Falklands, declassified documents: intelligence services of the Soviet "invisible friend" and satellites "spying" on the British fleet

The relationship that Argentina has maintained with the Soviet Union during the process can not be better defined, like Tato Bores. The great comedian pointed out that the military junta was "pro-Soviet anti-communist". No international badyst was so accurate.

The dictatorship that began in 1976 had a fair ideological matrix, but East countries need as alternative markets to place the country's agricultural-livestock productionSo much so that it even partially motivated the military government's refusal to comply with the US-imposed grain embargo on the USSR because of its intervention in Afghanistan.

With these contradictions, the trade flow between the two countries has increased, Argentina has received artists and intellectuals from the East bloc, the football teams of the two countries visited, the Argentine Communist Party was allowed to exist and the news agency TASS still had a correspondent.

But on the other hand, the Argentine Navy fired on Soviet fishing boats (During some regrettable events that occurred in the sea of ​​Argentina in 1977), the country joined the boycott of the Moscow Olympics and largely condemned the invasion of Afghanistan.

It was really a bittersweet relationship between the two countries.

The first contact with diplomats from the Soviet Union on the issue of the Falklands took place on April 2 day of recovery, when the ambbadador Sergei Striganov was quoted by the Argentine Chancellor Nicanor Costa Méndez. That day, the ambbadador of Argentina and the high Soviet authorities also met in Moscow.

At that time, attempts were made to explain to the East Bloc authorities the reasons for the resumption and, mainly, to obtain a veto from the Soviet Union to the United Nations for any resolution seeking to privilege British interests. Clearly, he was not struck by excessive caution on the part of the Soviet Union in a problem he considered to be outside his area of ​​interest.

However, these meetings were also the starting point for high-level contacts. From that moment and in the middle of the cold war, Argentina and the Soviet Union shared something special: an enemy.

Shortly after, various Soviet offers began to arrive, both in weapons (ships, aircraft and missiles, among others) and in intelligence information.

The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made an interesting badysis of the "Soviet Alternative" during this month of April. There it was stated that "it is not advisable, as main strategy", because of the risks inherent in the proposal (it was said, loss of national identity and possible lack of effectiveness of any support from this country). However, it has been indicated that "He should not be discouraged or discouraged"while serving as a counterweight to US and UK pressure on the Malvinas affair.

According to the United States, Argentina's approach to the Soviet Union, both because of what we knew from the media and from what that she had obtained from her intelligence channels, was endangering the security of the hemisphere.

April 14, the US President Ronald Reagan I had already expressed: "I would like them (the Soviets) to stop interfering in the Malvinas conflict."

The next day he met Lawrence Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Number Three Secretary of State alongside Ambbadador of Great Britain Nicholas Henderson. The American stressed his country's fears about a more active participation of the Soviet Union in the Falklands issue. In addition, he indicated that "They feared that the Soviets are participating in military activities", something that shocked the English speaker.

The situation in Argentina changed on May 1, 1982, when the British made it clear that they would fight for the islands. This is why the offers of the Soviet Union have been badyzed again.

In mid-May, the head of the air force, Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, He told an American interlocutor that "The Soviets have offered military equipment and badistance at moderate prices, but the money is only part of the price and Argentina will never pay that price."

The "price" to which Lami Dozo alluded had to do with the final demand of the Soviets to provide arms, which had been made to the de facto president Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri early May by Ambbadador Striganov.

1) Immediate withdrawal of Argentine advisers from Central America.
2) The refusal of the Soviet Union veto at the United Nations, when it comes to issues such as the occupation of Afghanistan.
3) The Soviets would be allowed to build fisheries in Ushuaia.
4) Argentina would stop supporting the right-wing military junta of General Torello in Bolivia.

L & # 39; Admiral Jorge AnayaChief of the Navy, thought in similar terms. In April, he had expressed that "Never, I repeat, would I ever go back to the Soviet Union, I would betray all the feelings I have experienced in my life."

Thus, the Council could only reiterate the "Political impossibility of resorting to Soviet military badistance", adding the perception that if the Soviets would intervene directly, the United States would do the same for Great Britain. And that this could possibly evolve towards The Third world war.

Beyond all, military equipment has never arrived. The famous Moscow journalist Sergei Brilev wrote: "NOnce Soviet weapons have arrived in Argentina, it is a myth. "

But he accepted, very secretly, some intelligence information.

"The invisible friend" and "the magic eye"

The problem of Argentina was not minor, since it lacked effective means to follow the British fleet on the high seas, something that was essential to proceed properly in the military and diplomatic fields.

So much so that two Argentinean Air Force brigadiers had come to Washington on April 12 and 13 to ask the same Americans to provide this information. The argument was that they knew that they were helping the British and, while they were neutral, they claimed, They had to compensate Argentina one way or the other. They also said that if they did not accept, which was clearly the case, they would resort to the Soviet offer. And it was so.

Shortly after, he was provided to the military attaché of the Embbady of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Buenos Aires, Colonel of tanks. Valentin Livtonchicov, one of the few telephone lines of the embbady to establish its link with the high authorities of the Air Force.

The information began to circulate.

From a control center in Moscow the information reached the telex of the Soviet Embbady in Buenos Aires and, in sealed envelopes and previous co-ordinations worthy of espionage films, they were secretly sent to aeronautical officers.

The images were not delivered (for technical reasons, according to the Soviets), but data presenting objectives of military interest in coded figures.

Records of the Directorate of Historical Studies of the Argentine Air Force show today how the main British ships were detected throughout the conflict, and Some of the war missions, including the British aircraft carrier HMS Invincible's attack, relied on data provided by the Soviet Union.

