Controlling the conflict in Yemen: the US Congress and the war powers

Yemen Conflict

We continue to hear it. State Secretary Mike Pompeo strongly believes that the conflict in Yemen should be resolved. "We all want this conflict to end," he said. "We all want to improve the catastrophic humanitarian situation." Then comes the knot, piquing, irritating and undeniable: "But the Trump administration is fundamentally at odds over the fact that the reduction in aid to the led coalition by Saudi Arabia is the means to achieve these goals.

The Yemenis may be suffering and heading for oblivion, but the resolution of the conflict is not intended to cripple the Saudi-led coalition. Some allies need help and encouragement. To that end, the United States would continue to grant "the Saudi-led coalition the support it needs to defeat Iran-backed rebels and ensure a just peace." Such an attitude is minimal in the humanitarian stakes, given that US aid to the Saudis and UAE air campaign has been indispensable for targeting civilian objects (schools, funerals, weddings, drug treatment plants). Water and medical clinics). A naval blockade imposed by the coalition has also triggered a wider crisis of famine and disease, a famine that could prove to be one of the worst of all memories. These are not exaggerations.

Another absurdity also arises. The United States' continued support of Saudi Arabia for Yemen's efforts not only fails to meet the national interest test, but it can also be said to be totally against it. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took advantage of the conflict and was sponsored by coalition forces. In short, a sworn enemy of American influence is subsidized by Washington's dizzying policy on the subject, supposedly intended to fight these same enemies.

The bloody logic of Pompeo and his company has not been so successful in Congress. For some time now, enthusiasm for US-backed efforts has diminished, which has remained, unlike many years ago, unauthorized by lawmakers. US lawmakers, who tend to spend their time in hibernation over control of the executive power, have generally been too indifferent when they referred to the 1973 War Powers Act.

In recent times, some change has occurred. The House and Senate have begun the process of adopting respective resolutions that, once finalized, may well put an end to US funding for the war effort in Yemen. It is actually more ordinary than audacious, but in America of President Donald Trump, the ordinary is remarkable.

The movements began with the pbadage of H.J. Res. 37 on 13 February, directing President Donald Trump "to withdraw the US armed forces from hostilities in Yemen or touching it in Yemen within 30 days, unless Congress allows a later withdrawal date," he said. issue a declaration of war or specifically authorize the use of the armed forces ". The resolution does not affect the continuation of operations against Al Qaeda, but specifically prohibits the provision of air-to-air refueling to non-US aircraft engaged in conflict-related functions.

Senate Resolution, S.J. Res. 7, is of similar formulation. As Senator Bernie Sanders, who co-sponsored the Senate resolution with Utah Republican Mike Lee, told his colleagues, "The bottom line is that the United States should not support a catastrophic war waged by a despotic regime with irresponsible behavior. foreign police. "

What is different in the approaches this time is the use of the procedures by the Congress that were added to the resolution on the powers of war in 1983. In the Senate, this provision allows the authors of the resolution neutralize filibusters, impose votes and remove obstacles. All this, despite opposition from congressional leaders or some senators.

The resolutions in question have also been amended to allow the President of the United States to continue to share information where it is judged in the national interest. This provision, in itself, allows Trump to have a back door to continue supporting the Saudi coalition. The Department of Defense has also argued that US support for the conflict does not fall within the definition of "hostilities" within the meaning of the resolution on the powers of war. Joint resolutions, to that end, would have no legal consequence and, as the DoD's General Counsel repeated in February, "would also undermine our ability to foster long-term relationships, to increase interoperability, to promote burden sharing and enhance communication capacity. security architectures around the world. Such tortuous remarks are of a confessional nature and demonstrate the depth of US engagement in the conflict even as officials seek to deny it.

The scene is now ready for President Trump to consider a veto. He clearly explained, the White House claiming that the premise of H.J. Res 37 is wrong. The statement issued to reprimand supporters of the resolution insists that US support for the Saudi-led coalition is at best minimal. "The provision of this support did not bring US forces to be introduced into hostilities." Still slippery, the statement goes on to state that "support is provided pursuant to licenses and approvals granted under the Arms Export Control Act, Department of Defense to provide logistical support to foreign countries, and the constitutional powers of the President."

As always, when the executive fears a limitation of its broad powers, the threat of constitutional instability is launched. Given that US support to Saudi Arabia and Allied countries in the Yemen conflict is based on the use of executive constitutional powers, the resolution "would raise serious constitutional problems in to the extent that it seeks to override the President's determination as Commander-in-Chief ". In fact, the time has come for Congress to take the lead and count on war.

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College in Cambridge. He teaches at RMIT University in Melbourne. E-mail: [email protected]