Sixty years after the Bay of Pigs fiasco

In April 1961, exactly six decades ago, 1,400 Cuban exiles disembarked at Playa Girón, in the south of the island, with the aim of creating a beach head from which they would seek to regain the power occupied since 1959 by Fidel Castro to then obtain the recognition of the Organization of American States (OAS) and of the international community. The Operation which attempted to overthrow the Communist dictator will go down in history as the “Bay of Pigs fiasco”, as it was deactivated almost immediately by the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

John F. Kennedy had assumed the presidency three months earlier. During the transition, the young president-elect had participated in “briefings” during which he was informed of the CIA’s plans to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala for an invasion. The designs predicted that much of the island’s population would rise up in support of the invasion aimed at overthrowing Castro.

The operation was originally conceived by economist Richard M. Bissell, deputy chief of operations of the CIA, led by the legendary Allen Dulles since the beginning of the Eisenhower administration. The goal of keeping the operation a secret was quickly thwarted. The plans became an open rumor among Cuban exiles in Miami and naturally reached Castro’s ears.

JFK authorized the invasion plans in February but tried to hide American support. Subsequent events demonstrated that Kennedy’s attitude throughout was hesitant and unconvincing. Kennedy’s “half-hearted” performance would have been fatal to the success of the operation. For years, JFK critics have insisted that if Eisenhower had been in the White House, the Bay of Pigs operation would not have been launched or, if it had started, would have received massive military support. the United States.

Analysts insisted that it was inexplicable that such a basic error was made in the choice of the landing site. The area was extremely swampy. On the 15th, eight bombers took off from Nicaragua – then ruled by the pro-American dictatorship of the Somoza family – to attack Cuban airfields. But the CIA used obsolete WWII B-26s camouflaged with the Cuban Air Force badge to disguise it for this purpose. On this day, fate intervened for the evil. The pilots had a regrettable performance: they missed their targets and left Castro’s forces virtually untouched. But the biggest mistake would happen immediately after. The news was known and images of North American planes repainted in Cuban colors saw the light, which transcended United States support for the operation. It was then that Kennedy made a decision that would prove fatal by canceling a second airstrike.

On the 17th, the exiles, grouped together in the so-called 2506 Brigade, landed in the Bay of Pigs. A severe welcome awaited them. Castro ordered a vigorous counterattack and deployed nearly twenty thousand men to stop the advance of the attackers.. What followed was a disaster. Some exiles fled to the sea, but many others were arrested, with their return to the United States subsequently being negotiated for the delivery of food and money. Some 1,200 members of the 2506 Brigade surrendered and over 100 were executed. In Havana, police arrested thousands of people suspected of having links to the rebels in theaters and auditoriums. And from Moscow, the Soviet Politburo (then called the “Presidium”) issued a statement condemning US actions while Nikita Khrushchev personally promised to provide Castro with all the assistance he needed.

Kennedy took four days to recognize what the rest of the world already knew: that it was a US operation. He did so in a memorable speech on the 21st, in which he assumed political “full responsibility” for the disaster. But this failure has caused enormous damage to Washington’s image and embarked Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev on a series of challenges that will include the construction of the Berlin Wall, the testing of new nuclear weapons and, finally, the installation. missiles in Cuba. Next year.

In his job “Remembering Kennedy“(1996), Roberto Alemann – who soon after would be Minister of the Economy and Ambassador to the United States of Presidents Arturo Frondizi and José María Guido – asserts that” Kennedy’s Latin American policy and his world foreign policy suffered the most significant setback of all. . his presidency ”. Alemann explained that “The president was aware of the operation, but denied it air support, without which it could not thrive.”

On the 28th, Time headlined: “Cuban fiasco has seriously damaged the international prestige of the United States.” Internally, the CIA was held responsible for the failure. For eight years it was chaired by Dulles, who shaped it and defined its operation. The CIA was “his agency”. Dulles and Bissell became the scapegoats for the operation. Kennedy accepted their resignation soon after. Kennedy himself explained it graphically when he said that just as triumph had a thousand fathers, so defeat was an orphan.

Some interpretations have subsequently sought to excuse Kennedy. In his work “A Thousand Days” (1965), Arthur M. Schlessinger Jr. interprets that the “hiatus” in Washington during the transition period opened the way for CIA leaders to have “a free hand” on the issue. . This interpretation asserts that the “uncertainties of the interregnum” could precipitate events. The CIA leadership, for its part, insisted that delaying the invasion could “demoralize” the exiles who claimed to be mobilizing. In turn, they cited meteorological reasons as the start of the rainy season was approaching, which would turn the land into “volcanic mud”. Schlessinger explained that in mid-March, the president was faced with the decision to act “now or never” (choice now or never).

Certain facts allow other conclusions to be drawn. During the election campaign on October 20, 1960, the New York Times headlined that Kennedy called for help from the Cuban rebels to overthrow Castro and urged the Eisenhower administration to help the exiled freedom fighters. His opponent, Vice President Richard M. Nixon, could not believe that the Democratic candidate would go public with the operation, putting his success in jeopardy. In a televised debate the following night, Nixon anticipated what would ultimately happen. He predicted that US support for Cuban exiles on a military adventure would elicit “condemnation at the United Nations” and that they would fail in their goals. “It will be an invitation to Mr. Kruschov to enter Latin America.” In his job “Ike’s spies. Eisenhower and the spy establishment“(1981), Stephen E. Ambrose recalled that” the irony, of course, has taken place since Nixon predicted precisely what ended up happening. “

The Bay of Pigs fiasco forever compromised the Kennedy administration, years later fueling the most diverse interpretations of the tragic outcome that ended the president’s very life. But beyond speculation, The truth is, it opened the doors for the Soviet Union to transfer military forces to Cuba, in a development that would put the world on the brink of nuclear confrontation barely a year and a half later.

The failed operation would have another unintended consequence. This fueled mistrust of Washington’s allies in the region at a very special time. On March 13, Kennedy launched his ambitious “Alliance for Progress,” an economic and political aid program for the hemisphere. Schlessinger recalls that former Costa Rican President José Figueres told him that he and his Venezuelan counterpart Rómulo Betancourt were “dejected”: “How can we have an alliance if even our friends cannot believe us if we are not able to be given an alliance. secret? “.

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