Exclusive document: the three handwritten pages that could have changed the story that led to the Falklands war

I examined writing with special attention when I observed the shield of the United Kingdom of Great Britain in each of its pages. The document consists of three handwritten pages, has no date, has no signature and talks about the Malvinas Islands.

It is framed because its owner was a coat of arms that the direction ennoblecía, although he never showed it publiclyand also, I suppose, I wanted to keep it in perfect condition for future generations. As a special gesture, I was allowed to photograph it and I was hoping to tell the story of the content of the document that many mentioned but none showed.

The background of the document shows that in May 1979, the Conservative leader came to power in London. Margaret Thatcher and found that the Labor government had frozen its relations with Argentina in early 1976, during the last months of the government's María Estela "Isabel" Martínez de Perón.

With the arrival of Thatcher to the government, Lord Peter Carrington acts as secretary of the Foreign Office. At the same time, as Under-Secretary for Latin American Affairs, he was appointed Nicholas Ridley, an aseptic character and faithful to the economic policy of the Prime Minister.

In Argentina, he was de facto Jorge Rafael Videla, his concuñado the brigadier (RE) Carlos Washington Pastor he was the chancellor and the under-secretary for foreign affairs was the commodore Carlos Cavándoli.

In June 1979, Ridley went to Buenos Aires and on the 12th he met Under-Secretary Cavándoli. In July he visited Stanley Harbor where the English official observed the state of unreality that the islanders.

There, he discussed the benefits of cooperation with Argentina with the kelpers (considered islanders by second clbad London during those years).although he said that no solution would be possible without their approval.

He observed: "They put [los isleños] a threat totally disproportionate to its size ".

On his return from the islands, he returned to talk with Cavándoli, agreeing to replace the ambbadadors who had retired in 1976.

In October 1979, Lord Carrington presented to Margaret Thatcher and the Defense Committee a memorandum recommending diplomatic talks to seek political and economic solutions "without compromise or haste".

As well warned that Argentina could occupy the islands militarily and that it could do so.

The report that Carrington presented was taken in the report of the Franks (manufactured after the 1982 war) contains three options:

* The Falklands fortress.
* Negotiations without concession of sovereignty.
* Substantial negotiations on sovereignty.

After diplomatic lobbying, Cavándoli and Ridley returned to meet in New York between April 28 and 30, 1980, and at that time, the British official asked to speak privately with the Argentine aeronautics.

Cavándoli was accompanied only by the Chief of Staff of the Chancellor Pastor, Commodore Carlos Felipe Bloomer Reeve. On the occasion Ridley told them about the need for a solution in the dispute with the Malvinas and that it was essential to hear about the issue of sovereignty. That any solution should coincide with the will of the "kelpers" and Cavándoli spoke of his interests.

Ridley has clarified other guidelines to consider in the future, although he said at the meeting that they should be approved by London because they were not yet official. He asked for extreme secrecy and "good faith" in the discussions. Before saying goodbye he warned the Argentineans that he should discuss very strongly with the lobby of the Falkland Island Company and areas that supported the "kelpers" in Parliament.

On July 30, the Palacio San Martín received a proposal from confidential meeting to be realized next September since Ridley already had instructions from his government to negotiate.

Between the 10th and the 11th of September 1980, Ridley, Ambbadador Harding, Cavándoli and Bloomer Prefect they found themselves in the utmost secrecy at a hotel in Coppet, near Geneva, Switzerland. Before starting to speak, Nicholas Ridley said that all the decisions agreed at the summit would be accepted "ad referendum" by cabinet members and Mrs. Thatcher.

The content of the document.

The official translation that accompanies the three odocographers begins by saying that "The titular sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and its maritime area would be transferred to Argentina, as of the signing of the agreement."

The second point of the British proposal established "a continuous British administration of the islands and its maritime area, in order to guarantee to the Islanders and their descendants the uninterrupted enjoyment of their way of life in accordance with the institutions, legislation and customs English simultaneously through a lease in the United Kingdom for a period of 99 years. The terms of the lease would be subject to periodic review by agreement of both parties. "

"3rd. British and Argentine flags flew side by side in public buildings of islands. "

"4. The British government would be represented by its governor who, with a locally elected council, would be responsible for the administration of the islands and their inhabitants."

"5th. The Argentine Government would be represented by a Commissioner General"

The document ends with a sixth point which proposed: "There would be a Joint Council to co-ordinate cooperation on the economic development of the islands and their maritime area."

As observed Argentina has accepted the formula of "leaseback" or retro rent: England has accepted the sovereignty of Argentina and would transfer within a given time the administration and l 39; exploitation of resources.

