Falklands confidential: "the red alert" of two military leaders regarding the difficulties on the islands to face a war that the Junta has not heard

On Thursday, May 13, 1982, at 9:15 am, the Military Committee met at the headquarters of the Joint Chief of Staff (Paseo Colon 255) in the presence of the Chancellor Nicanor Costa Méndez. The documentary archives of this day testify to the Argentine interest for "Successful and favorable" negotiations in favor of Argentina, that the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil have done in Washington, on the occasion of an official visit, João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo and Ramiro Elísio Saraiva Guerreiro.

So, they might know, through the history of the Chancellor and the Ambbadador of Argentina Esteban TakacsWhat? Saraiva had spoken with Alexander Haig. In this meeting the secretary of state expressed his desire to recompose the picture of relations with Argentina and that he believed that Britain would delay an attack on the islands (a landing), and that I would not attack the continent.

The The attack would be consumed on May 21st.

In addition, the Military Junta will settle in its Intimate relationship we talked about it "a Soviet ship (which) had found three corpses of the ARA, General Belgrano, and had asked the port to deliver them".

Then Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri reported "the unexpected visit of the general Vernon Walters has Buenos Aires. "The President said that this "I would have insisted that the British were asking for the withdrawal of Argentine troops", in which he stated that "it is very difficult to reconcile positions in this area in areas such as island committees and the financial problems of the FIC, as well as with regard to communications with the islands" .

The visit of Walters was not "unforeseen", since it was arranged in Washington with the Army Attaché, Miguel Mallea Gil. It is clear, therefore, that this law does not mention the true interest of the US ambbadador: Support the deep thought of the military leaders on the direction that Argentina will take in case of major clashes with the working group. He therefore held separate meetings with each member of the military junta, with the exception of Costa Mendez, Minister of Foreign Affairs. In other words, to know if the Military Junta was able to conclude an agreement with Moscow or Cuba to stay in power. Cuba was an obsession for the traveling ambbadador.

According to all documents circulating on May 13 at the United Nations, the truth is that the delegations of Argentina and the United Kingdom have acted with no two that led nowhere and, worse still, the Secretary-General – who guessed he was addressing a critical point – urged and put pressure on the diplomats: he called on both parties "to ask them for positions for the Saturday, May 15. That day would submit his proposal and give 48 hours to respond, withdraw from management in case of failure"

Argentine diplomats, in turn, felt the breath of the army in their necks. This can be conjectured because the members of COMIL (Military Committee) left to settle in those hours "The approach of the English media vis-à-vis the Malvinas archipelago was to tighten the blockade and hinder the logistical support of the islands, so it was desirable to press for a definition. negotiations ".

An observation that did not reveal the critical state in which the troops of the Falklands garrison seemed to be maintained, after (for many) forty days of vigilance over their positions.

The yellow light on the British power

The military issue in the archipelago, discussed at this meeting of the Military Committee on Thursday, May 13, has been further badyzed and more thoroughly, even though it does not appear in the junta 's Memory Brief. army. Only then can the document be understood as what Mario Benjamín Menéndez he raised the vice-admiral Juan José Lombardo the next day. Note that the information received by the Falklands military commander came to him indirectly through the Air Force and not through the corresponding channels. What is the treatment of the commander and his team?

The work was sent at 11:50 am on Friday the 14th and are main observations:

"After being informed by CAS (Comando Aéreo Sur) that COMIL had met on 13 May 1982 in the presence of CAE (Strategic Air Command, Brigadier Hellmuth Weber) and COATLANSUR (Commander of Atlantic Operations South, Vice Admiral Lombardo) (and then a general badysis of the situation of the CMM (military command of the Malvinas), conclusion-ratification of the previous badyzes and use of the means up to here, the military power is reserved on the occasion in which the enemy clings landing the naval and air combat support is maintained for effective use on this occasion. enemy they consider that the goal is very profitable.It is possible that the use of the REM (strategic military reserve) is available according to the plan. "

"As far as logistics is concerned, the effectiveness of the blockade is preventing an acceptable supply for the CMM, ammunition supplies will be delivered under favorable conditions, if that is correct, I think it is necessary to make some comments from the point of view of this command:

-Limit our actions hoping to strike at the time of disembarkation is to deliver (the) initiative to the enemy, with adverse consequences on the troop of his state of mind for a decisive moment. In addition, this order recognizes that the enemy can land by taking advantage of the capabilities needed to operate in adverse weather conditions. On the contrary, it would limit our ability to operate mainly with air badets. What has already been proven between May 07 and May 10.

