The Law Enforcement Manual, The Big Ortega Wager

CARACAS.- Nicaraguan intellectuals attribute to Tomás Borge, founder of the Sandinista National Front of Liberation (FSLN), one of the sentences that Daniel Ortega made after his return to power in 2007: "Whatever you do, the important thing is not to lose power. "

It does not matter that the eyes of the world again look with amazement at the old ex-guerrilla, who in the last century became a hero of the world after overthrowing the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza

The repression in Nicaragua is increasing daily, torture and disappearances are reported, the paramilitaries move freely into government battalions with a license to kill while the international community shows it with an accusing finger. But the Sandinista president does not yield, but on the contrary: he accuses the Catholic Church of plotting, once his great ally, and orders the rebel communes to be taken back by fire and blood, despite the fact that After the World Cup in Russia the abuse of its the government again appears mbadively in the media.

The President lost the street, the dialogue table stripped him every time he meets, the country's economy derails and at the Organization of American States (OAS) only three months more detractors than Chavez, in a landslide that already lasts five years. Only Cuba and Venezuela maintain their support without restriction. Even Jorge Arreaza, Bolivarian Chancellor, said he was ready to "offer his blood" in the mountains of Central America.

Ortega has a plan even though it was used during the half-century that preceded the political struggle. "In every negotiation or conflict, I have always tried to move forward as much as possible and I have never come back to where I started, I have always stayed a little further," he said. in the newspaper La Prensa Edmundo Jarquín, former minister and former deputy Sandinista.

This strategy is defined by Nicaraguans as "lifting the stop", urging to yield something later, but without returning to the original point. "Ortega's way of acting has always been to push things to the extreme, from there, to the brink of the abyss, to negotiate with each other the resolution of the crisis. "In making certain concessions, he intends to give the image of a conciliator. Hugo Torres, who participated in the aggression and abduction of Somali leaders in 1974 thanks to which Ortega was released by the dictatorship.

"Ortega is betting to change the correlation of forces, betting on state terrorism, as the main and almost one resource: he has tried to forcefully impose a state of affairs. exception, "adds Torres

.This situation, with 300 deaths and Ortega copying Nicolás Maduro's repressive manual (eliminating the resistance of the street, with opposition leaders and submission to society) , the political badyst Óscar René Vargas considers three possible scenarios.

"[En el primero] Ortega sees that there is no turning back and decides j The whole thing is to repress everything. A scenario like Augusto Pinochet, where the price to pay does not matter: more deaths, prisoners, injured, the collapse of the economy and the increase poverty and unemployment, "says Vargas.

A key not to be missed In this first scenario, the establishment of a "dynastic dictatorship", as defined by the journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro, is not just the case Ortega, but his entire clan, consisting of his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo. eight children, who are distributed media, public enterprises, positions of trust and international agreements.

Vargas baptized the second scenario as the "soft exit", and in fact was the solution by which the United States, the Catholic Church and the businessmen, all former allies of the regime, as well as the OAS, with as general secretary Luis Almagro, as the main factor of conciliation, have advanced the elections from 2021 to March 2019, With a transitional government meanwhile or with the own Ortega to the 39, ;before. The murder of Mother's Day, when a mbadive demonstration of opposition ended with the slaughter of more than a dozen young people, railed in this fashion. "Ortega did not agree because he did not believe in guarantees," reveals Vargas, one of the most knowledgeable politicians of the Central American country.

In what would be the third scenario, "a transitional government is still possible, but there is much indecision and the presidential couple see it as a trap," says the badyst. "Ortega -Murillo did not win the game, although they managed to temporarily control the main dams [barricadas] that prevented movement in the rebel areas ", phrase