has begun to pose a problem, but before that, the problem is obviously the stabilization of the exchange rate. And concludes that "If the government succeeds in the coming days, the next point to watch will be short-term debt."

According to the figures of the pxq, before the elections, the public debt (net of the estimated badets of the public sector) recorded maturities of nearly 11 billion US dollars, to which are added 6 billion US dollars until the end of year. In terms of receipts, IMF disbursements are expected to amount to about US $ 6.5 billion during this period. It should be noted that these maturities are calculated in dollars (whether paid in US dollars or pesos) and are based on the (extreme) badumption of no refinancing of short-term debt, in order to have the worst scenario.

This is not 2001

The book also warns that "if Argentina continues to panic, it could turn a liquidity problem into a solvency problem", but considers that "if the monetary authority and the political authorities manage to stabilize the situation, the The fundamentals are far from indicating a situation similar to that of 2001 ", in a study that takes away the drama from the current situation

The consultant Álvarez Agis estimates that debt maturities in 2001 amounted to 34.4% of GDP. At the same time, it calculates that the current real exchange rate is 87.5% higher than in 2001. With an estimated exchange rate of $ 55 per dollar by 2020, Argentina's gross financial needs equivalent to 8.3% of GDP. And "If we highlight this situation with an exchange rate of 70 USD / USD by 2020, needs reach 9.5% of GDP, a gap of -24.9% compared to the situation in 2001. "