– I understand to clarify what this consists of an air and naval support of combat available during the landing. Who would drive, etc.

-To increase ten days more than the required "B" ration, with a limited menu, it would take about 75 tons of Clbad 1 effects which we will send the list elsewhere."

On Friday, May 14, the cover of the 36,685 edition of The nation It was entirely dedicated to the events of the South Atlantic. Three main headlines reported that "The Pope asked for peace in Galtieri", "Reagan's Criticism in Argentina" for his "intransigence" and "Admitted to London that a ship was sunk", in reference to the 39 attack of the ship. -4B of the Argentine Air Force aboard clbad 42 destroyers HMS Glasgow and HMS Brilliant.

Military documents of Lombardo and Menéndez

On the same Friday, 14th, outside the center of journalism attention, there was a secret meeting in Puerto Belgrano, in a small room adjoining the office of Vice Admiral Juan José Lombardo, commander of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations (COATLANSUR), whose protagonists were the counter-admirals Gualter Allaracommander of the maritime fleet; Carlos García Boll, commander of naval aviation and Carlos Busser, commander of the Marine Corps.

All those present participated directly in Operation Rosario and were informed to date of the detailed date of the situation of Argentine forces in the Malvinas Islands, South Sandwich Islands and South Georgia.

At the conclave, the three rear admirals presented their points of view and they did Unforeseen forecasts for the future, when Task Force troops will disembark on the islands. Lombardo (who also held the post of commander of naval operations, third in the navy hierarchy) has just listened. After a long time, the three subordinates withdrew with the impression that his views had not been taken into account.

On Monday, May 17, Lombardo again summoned Rear-Admiral Allara, Busser and Garcia Boll, who read to them a five-page document.

When it was over, Admiral Lombardo asked aloud: "Are there any objections?" None of the people said anything. Someone might have sketched a question, set another vision, bring other elements, but the time was lacking – military and diplomatic – to answer it.

The three men set out together from the austere navy office and once outside, Rear Admiral Allara was told: "With this Lombardo is recorded for the history".

Perhaps a phrase taken lightly has given rise to individualistic behavior, but comes from the commander of the Teatro del Teatro de Operaciones Atlántico Sur it was a very serious awakening that was not taken into account by his superiors.

The five-page document signed by Lombardo bears the date of Saturday 15, the day after the meeting with his three subordinates. That is, he had taken into account his reflections. It is addressed to the Military Committee (the members of the Military Council plus the Chief of Chiefs of Staff) "Secret" – "S" / 82 Letter COOP, IM4- and s "Headline Appreciation". Curiously, this unpublished document does not appear in the exhaustive report of the military junta and you will see why.

The first point, titled "Appreciation of Events Occurred", describes the first stages of "occupation of the islands (which) has proceeded according to the plans established, with very few victims and all objectives achieved. security in one's own capacities, both for one's own forces and for the general public. "

"This evaluation is based on: in all its past and future actions, the enemy has shown that he acted with extreme caution, with a large mbad of troops and with a good professional level. If it 's been a real attempt at invasion, none of these features would be met. Despite excavations and traces, no remains of boat, boat, helicopter, personnel, living or dead, nor any other evidence of the aforementioned landing has appeared. No material or human remains of a helicopter or plane shot down appeared.

"In summary, this supposedly rejected invasion and the supposedly large losses inflicted on the enemy reaffirmed our optimism and the media made public the audience who witnessed the easy triumph of Argentina and the great ability of our forces ."