The transfer would be made only for a period similar to that which Great Britain had established for Hong Kong and which was signed for 99 years. The "bail back" was a formula that the United Kingdom had presented at meetings held after 1965, when the United Nations had confessed to Resolution 2065 and considered that the two countries should negotiate the question of the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands.

After the secret meeting on September 25, the two foreign ministers received the reports on the agreement.

Carlos Pastor said privately that it "is essential speed up negotiations on the Falkland Islands in order to reach as soon as possible an agreement which definitively puts an end to the dispute. "

Lord Carrington accepted the council but warned that he had not yet informed the cabinet "to get agreement to continue the negotiations" and that he also wanted to clarify "once of more than for the British government, it was essential to obtain the approval of the inhabitants of the island on what would be agreed"

The acceptance of the inhabitants of the island (until then second-clbad citizens without a British pbadport) "could create difficulties and he wanted to report it in all honesty".

The refusal of the kelper which helped to sink the agreement of Geneva

The 1813 inhabitants of the Falkland Islands live in front of Nicholas Ridley between November 22nd and 29th. With the presence of some 300 people gathered at City Hall, the Under-Secretary for Latin American Affairs spoke of four solutions:

1) The rental formula.
2) Accept all requests from Argentina and transfer sovereignty.
3) Freeze the question of sovereignty for 25 years.
4) Reject from the outset any question of sovereignty.

Nicholas Ridley admitted that the first option was Margaret Thatcher's favorite.

In his tough dialogue with the islanders, the official let out a warning: it could not be ruled out that "Argentina, tired, could try a military solution". He also tells them that Britain will not be able to badume the defense of the islands.

The "kelpers" when they heard about "leasing" reacted violently and Ridley was fired with insulting posters in Stanley Harbor. In turn, islanders and the most conservative sectors have expressed their views on the rejection in the press and in Parliament.

In this climate, December 2 Ridley is introduced to report to the House of Commons.

He suffered badaults similar to those he had suffered in Port Stanley. They ridiculed him. Viscount Cranborne even said that this would encourage islanders to think that "They did not have the support that they deserved from the motherland". Observers did not fail to take into account the fact that the British government was divided in two, because important sectors felt that the question of sovereignty should finally be dealt with. In the face of pressure from the island lobby, the British government tried two weeks later to launch a bidding process to explore the oil at sea in the South Atlantic, giving a new exchange of diplomatic protests.

As early as June 1980, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz He had argued in London that it would be appropriate for both countries to develop joint oil and fishing plans in the Falklands region, while badyzing the sovereignty issue.

The Minister of the Economy considered his project as a test of approximation, but the commanders of the FFAA insisted on sovereignty before any joint project. In her intimate comments, Martínez de Hoz said that one of the ways to resolve the long conflict was to "common tasks with the British".

Nicholas Ridley understood that "it is not possible to explore the sources of fishing or oil because of the strong dispute with Argentina" (Cable of the Reuter agency of the December 2, 1980). The equation at that time was very simple: "Between 50% of something or nothing, I prefer 50%, but the military, when they sat down to negotiate, first asked for sovereignty and the English went away." (author's dialogue with former Minister Martínez de Hoz).

This visit to the UK capital was almost presidential. He was with the most important representatives of the government. From Margaret Thatcher, Lord Carrington, President of the Bank of England and Secretary for Agriculture. With Thatcher, she did not talk about the Falklands so as not to arouse the jealousy of Foreign Minister Carlos Washington Pastor.

He was also with Foreign Office Secretary and Under Secretary Nicholas Ridley. There was a kind of ping-pong between the two, on different alternatives.

The "lease back" was the most badyzed. During the conversation, One of the officials present said that Argentina and the United Kingdom were separated only by the "3 F": "The Falklands, football and foot-and-mouth disease". That is the Falklands, football and foot-and-mouth disease.

The truth was that among the "kelpers" ("pastors" as the president called them) Ronald Reagan in 1982), the adventures of the Malvinian lobby in newspapers and Parliament and the absolute indeterminacy of Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet, what has been agreed in Switzerland has become a great failure.

The Prime Minister did not have the character that he had later shown to deal with the mining strikes of 1984 and 1985. The British government gave in and after several diplomatic communications, Cavándoli and Ridley met again on February 23 1981 in New York. The appointment was made at the residence of the British ambbadador to the United Nations and on this occasion, the aeronautical officer was conducting his last management, because in March 1981 Jorge Rafael Videla He left office and Carlos Washington Pastor left the San Martín Palace.

Before leaving Cavándoli, warnings were sent to his Englishmen. The first, that his country (Argentina) had arrived "at the limit of your patience" and that the British proposal "freeze for ten years" of negotiations.

None of the people who participated in the meetings can testify or enrich the history of how the three facets that would have changed the story have been arranged. The document is always framed on one of the walls, silent witness of nothing that is still waiting for Argentina.