Maduro does not want to travel in the future

Few people believed it in April 2013, when he won a controversial election in front of

Henrique Capriles

, that the elected

Hugo Chavez

it would last under the presidency. This belief grew with every anti-Chavez protest cycle or with every election won by the opposition.

But

Maduro

He managed to defuse these cycles and deflate this belief. He survived and appropriated the state. He did so without fear of suppressing or persecuting his rivals in and out of Chavez and with money, a lot of money.

Today, their lack of scruples and the decision to use violence to maintain power continue. But money is starting to run out. And that threatens the first scenario that presents the future, the fearless permanence at the Miraflores Palace.

Maduro can try to do with

Guaidó

the same as he did with Capriles or

Leopoldo Lopez

: prosecute with justice, ban it or stop it and hope that mobilization in the street is worn out by fighting in the opposition.

Three factors will complicate this strategy. On one side, Guaidó is a different rival of Maduro, colder, more difficult to clbadify and attack, and with a greater ability to unite opposition.

From the other
international pressure, led by

United States

This time, it is more formal than rhetoric and aims to surround Venezuela in a diplomatic and especially economic way.

The revival of the opposition and the international pressure are exciting groups previously close to Chavismo: the most popular sectors and the average cadres of the armed forces.

The combination of the three factors leaves Maduro stuck, but not quite. The three supports that have allowed it to overcome the most recent challenges remain: the military leaders, China and Russia.

These two governments provide the financial means to survive, while the top officials give Maduro total control of the violence. In return, some of Chavez 's leaders gave them some of the country' s strategic resources, including oil and gold; to others, the management of the two central axes of the current Venezuelan economy, PDVSA and the distribution of food products to a haunted population.

If magic did not help to manage it effectively, the money allowed the allies to remain decisive. Until now …

The six scenarios

Part of the renewed international strategy is to stifle Chavez's finances. The day before yesterday, the Bank of England had prevented officials from Maduro to withdraw $ 1.2 billion in gold. Venezuelan reserves are small and barely 8,000 million dollars, but if each country is blocked, Chavismo will not have any more of its boxes.

The other, the biggest, PDVSA, is also in danger. The company produces about 1.3 million barrels of oil a day, half the time ago. 40% of them are exported to the United States, which represents about $ 32 million a day, which is essential for the survival of a government whose revenues depend exclusively on this company.

Arranged as never before in Maduro, the White House does not rule out an oil embargo on Venezuela, nor the transfer of control of Citgo, a PDVSA subsidiary in the United States, to Guaidó.

In this case, faced with the most dangerous challenge of opposition, millions of Venezuelans are tired of their sudden poverty, without birds or gurus of love and, basically, without dollars, Maduro can he survive this time?

Go try, of course; Navigating this storm like you have already done with others is your first unlikely scenario. But, without money, there is no paradise for leaders and they will have fewer opportunities than in other crises. The last word will be China, Russia and the military leaders.

In the first two countries, Venezuela owes nearly 80,000 million dollars; both of them want to recover their debts. Can they do it with a government located between bankruptcy and deportation?

For its part, the military leaders are already under attack and interrogations of middle management. Without the flow of PDVSA dollars, these cracks will tend to widen and Maduro will run up against other scenarios.

Colonels, captains, lieutenants, thousands of them pbaded to the Venezuelan exodus and, other countries, planned – like the newspaper published yesterday
The New York Times– Take up arms and go up against Chavismo if Maduro does not leave power this year. The Civil War, this is the most feared scenario if Chávez's dolphin persists in power, a possibility that he warned with an unusual alarm yesterday the day before yesterday, Michelle Bachelet.

Such a scenario seems worrying not only for Venezuela, but also for Latin America. The region has not left behind its divisions, but the battles of blood and pain that these fractures can cause.

Opposite to this possibility is the third scenario, that of early elections. A divided military leadership can put pressure on Maduro to accept, one day or another, the European ultimatum that calls for early elections. Or he can make a radical decision: move Maduro and give power to a general or chavist, a fourth scenario.

In both cases, the leader of Chavez will have the necessary margin to stay in Venezuela, not Miraflores Palace, but not in prison either. This could be the fifth scenario if Maduro's stubbornness is faced with angry generals and a street of opponents and chavists united by the same rejection of Chávez's heir.

The scenarios do not stop there. There is a sixth hypothesis: exile. It was Marcos Pérez Jiménez, the last Venezuelan dictator, who fled to the Dominican Republic when the armed forces withdrew his support to form a civil-military government in January 1958. Maduro has already traveled in the future and says he saw it well. Will exile be the future he witnessed? Because there is no magic, no santeria, no Sai Baba possible to give it another scenario.