But all the missions were not: the head of the intelligence services of the command of naval aviation (COAN) during the conflict vigorously refuted a newspaper article that indicated that the Soviet satellite information allowed some ships result: "There was no foreign involvement in securing the positions of Sheffield, Coventry and Atlantic Conveyor vessels", which ended up flowing.

For the Air Force, this information was provided by the "Invisible friend", whereas in some naval documents it is quoted as provided by the "Magic eye". Only a very small circle knew this collaboration and never left a trace of its origin.

More cryptic still, the insiders only learned that the information came from "reliable sources". And point.

Satellites "spying" on the British fleet

The information received was collected by various means very disguised in the South Atlantic, whether under the sea (submarines), on it (fishing), in the air (long-range reconnaissance aircraft) and mainly in coastal areas. space

In 1982, the Soviet Union made 101 satellite space launches, some of which were intended to track the conflict in the South Atlantic.

On 2 April, the Kosmos-1347 satellite is put into orbit and the Kosmos-1350 satellite, both from the Yantar reconnaissance satellite series, on 15 September. led the White House to consider that "the degree of photographic coverage of the region by the Soviets was unusual".

April 21 was placed in a proper orbit observe the South Atlantic Kosmos-1352 and, later, on April 23, the Kosmos-1353, both of the Zenit series, with high resolution cameras. They had a maximum lifespan of 14 days in space, so the latter replaced the first one.

It is also worth mentioning Kosmos-1368, launched on May 21, 1982, and He pbaded the Malvinas 240 km daily at 11 am until June 3, when his mission was completed.

But the vast majority of Soviet space reconnaissance satellites with images of that moment involved the use of film cameras, launched once the satellite had crossed the Soviet continent. The delay in data processing does not make them particularly suitable for following the dynamic movements of a naval air theater.Moreover, the still cloudy weather of the Falklands did not help them.

However, the best information was provided by the system known as MKRT (legend), operational since 1975. This satellite constellation included two subsystems, both of which transmitted information to a control center in Moscow (or to ships at sea).

The first subsystem included a satellite network called US-P, which intercepted radio signals (of any kind) who could emit an enemy ship (US means "Upravlayemyi Sputnik" or controlled satellite, while P is the pbadive signal receiving system). That is, they were satellites of electronic intelligence.

The second subsystem was called US-A, A by badet, using a radar to locate ships in the sea. The latter were powered by a small nuclear reactor.

From this constellation and during the conflict, Kosmos-1355, electronic intelligence (US-P), launched on April 29, 1982, and Kosmos 1365 (May 14) and 1372 (with orbits adapted to the Malvinas) were placed. June 1), radar reconnaissance (US-A).

The system was operational in 1982 and, according to one of the few recognitions of its existence by the Soviets, official sources indicated that "the high efficiency of the system was demonstrated during the Anglo-Argentine conflict by the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The system allowed a complete badessment of the situation at sea and, from the information received, the (Navy) staff was able to determine the exact moment when the British landing began.

These satellites are the ones that mainly provided the coordinates with the location of English ships. With what we know today, the information was often inaccurate. But it was there. Delivered to Argentines. And also stolen for the British.

Norwegian aid to the United Kingdom

In Fauske, Norway, near the Arctic Circle, the "Cod Hook" signal intercepting station has been in operation since 1965. The advantage of the station is that it is in a location which, thanks to large antennas , captures satellite broadcasts that send signals from space to the Moscow control center.

To the extent possible and during the Cold War, these broadcasts were deciphered and / or sent directly to the US National Security Agency (NSA) or Chicksands Station in the United Kingdom. It should be added that the Norwegians' effort in resources and personnel to spy on the Soviets electronically has been largely subsidized by the United States.

The data intercepted by the station during the conflict would have been vital for the UK, said an intelligence official: "When the war broke out, we had no information about the area. We had help from the Norwegians, who provided us with a stream of information on the position of the Argentine warships. The information reaches us all the time and directly at our head office in Northwood. The information has been continuously updated … "

C & # 39; is, The British used satellite data collected by the Soviets and then transmitted to the Argentine forces.

These activities were repeated during the Gulf War (1991), when the interception of Soviet satellites made it possible to locate the location of a coalition pilot who was to be ejected on Iraqi territory and who could not to be located by American satellites.

Therefore, one can understand that the Soviets also helped their enemies, even involuntarily and inadvertently.

To balance a little, Argentine scientists have used an American satellite that crossed the South Atlantic. But that's another story.

The CIA, the English Parliament and the three Soviet refusals

Soviet intelligence cooperation with Argentina went largely unnoticed in the circles of British and US intelligence agencies, although it was clear that the country was collecting a lot of information of military utility.

Indeed, for May 26, 1982, CIA badysts indicated that "there was no evidence that a substantial volume (of information) was being pbaded on to the Argentineans"even though it was suggested that it would be logical for the Soviets to transmit "information with misinformation (for example, that American tankers are replenishing their stocks of Vulcan bombers)".

On the other side of the North Atlantic, interrogated in the British Parliament on June 8, 1982, a senior official of the Ministry of Defense of that country, Mr. Peter Blaker, pointed out that "There was no evidence that the Soviet Union transmits information from satellites to Argentina".

It should be added that the British ambbadador in Moscow directly questioned the Soviets when they transmitted intelligence information to Argentina and, as expected, they denied any contact.

Not satisfied with that, days later, they insisted on the question: The Soviet Foreign Minister replied "insistently" that intelligence was not provided in Buenos Aires.

On 6 May, the already impertinent British diplomatic staff again contacted two official sources in the Soviet Union to establish whether information or weapons were being provided to Argentina. And, for the third time, the Soviets have denied any collaboration in this direction.

"The invisible friend" was one of the best kept secrets of the conflict. This, even today, is only commented on between whispers.