Sergio Jaramillo explains how peace was reached with the Farc – Peace Process – Politics

On the occasion of the launch today, at the Teatro Colón, of the Peace Process Library with the FARC, which contains unpublished documents of dialogues with the former guerrillas, l & # 39; 39, ex-commissioner for peace Sergio Jaramillo, current ambbadador in Brussels, exposes in the following article, the 10 reasons which, according to him, made of the negotiation of peace in Havana the definitive one.

The Colombian conflict has been the longest in the history of Latin America. So long, that it has become a way of life. Our officers have spent their entire military career fighting with the same enemy, while the guerrillas, though diminished, have continued to haunt the jungles and mountains, and the civilian population in the conflict zones has survived as best as it can. She could. to majorities in the cities only the pictures on their televisions reminded them that they were living in a country at war .

When a conflict continues for more than five decades, as it happened in our country, it is also because there are practices and interests that militate against any solution. The question is, if Colombia were to suffer from "insoluble conflict," as the experts say, why could an agreement be struck this time? Or, in other words, how was it possible to turn the logic of confrontation into a logic of cooperation?

Before attempting an answer, it is worth recalling here two ideas of Thomas Schelling, a great theoretician of strategy (and who was kind, at 93, attending a meeting in New York in 2014). on the negotiation of Havana). The first is the well known idea that no conflict is a pure conflict or confrontation, but rather a combination of interests that can motivate both confrontation and cooperation.

The second idea is a complement to the first: for this reason – so there can be cooperative solutions with which everyone wins – "win" in a conflict does not mean much to gain compared to the opponent, but "Win over our own system of values" .

A negotiation can then be the best way to win in a conflict, in that it aligns the cooperative interests of the parties, ends the war (is there more justification for a negotiation than saving lives? ) a solution in which the whole society wins and the victims in particular win, those of the past and the potentials of the future. I believe it is what it means to earn "in relation to our own value system".

This is in any case what we tried to do in Havana: reaching an agreement that would end the conflict and open the door to a transition phase to implement the agreement and closing the historic conflict, for the benefit of all society.

Back to the question: why was it possible to reach an agreement this time? There are two complementary ways to see the problem. The first is: what conditions have changed the negotiations? This is what scholars often call the right or "ripe" moment. Let's leave this discussion to historians and badysts, even though it's worth pointing out that the change most often mentioned – the change in military balance – was undoubtedly a condition necessary for the negotiations to take place, but not enough. As Helmut Kohl of German reunification has said, many stars have had to line up. In addition, virtually no guerrilla surrender. The conflict could have continued in rural areas of Colombia for decades without any problems .

The fact is that the existence of favorable conditions in no way guarantees a result. The story is full of good times that have been abandoned because a solution has not been built.

This is the other way to see the problem: understand the peace process as the construction of a space to change the mix of Interests so that cooperation prevails during the confrontation. It is the essence, in my opinion, of peace – and perhaps of strategy in general – to build spaces that channel reality and move things in a certain direction and that people behave differently, opening up opportunities for change and transformation.

This is, if you will, a form of drawing that does not differ much from the construction of a house: a plan is agreed upon, the foundations are laid, then the floor, and then pieces are added, etc. Except that it is literally a moving house

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I will try to describe ten steps that, in my opinion, have made it possible to transform the logic of confrontation into a logic of cooperation and to reach an agreement.

The first step was simply to recognize that there was a window of opportunity for peace and peace. Above all, acknowledge the conflict. That's what President Santos did in 2010. Without this clear vision and this willingness to badume all the political risks, there simply would not have been agreement.

At the same time, after three failed peace processes – in Uribe, Tlaxcala and Caguán – we knew that another failure would close the doors in the future to any attempt at negotiation. So we were forced to follow a "prudential strategy", which is nothing but going step by step and doing things gradually, relying on on concrete results. It is well known that the best way to ensure cooperation between opponents is to build results gradually over time, which, in turn, builds trust because it shows seriousness.

Whatever the case may be, at the end of 2010, President Santos publicly acknowledged, through a bill – the Victims Act – that there was an internal armed conflict in Colombia. Something perfectly obvious (hundreds of our soldiers died year after year in military operations, all conducted under IHL, ie the law of war), but not for the previous government which always denied it. This denial is the basis of the ideology of former President Uribe and the main obstacle to a reasonable solution to the conflict.

