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The boss of Audi, Rupert Stadler, is still being held because of the diesel case. At the same time, the parent company is struggling to pull the right lessons from the scandal – but not only …
The prosecution accuses the boss of Audi, Rupert Stadler, of wanting to conceal a crime – the handling exhaust gases from diesel engines. That's why she stopped him. Stadler's application for bail was rejected this week. It is clear that until charges are laid, no prosecution and no verdicts have been pronounced, Stadler must be considered innocent.
Nevertheless, it is worth thinking about the German car companies and their management teams. How can this happen? Why are German companies particularly affected – are the emission and particle limits equally applicable to everyone? Did the German manufacturers feel too safe? Did you feel protected by regulators and politicians? And most importantly: Do German auto companies have special management structures that make misconduct more likely?
Diesel was not under control
It was obvious that the companies were cheating because they did not find satisfactory technical solutions to the problem of diesel particles. Instead of exposing, was deceived. The automotive industry is one of the leading industrial sectors in Germany. Their leaders could always hope for an understanding on the part of the supervisory authorities
. But that 's not the only reason why Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche, BMW and Mercedes are especially problematic: no other technology is as German as the diesel engine. Other builders have relied on the gasoline engine in the past, on hybrid drives, or more recently on the electric motor. German manufacturers, for their part, were convinced that the future belongs to the diesel engine. Admitting the failure of such a strategy would have cost the companies billions.
Culture of Problematic Leadership
These are problems common to all German manufacturers. At Volkswagen – the Audi brand, like Porsche, belongs to the Volkswagen group – a specific leadership culture has obviously been added. Failures in the development of diesel exhaust technology have not been disclosed, but removed. The errors were not admitted, but kept secret. The problems have not been solved, but swept under the carpet.
Such a culture often develops in companies that recruit few external managers. The more frames come from their own ranks, the stronger the character of a person, the greater the risk that internal practices will develop. With intent and criminal energy, it usually has little to do if these habits are in conflict with the applicable law. It's like that because everyone does it like it's always been done.
Top manager outside? Nausea
Until the diesel case, Volkswagen group leaders rarely came from outside. Senior executives from other companies remained episode. Under the leadership of Ferdinand Piëch, Volkswagen's exceptional CEO, capital and management quickly merged. Piëch was a major shareholder and a head of a company in one. He first practiced for nearly ten years as CEO and then thirteen years as Chairman of the Supervisory Board. Under his leadership and successor Martin Winterkorn, Volkswagen became the company of engineers. The gap reigned strictly, forgiveness in technical matters was not given. Business development, openness, culture of error? A minor question
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Once before, this structure was unloaded from a tangible scandal. In 2005, it was discovered that the company board had been corrupted for years at Volkswagen – by its own personnel department. For employee representatives, there were additional payments, extra company cars, elaborate trips, and even brothel visits to company expenses. In return, concessions are expected in terms of work organization and staff planning.
Volkswagen puts the relationship between the labor inspectorate, the company committees and the human resources department on a new foundation. But obviously, the group has not been rebuilt, so that in all departments and subsidiaries of the group, awareness would be increased to comply with the law at all times. It was only after the start of the diesel scandal that the board and integrity were created for the first time. The first general manager had to leave after only a few months.
Essential Trade Reforms
What was missed after the business committee case must now be invented to show its strength. At Siemens, after the corruption scandal, the whole group was reduced to legal compliance, in Daimler it was similar after the 2010 corruption scandal. Although that does not mean that these companies are at the same time. Sheltered from new scandals – even Daimler is in the business of diesel emissions again pillory. But with them, there is the awareness that scandals can not be satiated and displaced. At Volkswagen, it was obviously different: even senior executives did not know how to behave when the public prosecutor was in the house.
One more thing: many people in Germany – also online readers, like me since my last comment on this question knows – think the US authorities are acting so hard just because they're German companies. It may be, but you do not know it. Some indications against: there were once a billion-dollar penalties for US companies, even before Donald Trump's "America-first" policy was delivered to companies German and European
. must change, this time globally and permanently – at least if they want to remain active in the US market. Because the American authorities will not change.
Some companies will find this process easier than others. Volkswagen is among the others.
Ursula Weidenfeld is a business journalist. In his book "Government without people, why our political system no longer works." She writes about the problems of German politics.
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