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The Sahel region, a belt of largely semi-arid countries under the Sahara, continues to face jihadist insurgents with diverse affiliations.
Broadly defined “jihadist insurgents” rely on religious rhetoric for political mobilization and use violence in pursuit of their goals.
Groups such as Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa Province have demonstrated their resilience in Nigeria and parts of Niger. Groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara continue to mobilize in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
These groups often receive international attention because of their violence. An estimated 500 civilians were killed, allegedly by jihadists, in the Sahel in 2021. Recent examples include massacres in Niger and Burkina Faso.
But such violence obscures another dimension of these groups: they develop alternative forms of local governance in rural areas. And the way they rule varies, both within and within groups, even though they are affiliated with a broad Salafist-jihadist ideology.
There is only scattered academic research on this subject. Therefore, as part of a larger study of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria, we reviewed existing research to explore how jihadists rule in the region. Also, why does their governance differ?
We have found that they do not follow strict ideological models to impose their rule. Nor are they based solely on the use of spectacular violence. They are constantly adapting the way they govern in response to internal factional dynamics and pressure from state and non-state actors. They also respond to local politics.
How jihadists rule
Jihadist insurgents, like other insurgents, rule by force. But this violence can vary to the extent that it is selective or indiscriminate. Subgroups of the Al Qaida-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin have generally targeted non-collaborators, government authorities and international forces, mainly in Mali. The Islamic State of the Greater Sahara, on the other hand, attacked civilians indiscriminately.
Jihadist groups sometimes locally impose their interpretation of Sharia (religious law) with severe punishments. The same group may exercise restraint elsewhere to avoid alienating local communities. Their transnational ideological commitments may be incongruent with local norms and the interests of existing power holders.
Local elites such as religious leaders and village leaders can play an important role in determining how jihadist groups exercise their authority. For example, the Ansar Dine group in Mali’s Kidal region retained the services of local Sharia judges (qadis) who limited the group’s severe application of Sharia law.
The researchers pointed out how rebel governors sometimes develop elaborate bureaucracies, but jihadist insurgents in the Sahel appear to have developed more fluid and less formal local institutions, to maintain social control over local populations.
Groups like the Katiba Macina and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara have developed mobile courts to provide local justice where they could not establish a permanent presence. Some groups collected zakat (Islamic tax) from the local population. But, from the little research that exists, the public services rendered by the jihadists in return appear to be quite limited.
Although these groups may espouse regional or global goals, they tend to position their governance plans within existing conflicts and cleavages. Jihadists seek to take over local communities by allying themselves with certain groups in existing conflicts. For example, some have sought to recruit Fulani pastoralists by promising them access to resources such as pastures. They also intervened to settle disputes. This, in order to provide a type of justice that is more efficient than the state.
Explain the different styles
One factor explaining why groups differ in style of governance is the role of state and non-state actors such as militias, vigilantes and rivals for control. For example, counterinsurgency operations can prevent jihadists from building institutions, confining them to a more obscure style of governance. In addition, rival jihadist groups can adapt their styles of governance to outbid each other in order to maintain community support.
Another explanation is the organizational structure. Jihadist groups differ in their cohesion and degree of centralization. The dynamics of factions can lead to differences in governance. Leadership may not always be able to discipline sub-commanders to ensure their vision is implemented locally.
Differences in ideological engagement can provide clues as to what to expect from jihadist governance. But there are no ready-made models for “real” Islamic governance. Commanders and group members interpret ideology and are themselves influenced by local traditions and demands.
Finally, local politics and conflicts strongly influence jihadist governance. Exploiting social divisions and grievances can allow a group to impose new systems without relying solely on violence. The group’s existing social relationships with the locals, such as ethnic affinities, clan or tribal ties, influence what they can do. Local actors can also mount an organized collective resistance that calls into question jihadist governance projects.
Global labels, localized governance
These preliminary findings contain important lessons for policy makers. The label of Salafi jihadism will not tell us how a group will rule. On the contrary, they must be studied as complex political organizations emerging from local socio-political and economic contexts. Support for jihadists often comes from aggrieved groups who see an opportunity for advancement. Their local momentum is not just a question of religious appeal.
Resolving jihadist conflicts in the Sahel will require an approach that treats them not only as terrorists or criminals, but also as political actors seeking to provide an alternative form of governance.
Natasja Rupesinghe receives funding from the Research Council of Norway.
Mikael Hiberg Naghizadeh does not work, consult, own shares or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has not disclosed any relevant affiliation beyond his academic appointment.
By Natasja Rupesinghe, researcher and doctoral student at the University of Oxford, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and
Mikael Hiberg Naghizadeh, PhD candidate in international relations, University of Oxford
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