"Option 13": the secret plan of the British to bomb Buenos Aires during the Falklands war

Faced with the imminence of an Argentine military action in the Falklands, alerted by their own intelligence services and the United States, at a meeting at the British Ministry of Defense in Whitehall, he was presumed that nothing could be done in the short term to prevent it. At that time, the Argentine landing fleet was still navigating towards its ultimate goal: the recovery of the Malvinas Islands.

It was 2 pm, March 31, 1982, in the 5301 building of the Ministry of Defense, when the study of sanctions and retaliation to presume that the threat had been uttered had been undertaken. In the minutes of this meeting, it was included as an opportunity for retaliation against Argentina, the Royal Air Force will conduct air strikes "on Argentine cities or on ships at sea, which should be launched from the Island of Ascension. Without the support of tankers, because of the distance required to approach, the plane should land to carry out its mission on the South American continent, possibly to Montevideo or Santiago . Therefore, in the probable case of refusal of use of aerodromes in South America, attacks on Argentine targets are not achievable"

From here, the Minister of Defense John Nott He had already ordered the launch of a nuclear submarine heading to the South Atlantic and the commitment of two others. The Royal Navy pinned emergency plans for the Falklands and alerted the fleet. The Royal Air Force (RAF) is eager to prepare a plan to bomb targets in Argentina.

At the meeting of Chiefs of Staff of the British Armed Forces on 2 April at 3:10 pm in London (+3 for Buenos Aires), the "possibility of obtaining the badistance of potential allies, especially from Chile, and to a lesser extent from Brazil", for the use of air bases in South America, and the Foreign Office was instructed to obtain "permission to use aerodromes in Chile, if one attempted to deploy RAF aircraft within range the Malvinas Islands ".

At the same time, in the South Atlantic, the last stages of the Operation Rosariowhich would lead to the evacuation of the governor Rex Hunt and the royal endowment of the island marines.

At 9 am on April 3, a new meeting of Chiefs of Staff was held to badess events since the previous day. In its course, it has been reported that Chile had received a request from Argentina banning refueling of United Kingdom ships and aircraft en route to the Falkland Islands, and Brazil would not provide facilities or badistance to the forces. British. engaged in operations against the Argentines.

Despite the intense British diplomatic deployment, on 4 April, the Foreign Office was to inform military commanders that most countries in South America have expressed their support for Argentina. But the British Embbady in Santiago de Chile had reported that "there was the possibility of Chilean support" (Telegram No. 66 of 3 April 1982), it was therefore decided to continue efforts to determine the possibility of using aerodromes in this country.

The RAF would use the old Avro Vulcan bombers, whose phasing out of service was half completed when the crisis erupted. Despite many years devoted to low-nuclear attack operations within NATO, with its large reach and its ability to carry a large number of conventional bombs, it was ideal for the task.

Since the early 1970s, they had not used their conventional bombing capability or in-flight refueling. It was therefore essential to train the crews and capabilities of the aircraft prior to its deployment on the island of Ascension.

The distance to targets in Argentina was greater than what the plane could achieve. It was therefore essential to obtain, in addition to the successive refueling flights, the obtaining of overflight permits and possible landings in the South American countries for the bombing to be effective.

It was entrusted to the Foreign Office to obtain these authorizations allowing him to fly over Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, and thus to ensure the aerial approach to enter the Argentine territory. The foreign ministries of these countries immediately refused permission to the British.

The possibility of operating from Chile was always open. The hours pbaded and planning began to consider sending Vulcan planes from trans-Andean bases for which they had to trace a flight route from their base in Britain to Santiago / Punta Arenas. Faced with the refusal to fly over South America, it was necessary to trace a route involving crossing the North Atlantic, flying over the United States and arriving in Chile from the Pacific.

With these premises, April 8 was published the first project entitled "Vulcan Operations against Argentina's Ascensión", to use these bombers against targets in Argentina. The concept of the operation would be the following:

1 Vulcans at high altitudes, especially during the day, would be extremely vulnerable to known defense forces. It is recommended that operations be considered only at night and at low altitude. The bombing would be by radar and, therefore, the targets should be zone rather than punctual; cities, aerodromes and port facilities would be the best option.

