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It has been ten years since ordinary people from various Arab states took to the streets, demanding freedom and calling for the fall of authoritarian regimes. With the exception of Tunisia, none of these uprisings resulted in a lasting transition to democracy.
In Egypt, the army has installed a military dictatorship. Opponents of the regime risk detention, torture and, more often than before, death. Libya is a failed state, challenged by warlords and ruthless international competition. Syria and Yemen are the most devastated countries of all the Arab Spring countries. Hundreds of thousands have died and millions displaced. Early hopes that the uprisings would transform the Arab world have been shattered. The state of the Arab Spring today is nothing like what people wanted ten years ago.
In this context of shattered dreams, the region’s authoritarian regimes are consolidating themselves by renewing a discourse on the importance of stability that only they can bring, and Western democracies are buying it. While the United States and major Western powers initially supported the wave of change in the Arab Spring – albeit selectively – they quickly reverted to a policy of subsidizing and supporting Arab autocrats, falling back on an essentialist trope. and orientalist on the dangers of change and stability. authoritarian regime. They can do better.
Western democracies can do better by crafting policies centered on two interrelated truths: 1) self-sufficient citizens of Arab states will continue to demand legitimate governance and 2) authoritarian Arab regimes cannot guarantee stability. While conditions today may be grim, in the long run the real power over the political trajectory of the Arab world is in the hands of its people. Western powers should therefore reconsider their commitments to Arab leaders.
Authoritarian Arab regimes use fear to discourage civic engagement and mobilization. The oppressive measures aim to demonstrate that public protests are futile. This deprives people of their right to true citizenship – in which governors derive their legitimate power from the people.
Yet despite many horrific episodes of state abuse, protests, including new ones, continue to take place across the Arab world. In the past two years, uprisings have erupted in Algeria, Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon. The truth is that Arab regimes are deeply unpopular and continue to cause and exacerbate political and economic problems.
The Arab Spring is not over, because the Arab dictators have not put an end to the aspirations of their populations. Youth-led and tech-enabled civil society in Arab states is now global, networked and increasingly able to launch campaigns, manage messages and organize public mobilization. While Arab regimes are keenly aware of the power of online tools used by civil society, they are largely incapable of infiltrating, co-opting or containing such modes of activism.
By piercing the wall of fear that enveloped them, the people of the Arab Spring became aware of the strength of their collective power, but also of the fragility of authoritarian narratives. The Arab populations were able to regain part of their citizenship and they demanded real legitimacy in governance. Even though the dictatorships did not fall, a shift in power – however slight – has occurred. The failure of Western powers to recognize this change robs people of their ability to act as political actors and prevents good policy prescriptions.
While poor socio-economic conditions were major reasons behind the Arab Spring protests – and continue to spark public discontent – the heart of the problem has always been a broken social contract. Arab regimes lack political legitimacy because they rule without broad consent. Repression will mobilize the Arab populations again and again.
The argument that strong-fisted leaders can bring stability using fear and force is utterly dishonest. It feeds on Western assumptions that the Middle East is inherently resistant to democratization and therefore Western powers should support strong regimes, however corrupt and oppressive they may be. This argument ignores the power of civil society. This is why so many political scientists have failed to predict the Arab Spring, as have Western policy makers and experts. It is only by recognizing the potential of civil society to challenge existing power structures that one can understand that authoritarian regimes are still sources of instability.
Western support for autocratic Arab regimes is not the most important factor preventing democratization in the region, but it strengthens otherwise fragile governments. Rather, Western democracies must commit to advancing their values of human rights, rule of law and accountability.
It is the moral thing to do, but there is also strategic value in supporting civil society in the region. The authoritarian and elite-ruled Arab world will continue to weaken global democratic standards and export security threats beyond its borders. This is not good for countries like Canada that depend on these standards and the international order on which they are built. Supporting the Arab populations does not mean inviting disorder in the region. The stability of the Arab world can only be ensured when its people can shape their governance structures in such a way as to enable them to live in dignity and prosperity.
This is not a call for Western interventions or nation-building initiatives. Rather, it is an invitation to Western policymakers not to neglect the power that lies on the combustible streets of the Arab world. If it is truly concerned about long-term regional stability in the Middle East, the West must advocate reforms in the Arab world by engaging with civil society actors and conditioning security and trade cooperation with them. Arab States for the advancement of human rights and the rule of law.
Arab regimes are far more vulnerable than many in the West realize. One thing that must be evident now is that oppression will mobilize the oppressed. The people of the region have realized how powerful their mobilization can be. Lasting stability will only come when the governance structures of the region are inclusive and accountable.
For more analysis on the role of social media in the Arab Spring and the repression that followed, read Karim Zidan’s essay “The Double Edged Sword” here.
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