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Jean-Christophe Niel, Director of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) the independent authority responsible for issuing opinions on nuclear installations reacts to the report just published by the commission parliamentary inquiry into nuclear power
Are nuclear installations at risk? Yes, believes Greenpeace, which Tuesday, July 3, launched a drone against the central Bugey (Ain). "When we look for faults, we find and we found some" observes, for its part, Barbara Pompili. MEP LREM, she took part in the parliamentary committee charged with investigating this subject
The report made public yesterday, points out certain risks and formulates proposals. MEPs complain that they have run up against the defense secrecy invoked by the public authorities, as by EDF, particularly on the issue of resistance to attack by swimming pools where spent fuel is stored. They also dispute the storage of waste at great depth.
In the nuclear industry, they denounce an excessive use of subcontractors. They give as an example "irregularities of secondary circuit welds" for the EPR of Flamanville (Channel). EDF, for its part, says it does not use more subcontractors than fifteen years ago. In an interview exclusive to Ouest-France, the director of the IRSN reacts to the publication of this text.
Feedback on this report?
It is very rich and offers a lot of information, some of which comes from the IRSN. I received the members of the commission at the Institute. We showed them the tools we use, such as our Sofia crash simulator. It allows us to make counter-expertise. We also opened our technical crisis center to the commission. It was here, during the Fukushima accident, that IRSN was the first to announce the fusion of the reactor core. And our estimates of rejections have not been disputed since.
You give opinions. Are they taken over by the Nuclear Safety Authority?
Yes, in general, they are taken over.
There are flaws, worries Barbara Pompili, who participated in this parliamentary commission. Do you share this opinion?
We have not identified a topic to be treated urgently, but very important topics for nuclear safety in the long term. I would mention, the extension of operation of reactors for which reinforcements must be implemented to increase their level of safety, the completion of work post Fukushima, as well as the improvements to be made to storage. It must be treated with rigor, but there is no imminence.
Barbara Pompili regrets that the defense secret serve as an excuse not to answer. Do you share this opinion?
One of the first levels of defense against malicious risk is to limit access to information. It's not the same thing about nuclear safety. We render 850 reviews a year and most are public. At IRSN, we are entitled to have access to documents that have a certain clbadification level.
Should this access be open to parliamentarians?
It is true that the representation national should be able to make sure of that. But in respect of the rules of confidentiality, because it is the first barrier in the defense. It is fundamental
Why store nuclear waste in the soil layers? The parliamentary report is reserved on this option.
The National Agency for the Management of Radioactive Waste (Andra) has a storage project in Bure (Meuse). This waste will remain radioactive for several hundred thousand years. The principle is to contain the most harmful waste in a layer of clay that is 150 meters thick at 500 meters deep. This is to prevent the radioactivity from returning to the surface. Hence the idea that it is deep enough. Moreover, the vector of radioactivity is water. This clay medium with little or no water explains the technical reason for this choice.
Other countries have retained this deep storage?
At the international level, this is the solution reference in particular by Finland and Sweden. Indeed, what is near the surface can be reached by erosion. There is also the risk of human intrusion. And on the surface, what confidence do we have in the long run to guarantee that control will be exercised well in 100 years but also 1000 or 10000 years?
You yourself have pointed some risks.
We made a conclusion to the ASN (Nuclear Safety Authority) in June 2017. We looked at the concept of storage and the safety objectives in operation and after closure. Cigeo, the storage center project, is an unusual facility since it is both underground and will operate for over a hundred years. Today, no nuclear facility is planned for such a duration. The technical maturity of this project is satisfactory. That being the case, we have identified some sensitive points, including, at this stage, the risk of fire of certain types of packages.
Which ones?
These fire risks relate to bitumen packages. It is a tar used to contain the waste resulting from the treatment of nuclear installation effluents. This concerns 18% of this waste destined to be stored in Cigeo, ie 40,000 parcels. Our question concerns the ability to intervene in case of fire. Many of these wastes are old. And there are fears of chemical reactions that could develop. So, we have to look at this subject a little more closely with two options: stabilize this waste by making it more resistant or that Andra can intervene on these packages in case there is a beginning of fire. At this stage, from Andra, there are additional elements to bring.
The IRSN (Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety) provides for the State, independently the experts on the nuclear issues. It has teams of researchers but also doctors and makes more than 800 opinions per year, but not only to the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). He employs 1800 people. 60% of its activity is devoted to research and 40% to research.
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