2 The extreme distance separating the Ascension, even from Buenos Aires with its return to Ascension, would require the support of 7 Víctor tankers for a single Vulcan carrying only 7 bombs of 1000 pounds. Ascension missions to targets in or around Buenos Aires, as well as the restoration of the nearest base with Vulcan capacity in Chile, Santiago, would be much cheaper anyway. The tank requirement would be xx Victor for each Vulcan; the last refueling would take place just before the last lights at high altitude with penetration of Argentine airspace in the dark and at low altitude.

3 Once in Santiago, Vulcans will be a very vulnerable target for offensive support missions. Anyway, from this base, conventional attacks could be performed at a low level and without the use of AARs (In-flight refueling). However, significant ground support would be needed in terms of personnel and equipment to support sustained operations.

The report concluded that "a deployment on Ascension and a single operation for each Ascension aircraft is a workable proposition.The maximum capacity of 56 bombs of 1,000 pounds, however, does not have much significance actual, but the rapid and open deployment of the Vulcan to Ascension with visible refueling probes, Victor tanker parked along and announcing that Each Vulcan is capable of carrying 21 1,000-pound bombs and must impose a real and significant threat on Argentina – if they believe we have the will to use them."

An informal consultation between aeronautical officers from Great Britain and Chile resulted in John Heath, The British ambbadador to Santiago de Chile announced, by secret telegram No. 89 of April 9, that "General Lopez, chief of operations of the Chilean Air Force (FACH), had transmitted the message through Griffin's intermediary the FACH is eager to help us and expects to have to receive British planes in case of emergency, for example, damaged in combat"

But anticipating Argentine reprisals on Chilean aerodromes, the aid would have its conditionsThe message continued: "Due to the weakness of air defenses in southern airfields, especially Punta Arenas and Balmaceda, the FACH urgently needs the following elements, in anticipation of a possible attack from the Argentina: (a) 4 or 5 Bofors 40/70 (used) Bofors anti-aircraft units, b) 2 Bloodhound units. "

Heath stated in the telegram that "the FACH would be ready to buy them immediately by commercial contract and at a normal price, and to send a C-130 tomorrow in the United Kingdom if necessary to recover them." Bloodhound in particular, the FACH would be ready to receive British experts dressed without insignia to operate the units, which is normal for similar commercial contracts for new weapons. "

The British diplomat called for an immediate response to these possibilities and the need to be able to have information for the April 12 meeting convened by the Commander-in-Chief of the FACH, General of the Air. Fernando Matthei Aubel, in which "the subject will surely be raised".

The message was music to the ears of British aeronautics officers. They would have a base a few hundred kilometers from the Argentine bases and the possibility of bombing Buenos Aires began to take shape.

But General Augusto Pinochet made it clear to his chiefs of staff that would not allow the British to launch military operations against Argentina from Chilean territory for fear of provoking "an unstable neighbor". Despite this, there would be no problem receiving British planes "in case of emergency" on Chilean airfields.

Chief of Defense Staff, Admiral Terence Lewin, entrusted the preparation of a working document setting out options for Business operation. Following his instructions and after consulting each of the armed forces, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a list of options was established, which was divided between those in progress and those that would remain available. future consideration. The intention was to formulate graduation in ascending order according to the politico-military impact of each one, on the basis of highly subjective evaluations, which would be reviewed and possibly modified according to the evolution of the situation.

Among the future options, under the title "Attack of selected targets in mainland Argentina" there was the "Option 13"in which the objective was fixed and the circumstances considered would operate in favor and against the initiative.

Among the first, the obtaining of surprise has been reported; the reduction of the efficiency of the Argentine Air Force; the possibility of squeezing Argentine air defense away from the conflict zone. The disadvantages would be the international repercussions; the questioning of the legality of the attacks; the direct justification of reprisals against British expatriates in Argentina, among others.

With new data and estimates, planning changes were introduced on April 10th. The report concluded that "A deployment to Ascension, and a single flight leaving Ascension for each of the eight Vulcans to attack targets around Buenos Aires, is a feasible proposition.The capacity of 168 1,000-pound bombs is considerable, despite the accuracy Vulcan operating at night on a conventional mission. "

He insisted with the psychological aspect that the maneuver could cause among Argentines: "The rapid and open deployment of the Vulcans at Ascension, with visible refueling probes, and the Victor tank parked alongside them, will pose a real and significant threat to Argentina, if they are convinced that we are willing to use them. "

In parallel a report has been prepared with the possible targets of economic character on the Argentine territory, targeting mainly oil fields and refineries; reservoirs and pipeline systems, on railway network nodes and the road network, and their effects on military efforts and on the population.

