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The waning political dominance of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa has gained more and more academic attention since 2009. The new book by political analyst Ralph Mathekga, The ANC’s Final Decade: How the Party’s Decline Will Transform South Africa, is a welcome addition.
The ANC’s electoral fortunes have steadily declined in the last three national elections; 2009 (65%), 2014 (62%) and 2019 (57.50%). But, since the 2016 local elections saw the party lose some of its old strongholds, including four large metropolitan municipalities, the question has shifted as to whether the party will lose power at the national level.
This book is one of the few research publications bold enough to offer specific time frames for the end of ANC domination. Mathekga puts this at 2024 or 2029.
Throughout the book’s 17 chapters, he skillfully combines his journalistic and academic writing flair to educate the reader, especially the laity and the uninformed, about the ANC. It offers a glimpse of its hold on South African politics and development, and what the country would look like in a possible future without the party that led the freedom struggle.
In essence, the book argues, quite convincingly, that the ANC is on a downward slope from power. This could offer new opportunities for political reform and development in the country. But it also comes with uncertainties, as state and society compete for dominance over the development agenda.
Fatal flaw in ANC DNA
The book – from chapter one to the end – is an interesting read on the good, bad and ugly of South African politics.
The first chapter provides a historical overview of the ANC, focusing on what the author calls “the fatal flaw in the giant’s DNA”. It is a culture of “democratic centralism”, which is a consequence of its history. Chapter 17 predicts and describes a “strange new world” of South Africa without a hegemonic political party.
The book discusses and contextualizes a number of factors that explain the decline of dominant parties globally.
This is a topic that our fellow political scientist Hakeem Onapajo and I have explored, identifying a number of factors that lead to the demise of dominant parties. These include opposition coordination, institutional or electoral reforms, high levels of corruption and blatant abuse of office, and factional conflicts within the dominant party.
Read more: Factionalism and corruption could kill the ANC – unless it kills both first
The book focuses on corruption and factionalism, which in my opinion the ANC must kill before they kill the ANC.
Mathekga traces the ANC’s struggles with governance in a liberal democracy to its failure to transform from a liberation movement into a political party after 1994, when it took power.
He argues that the vagaries of the liberation struggle, which intensified when the ANC was banned for 30 years from 1960 to 1990, pushed the party towards “democratic centralism”, which made it more autocratic and therefore more autocratic.
unsuited to the demands of a liberal democratic governance system.
At the same time, the centralization of decision-making perpetuates an elitism that excludes the ordinary people that the ANC claims to represent. This, despite claims to represent their will through the argument that decisions emanating from the branches reflect “the collective will”.
It is an elitism that is neither transparent nor accountable, at least at the level of individual responsibility. This is the scourge of the ANC and therefore of South African politics.
Confuse party and state
The second important point of the book is that the ANC amalgamates the party and the state. This has the deleterious effect of reducing South Africa to the ANC and its shenanigans.
This is the basis of the third critical point of the book; set a timeline for when the ANC loses power, and how that will change South Africa.
In essence, the fortunes of the country are tied to what happens in the ANC. It is a reality that all South Africans must face. That is why every South African should read this book.
As noted in the last three chapters, South African politics are moving from the bottom up and moving towards a more competitive political system. New critical actors (ordinary people and civil society) are working the system to force political accountability and meaningful change.
In addition, horizontally, the Chapter 9 institutions – which protect the country’s democracy – and the judiciary appear as power centers that successfully challenge executive and legislative excesses or silences in such a way as to foster a functioning separation of powers. in the public interest.
As Mathekga rightly argues, this also comes with associated risks for the country’s survival and development. On the one hand, this will lead to fragmentation and cleavages along ethnic, racial and class lines that exacerbate the disruptive tension between extremist identity politics and populist nationalism.
In addition, the ANC’s responses to its diminishing dominance, which include a tendency to resort to “a quasi-dictatorship under the guise of a developmental state”, pose a threat to democratic consolidation. For example, Mathekga argues that the theoretical creation of district development councils aimed at consolidating and coordinating service delivery in all municipalities, extends the ANC’s grip on municipalities in the same way it seeks to restructure state institutions to extend its hold over the country, and counteract its decline in political power.
In my opinion, consensual leadership such as that favored by President Cyril Ramaphosa is essential to address the political and socio-economic fragmentation that afflicts South Africa. For good effect, this should be combined with what the German political philosopher and historian Jan Werner Muller calls “constitutional patriotism”. It is a set of beliefs and dispositions that promote liberal democracy.
Maintaining hegemony
Mathekga concludes by stressing that the ANC “will remain a force to be reckoned with”. He also argues that he “will not go quietly into the night”.
This is no exaggeration given the opportunities available to the ANC to devise new strategies to maintain its hegemony. These include exploiting a fragmented political space and weak opposition.
Indeed, the exact date of the end of his reign depends on what the party does or does not do between now and its elective conference in 2022.
For example, if Ramaphosa reappears as president and continues to quietly separate party from state, including building a consensual leadership, he could gain broad support to win the 2024 election. This will be reinforced by his stint. at the top speed in the fight against corruption.
Read more: Precarious power leans towards Ramaphosa in battle within South Africa’s ruling party
Reforming the economy to improve access, appropriate and redistribute land without harming the economy and create jobs for the burgeoning unemployed youth will also work in the ANC’s favor.
Finally, if Ramaphosa makes significant strides in internalizing democracy and debate within the ANC, which may produce an acceptable successor both within the party and in other centers of power in society, such a candidate would win the 2029 elections. This would lead the ANC to another decade of domination of the South African political landscape.
There are a lot of ifs. But it shows how closely South Africa’s fortunes are tied to the ANC.
Christopher Isike does not work, consult, own stock or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has not disclosed any relevant affiliation beyond his academic position.
By Christopher Isike, Professor of African Politics and International Relations, University of Pretoria
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