Without this recognition, there is no framework for a peace negotiation, for two reasons. First, because the focus of all negotiations in the world is the disarmament of guerrillas in exchange for their transition to politics . Otherwise, there is no negotiation possible: no guerrilla leaves his weapons and then jump into an abyss, but turn into a political movement.

This transit finds its justification in what it means the closing of an armed conflict, the end of political violence and therefore the strengthening of democracy. Moreover, without the framework of the conflict, there is no basis for dignity and, without dignity, there is no negotiation possible.

On the other hand, it is the context of the conflict that allows us to determine which conduct is lawful and which conduct should be punished because it constitutes an infringement of conflict of laws norms. armed. And, above all, this allows and justifies the establishment of a transitional justice system to respond to victims.

What is at stake is then the very idea of ​​the transition. Without the recognition of the conflict, there is not only a possible peace negotiation, but also a coherent concept of transition with all the consequences that this has for the victims, for peace, for reconciliation and for building a collective vision of the country's future.

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The second step was to create an adequate international environment and participation. In 2010, Colombia was completely isolated on the continent. That's why one of President Santos's first acts of government was – beyond all differences – sitting with President Chávez as responsible neighbors to reduce tension. A few months later, with the help of his Minister of Foreign Affairs, María Ángela Holguín, President Santos succeeded in normalizing relations with our neighbors and gaining support from the whole region. I clearly remember a meeting with Hugo Chávez in which he ended by telling me: "we treat each other as enemies, now we treat each other as adversaries" .

This is what the dialogue accomplishes. After meeting with President Santos, Chávez radically changed his stance with Colombia and, instead of supporting the guerrillas, he decided to support the peace process.

After the tragic trial of Caguán, to which about two dozen were invited from countries as friends of the process without really knowing why (once a person is badigned to a function, he wants to exercise), we decided to This time in front of the international community for a minimalist or rather "needs-driven" strategy: to obtain the strictly necessary international support for the tasks at hand and to open it progressively to other countries – mainly in the region – depending on the needs of the process.

The first and the main country of support were Cuba and Norway who were known as the "guarantors" of the negotiations, with Cuba as their host (they attended all the meetings, but were not allowed to attend). did not intervene, in times of crisis, they facilitated solutions outside the table).

Why Cuba? We thought Cuba had an interest in helping to end the armed conflict, and that is exactly what happened. He gave the FARC the necessary security guarantees, he gave us a place where we could negotiate peacefully, and he generously provided us with all the human and material resources needed for a successful negotiation. Norway, on the other hand, has brought all its recognized professionalism and has accompanied the negotiation with a lot of intelligence (for example, by taking groups of transitional justice experts to speak with the FARC) , from beginning to end.

The International Committee of the Red Cross was not much less important. This was thanks to the extremely complex operations of farc jungle commanders that trading in Havana was literally possible. These operations are a good example of the "incremental strategy": by overcoming many fears, we have built a secret phase model with the ICRC and the guarantor countries that have given results and built trust. And then it opened like a spiral, multiplying by dozens in the public phase of trading.

On the other hand, we have gathered a group of international advisers – Jonathan Powell, William Ury, Shlomo Ben Ami, Joaquín Villalobos and Dudley Ankerson – with much experience in peace negotiations. Every conflict is different, and so are all peace negotiations. As Clausewitz would say, the first requirement for a negotiation to work is to understand the nature of the conflict that is being solved. But also there are structural elements in all negotiations that are necessarily similar (for example, the problem of guarantees for those who disarm) and we learn a lot from what others have achieved, as well as their mistakes.

Later, in the public phase, we invited Chile and Venezuela to act as "companions" in the process. They visited us in Havana and then explained the progress (as well as the difficulties) to the different countries of the region.
A separate chapter is the United States. President Obama has strongly supported the process. His government did not intervene in any way and by the end of 2014 everything indicated that a more active role of the United States was convenient, at the request of President Santos, Secretary of State John Kerry, who n & # 39; 39, could not have demonstrated a greater commitment to the process. – He quickly sends Bernie Aronson as a special emissary to Havana. A retired diplomat, very patient and very intelligent, who helped the FARC understand the point of view of Washington, and vice versa.

Unfortunately, with the change of government in the United States, the attitude has also changed. This proves once again that you can not miss the windows of opportunity. In the current international context, negotiation would have been much more difficult if not impossible

We must underline the role of the United Nations Security Council, which amid the greatest disagreements and international tensions , Colombia unanimously calls for two resolutions to create and launch a special political mission to verify the ceasefire (later will vote three other resolutions, also unanimously); and Jeff Feltman, UN Under-Secretary of Political Affairs, who designed this mission strictly following what we asked and supported at all times, as did the UK delegation that drafted the Council resolutions.