The island of Ascension was in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean and far from the eyes of Argentina. It was necessary to broadcast the preparations for the bombing missions and that the military commanders and the public opinion of Argentina read them. But how would that be done?

In accordance with the directives of the British Cabinet, on 11 April 1982, the Group of special projectsunder the direction of colonel T.S. Sneydwithin the Ministry of Defense, for the preparation and promulgation of deception and propaganda. His plans would be implemented by the secret intelligence service and the Foreign Office.

The art of deception or deception is as old as the war itself. In conventional military operations, commanders must not only motivate their troops, but also seek to affect those of the enemy. Propaganda, as a crucial element of psychological actions, must be based on credible information for the enemy.

Only two days after the landing of Argentina in Malvinas on April 4, the journalist Jon Connellof Sunday Times, conducted an badysis of the different military options for "reconquering the Malvinas", indicating that "One possibility, of course, would be not to attack the Falklands but Argentina itself – its military and coastal naval bases."

The comparative tables of the strengths of the two countries show a clear imbalance in favor of Argentina in terms of the number of air badets. British public opinion was beginning to worry about the success of the working group.

At the War Cabinet meeting on Friday 16 April at noon, chaired by Margaret Thatcher, press filtering on the reconditioning of Vulcan aircraft and their ability to reach targets on the Argentine mainland was discussed.

The news would be published next Sunday in the Sunday Express on the first page. Although the minutes of the meeting reflect the lamentations for failing to stop the leak, participants concluded that "although there is no intention to attack the Argentine continent, there could be a military advantage if the Argentineans feared it ".

That same Sunday, April 18, the cover of the Sunday Express I have titled "Vulcans are ready to hit Argentina." The note, signed by Michael Toner, detailed the enlistment of bombers and their deployment in the South Atlantic. although they are not equipped with nuclear bombs, "they will have the capacity to destroy all airfields and all ports of the Argentine Navy", and "If the Vulcans were properly employed, the entire Argentine military structure could be destroyed".

The journalist acknowledged in his note that the decision to use the Vulcan against Argentina "could be the result of the work of" psychological operations "" at the Ministry of Defense. "A little known group of experts has worked overtime to discourage and destabilize the military opinion in Argentina." In saying this, Toner may have implicitly acknowledged his involvement in the propaganda action. Its note contained details similar to those of the April 10 schedule, which the Cabinet had now deemed appropriate to reach the ears of Argentina.

Toner concluded by describing the threat in unambiguous terms: "There is no doubt that the mere threat of Vulcan operations will terrify all the experts in Argentina who know what these planes can do.. They can destroy any target virtually at will. This is so that you will virtually guarantee immunity to the British South Atlantic Fleet against Argentine airstrikes. "

The psychological action had already begun. The information, taken by international agencies, was reproduced profusely in the British and Argentine media in the following days. The "gunboat diplomacy" was a new demonstration of what he was able to do.

He was the spokesman for the Conservative Party, the parliamentarian Winston Churchill, grandson of the famous British Prime Minister, who in a note published by the newspaper The sun April 23, under the title "Why should we bomb Argentina?", justified the actions on the continent against the threat of the Argentine aviation operating from its bases on the Atlantic coast against the British Task Force.

Churchill said: "Another obvious factor, which up to now could have been overlooked by the Council, is the ability of the Vulcan bombing force of the RAF to eliminate, if necessary, all key Argentine air bases on the mainland with a single attack synchronized with the Israeli style. From bases in the South Atlantic, Vulcans have the ability and the ability to crater the tracks with conventional bombs and destroy most of the Argentine Air Force on Earth with cluster bombs … Eliminate the Argentine air force with a quick and devastating blow, would guarantee the victory of the task force and ensure a minimum of British casualties. "

While Argentine forces were taking appropriate measures to defend the Argentine territory, its air bases and strategic facilities on the national territory, civil defense organizations and local delegations of the Argentine Red Cross have also begun to act.

But the most picturesque reaction was that of the weekly As such, in its edition of April 23, which described a series of questions and answers before "these moments of tension and uncertainty that the country lives", with practical recommendations before the bombing of the city of Buenos Aires.

* Yes [la guerra] arrives on the continent, will he arrive in Buenos Aires? – If it is an open war between the two countries, it can be bombed by both Buenos Aires and London or by any city.