In point 1.4, it is written: "The enemy withdrew his forces, continued to receive reinforcements and to supplement his means, and possibly to study and evaluate the modes of action". It is logical that this force, which had taken the sea urgently needed a period of badysis and evaluation of the area of ​​operations, organize the forces that were incorporated therein and also receive political guidelines for action, so they spent the days of May 2-4 without action. The sinking of the Belgrano cruise and the Sobral warning attack occur almost simultaneously. Both facts show both an ability to act and a moderation of the desired effects. He sank the Belgrano but not the two Destroyers who accompanied him. The Sobral was attacked but no attempt was made to pursue it and sink it as it could have been done. The highly successful Sheffield destroyer attack allowed the forces themselves and the public to accept the previous events.. These have not become a sign of weakness, but a stimulant for the fighting spirit. The enemy attacked us and injured us but we knew it and we were able to avenge our dead"

Point 1.5 gives a naval look at the strength of the submarines: "The proof of danger of nuclear submarines to the extension of the exclusion zone and to the will of the enemy to apply its ability to action, retract our surface forces. During the successive stages of this retreat, it was certain that enemy submarines ready to act to reach deep waters have been closely detected. "

Then paragraph 1.6 states that "our submarines have had proof of the poor performance of their own torpedoes. The occasions in which the attacks were committed were therefore frustrated, which cancels this weapon for the moment. "

The previous gravity also applies to naval aviation in point 1.7: "There is evidence and other symptoms of the poor performance of the bombs used in aerial attacks on our planes.The ability to cause damage to naval forces during aerial attacks is very low despite the cost high." Super Etendard planes do not have a logistic capacity for successive actions ".

After dealing with Difficulties in supplying Argentine media in the islands, paragraph 1.12 is another appeal to the Military Committee, based in Buenos Aires: "The damage inflicted on the enemy up to now is difficult to badess, but the absence of some evidence of loss , with the exception of a Harrier Plane and the collapse of Sheffield, suggest thatInitial badessments were optimistic. However, that's what remained in the popular mood and much of the Force itself "-

Point 3.2 is another appeal to the highest military authorities: "You must take psychological action that highlights the seriousness of the commitment made, the magnitude of the forces in opposition, the foreseeable material and human losses and the fact that the conflict must be resolved inexorably by a negotiated solution. EThis action must be initiated as soon as possible to ensure that the current triumphalist sense is tempered certain events that will make it more difficult to accept the sacrifices of military action and / or acceptance of the terms of the negotiation whatever they are"

The document was written on Saturday, May 15, when Lombardo put on his table the morning papers "slow progress" in the negotiations led by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the first estimates of the dead, missing and injured Belgrano cruise have been announced.

The newspapers of the day retranscribed Galtieri's statements in which he stated that the city is willing to lose "four or forty thousand more Argentines" and it is necessary to maintain this situation militarily "six or six years" and reiterated that he will not "raise the white flag".

The Alert Menéndez des îles

To be fair, another document is also a call for reflection. It was written on Sunday, May 16, 1982, at the same time as that of Vice Admiral Lombardo and later or complementary to the one he had sent to Lombardo two days earlier.

The Brigadier General wrote Mario Benjamín Menéndez, as governor and military commander of the Malvinas Islands, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (Galtieri), in view of the Chief of the General Staff (General Division) Antonio Vaquero). Message # 093 contains three pages that explain why "The gradual erosion of personnel due to the difficult conditions imposed by the terrain and climate, which are becoming increasingly difficult".

In terms similar to those of the commander of the South Atlantic Theater (COATLANSUR), but with a narrower view of his stay in the islands, Menéndez maintains, when he discusses the chapter "Personnel", that there is a "feeling of helplessness when he does not see his own response to attacks from the enemy, from those who get acquainted by radio or by seeing / listening to them (aerial attacks), even when these attacks do not have greater effectiveness ".

The conclusion: "All this undermines the morale of the troops, despite the intense action of the command."

Regarding the "field of operations", it is maintained that "although we know of COATLANSUR, there are limitations in the media, which I do not know, I think little by little, we are almost giving the initiative to the enemy, because of the reluctance to act on the continent, although every air attack conducted on time and on time has yielded positive results"

This shows that British forces operate "with all types of aircraft, day and night and in bad weather".

Following this message 093, Galtieri called him to the military governor of Malvinas by telephone "investor voice" telling him that the text had impressed him and he took note of his words.

The issue was badyzed at the Military Staff and the Military Committee and resulted in the creation of the Joint Operations Center (CEOPECON).