The bilateral ceasefire under the supervision of the Security Council has been a success. There was virtually no incident during the FARC stay in the 26 concentration areas. Our military forces and the national police have shown the most extraordinary professionalism, and the Farc have also done their part. "It's an honor for me to be part of the end of the war," said an army major in an austere camp amidst the jungles of Chocó, where he spent his days ensuring the protection of the concentration area. The national police did the same with the creation of a special protection unit (Unipep), which quickly earned the respect of Farc commanders.

At the same time, the tripartite verification mechanism that we agreed on, in which the United Nations, the Government and the FARC jointly investigated any report of violation on the ground, bearing the same brown vests, surprised the inhabitants of the areas and built trust. Today, the United Nations presents it as an example for other processes.

The disarmament process has not been less fruitful. After collecting information for decades, the government had very detailed information about FARC weapons, and they were delivered. Nearly 9,000 weapons, including 274 heavy machine guns and 266 mortars, as well as 40 tons of explosives, were left in the hands of United Nations observers, mostly representatives from countries in the region.

Finally, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the European Union, Federica Mogherini, as soon as she saw the end of the negotiations approaching, sent Eamon Gilmore, the former Foreign Minister of the European Union. Ireland, Havana as envoy. from the European Union, to start preparing support for the implementation of the peace agreement. Difficult to imagine a more consistent partner and more attached to the peace of Colombia than the European Union.

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The third step – and perhaps the critical step – was to first hold secret talks ] and conclude a framework agreement before engaging in a public peace process. After a year and a half of using secret channels and sending and receiving messages through the good offices of Henry Acosta, we began secret talks in Havana on February 24, 2012 with Enrique Santos, Frank Pearl and the other members. from a small delegation.
Talking secretly had three advantages.

First, it allowed the two parties to seriously discuss and prove each other without the pressure of public opinion, and without the temptation to use the means to please their own public, what was exactly what had happened launched the public phase of the process in October 2012.

Second, the Framework Agreement that we signed on August 26, 2012 – the General Agreement – not only set the agenda, but also the terms and vision of the peace process. It was a kind of "contract", so the government, the FARCs and, most importantly, the Colombians, knew exactly what we were embarking on and what the bargaining agenda was (and not least). And specified, as we will see, that this time the end of the real conflict was going to be discussed.

Thirdly, the secret talks gave the necessary dignity to the peace process and developed the methods that later channeled the process. We treat each other as interlocutors at the bargaining table and we speak with respect. It's something that even now, some do not accept. They claim that the government "equaled" the FARC.

It's not like that. Obviously, a negotiation is between two, and in order to function, it is necessary to respect the same rules and procedures, because it is these rules and procedures that make it possible to reach agreements. And they also give the necessary dignity to the negotiation process.

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The fourth step was to create a story or "narrative" – ​​as they say today – that would lead the peace process, set clear boundaries for negotiation and open a space within that both parties could "live".

The new narrative called "the end of the conflict". From the beginning, we said that this process, unlike previous FARC processes, was aimed at ending the armed conflict . We wanted to say three things. First, this time, it was really over: the agenda had to include a point on disarmament, which the FARC had never agreed to and which, in fact, led to the transitory break of the secret talks. Otherwise, we did not want to risk a new peace process.

It is worth noting that we have proceeded contrary to what is recommended by many "experts" in negotiation. Instead of going from the easiest to the most difficult, we insist on the most delicate point, disarmament. When it became clear that this point was going to stay, we opened the door to the discussion of others.

Secondly, "the end of the conflict" meant not only the end of the armed confrontation, but also and especially its non-repetition. The Agreement should help put a definitive end to the historical cycles of political violence in Colombia and prevent its repetition or degeneration in other forms of violence, as it does. is produced so many times in the past. That's why, as we never tire of repeating, it's more than just giving up arms by the FARCs.

Disarmament was a necessary condition, but by no means sufficient to guarantee non-repetition. We had to attack the factors that had fueled and kept alive conflict and violence.

Such is the logic or logic of the non-repetition which aims to release the agenda of the Agreement. A logic of territorial integration that allows a transition of 15 years to the regions and populations of the peripheral areas most affected by the conflict to integrate into the life and the national economy and to benefit from minimum conditions of well-being. to be (point 1, integral rural development).