* If you arrive in Buenos Aires, will you build shelters? – Of course, natural shelters will not be enough (special basement, underground, etc.)

* Should we evacuate the city? – This possibility will only be addressed if there is an attack with an invasion of Buenos Aires.

* What should be done in case of bombing? – The members of the Civil Defense will inform the population in due time, by all means of information within their reach (radio, television, etc.).

* What are the shelters for bombing? – The natural constructions, the reinforced concrete constructions which are under the surface. Underground garages, underground, basements of large buildings (the Barolo in Avenida de Mayo at 1300, has a basement anti-bombing).

In Buenos Aires, the war still seemed very far away and a peaceful solution to the conflict had been entrusted. There was no need to seek refuge or to pay attention to preventive measures. In exchange, In the main cities of southern Argentina, where the movements of troops and armaments were incessant, the authorities and the population had become fully aware of the possibility of an attack., performing darkening exercises and a simulation of evacuation to shelters and protective measures against bombing.

The evening of April 30, Argentinian commanders received notification of the takeoff of the Vulcan and Víctor tanks from the Ascension Island, recognizing that they would have as their destiny the continental coastline.

The Soviets had deployed a "scientific" ship to sail around the island. So it's probably the one who gave the Warning before such a movement of planes. However, The way taken by the attackers would be Malvinas.

At 4:40 in the morning, May 1, the Vulcan threat was put in place, throwing on the runway of the airport the number of 21 bombs of 1,000 pounds., only one impacted effectively, quickly repairing the damage. The so-called "Black Buck" missions were initiated by the British.

With the development of military operations and access to more information, the "Option 13" continued to reformulate. On May 4, 1982, the destroyer HMS Sheffield was hit by one of two Exocet missiles launched by two Super Etendard aircraft operating from the base of the Rio Grande Aerodrome in Tierra del Fuego.

The option of bombing Buenos Aires was diluted in the plans, which were now focused mainly on military air bases in the south of the continent. Whenever the British fleet received a specific blow from the Argentine air force, the plans were adjusted according to parliamentary pressure and public opinion.

However, the idea of ​​bombing Buenos Aires, which had appeared even before April 2 and discarded as operations evolved, has regained its validity on May 13, but for a new psychological action.

Prior to the British invasion of San Carlos, on Soledad Island, the Argentine land aviation was considered the main threat to the establishment of a secure bridgehead.

The Special Projects Group proposed to "Pbading the rumor through unbadigned discrete means means that day attacks are planned with Vulcan bombers against targets north of the continent, before any major landing in the Malvinas Islands". This would reduce the number of attack aircraft in the Malvinas area of ​​operations by replicating certain elements to the northern airfields.

Whatever it is, to be effective, the rumor had to be credible and appealing to Argentine commanders, the Group estimated that "if it spread that the attacks were modified at the time of day, it could encourage the Argentine Air Force to actively seek the confrontation to win a prestigious victory by demolishing a Vulcan. large fuel facility near Buenos Aires, a credible option, is expected to attract fighters to the north. "

The colonel T.S. Sneyd, finalizes its report expressing: "It is recommended to allow the use of discreet and non-attributable means to inform the Argentine authorities that Vulcan aircraft will soon attack fueling facilities in the Buenos Aires area. aim to improve accuracy and thus reduce the number of civilian casualties. "

The political consequences of a British action on the continent have conditioned any attack of these characteristics. Argentina found support in the field of the Organization of American States and the possibility of regionalizing the conflict was still latent. This is a risk that Britain does not intend to take. He had justified his military reaction to the principle of self-defense of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Security Council Resolution 502, so that an open attack on the mainland seemed unnecessary and that it would jeopardize legality. of your actions.

It was still possible for Britain to fail in its main military objective in the Falkland Islands and for the working group to be humiliated. It was like that Until the end of the conflict, the idea of ​​these attacks on the continent has never been ruled out any more than planning has been suspended.

This option would be reserved when military operational requirements so require, provided that it justifies the means employed and that international condemnation is supported. The "option 13" of "Attacks on selected targets in mainland Argentina" was still on the planning table, waiting to get the green light from the War Cabinet.

The bombing of the city of Buenos Aires remained valid in the minds of British planners as well as in the design of psychological warfare actions.

37 years of that Charly García I composed the song "Do not bomb Buenos Aires", now we know that his prayer was not a fiction.