A logic of activating the political rights of citizens, so that the term "democracy" has a meaning throughout the national territory and that violence disappears from our political customs (point 2, political participation).
A logic of transforming territories into Coke cultures through the creation of legal savings, hand in hand with the action of the judiciary on local organized crime (point 4, drugs).

And finally, a logic of recognition and response to victims that guarantees their rights, soothes resentment that eats people and nurtures hatred in society and promotes the conditions of coexistence and reconciliation.

The story of the end of the conflict has also helped us to separate from the negotiation the infinity of the proposals made by the FARC and which we do not accept (it suffices to recall the hundreds of "minimum proposals ") precisely because they do not have a direct relationship with conflict and its non-repetition. The narrative defined the agenda.

At the same time, everyone could give their own justification for the items on the agenda. The government, for example, thought, as I mentioned, that the agenda included the points that dealt with the conditions that kept the conflict alive, while the FARC thought it was important Was acting "objective causes" and justification of their struggle. with which the government did not agree.

But the interpretation did not matter, while we were talking about the same concrete things. This is what the narrative of the General Agreement allowed: to open a space in which both parties could breathe and develop a negotiation.

First, the story of the end of the conflict recognized the enormous opportunity for change that a peace agreement meant for Colombia. The possibility of moving from the aspiration set out in the fundamental rights of the Constitution of 91 – and in so many broken promises – to unleash logic and concrete actions of transformation which, at least in certain territories and certain populations more vulnerable, would give birth to and lay the foundations for peace.

Our critics have sometimes asked why these reforms should be the product of an agreement with the FARC, while they were – they say – what a government should do. What I always answer, if it's so obvious, why did not they do it?

It is clear that there is a problem with the incentives of the political economy of our country, which has left vast areas out of the reach of politicians and, in general, the government. ;economy. In my opinion, only a peace agreement can promote with sufficient force a process of institutionalization and democratization of the territory . What I once called a territorial peace and a more complete democracy.

Finally, the story of the "end of the conflict" allowed us to distinguish between the negotiation that was taking place in Havana to end the confrontation and the next phase of peace building that requires the participation of all. This conceptual and practical difference, which we have included from the beginning in the General Agreement, was also a means of recognizing all the peacebuilding efforts that had already been made in the territories for many years, which brought the process closer to the communities.

All of the above was subject to a very simple but very effective principle of the General Agreement: "Nothing has been agreed until all is agreed upon". In other words, the government would not commit to doing all this if the end of the armed conflict was not also accepted.

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The fifth step was to establish a methodology that could "contain" the process, especially in the public phase. Do not forget that the negotiations in Havana did not have a mediator, which is unusual. There was not a United Nations diplomat who wrote the agreement in the perfect UN language. We discuss and fight virtually every word we agree with the FARC, and yet we managed to write together the 300 pages of the agreement.

This was only possible because, starting from the secret phase of the negotiation, we had established a working method which, later in the public phase, was developed and enlarged: [19659003] – The Bureau with all the plenipotentiaries. They exchanged views and made proposals

– The Editorial Committee, where concrete proposals were exchanged and the text of the agreement was agreed.

– Gender Committee, where the text was revised and proposals were made

– The Commission of the item "End of the conflict", where the terms of the cease-fire and bilateral and definitive hostilities have agreed, with the participation of the active officers of the armed forces and the National Police

– A group of jurists, who dealt with the question of criminal justice.

Formal bargaining procedures were also important. The fact that we worked for three days, we stopped one day and continued with three others, regardless of the day of the week, gave a strange sense of structure to the negotiation. As we did, unlike all this formality, the informal meetings that we organized between the heads of delegations, known as "3 x 3", where we surveyed proposals and solved problems.

But perhaps the most important thing was the gradual way in which negotiations were going on. As we know, the process lasted a long time – we were in Havana for four and a half years – and we paid a high political cost for that . But I wonder if it could have been otherwise. There was practically no day when we did not work intensely.

And the counterpart was very clever in putting the hand brake on when she was not willing to deal with an uncomfortable subject or accept a proposal. In this situation, there is no choice but to endure and not accept the unacceptable.

Above all, I believe that this "progressive" and progressive approach has been instrumental in building trust, both in Havana and in Colombia. Whenever we reached an agreement on a point of the agenda, we made it public. After one or two of these agreements, it was very difficult to imagine that one or the other party was going to give up easily. The work had been long and difficult, he was missing so much more.
Incidentally, it is, in my opinion, what it means to build trust in a peace process: you rely on the results of the process itself. The more it is accomplished, the more it seems irreversible and in fact it is.