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The Trump administration is putting pressure on Iran: last week, the president announced that he would try to use the threat of sanctions to force Iranian oil sales to zero. Earlier this month, he announced the appointment of the Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization. Government members are now discussing the opportunity to renew the sanctions waivers for cooperation of Europe, China and Russia with Iran on civilian nuclear projects. These exemptions allow international partners to work with Iran on non-military projects without fear of US sanctions.
Not to renew the renunciations would be indefensible. The fact that there is even an internal debate is enlightening: at least some Trump advisers wish a crisis with Iran, and the sooner the better.
The withdrawal of renunciations of civilian nuclear cooperation may seem less aggressive than measures such as the abusive designation of the Guard Corps, but it is one of the most dangerous measures left by the administration, jeopardizing cooperation which is Iran's last practical benefit for this agreement. The exemptions cover three projects. The first is Fordow. The discovery of Fordow, which was originally a secret facility for underground uranium enrichment, has sparked intense international concern and a multilateral agreement on the sanctions that have paved the way for the development of nuclear power plants. agreement with Iran. As part of the deal, Fordow's uranium enrichment infrastructure was dismantled and the plant turned into a harmless "nuclear, physical and technological center" led by Russia and the European Union. Some critics he's complainingFordow was not "closed" and the agreement did not need to be dynamited or abandoned, but it was no longer a uranium enrichment facility. If Iran is not allowed to collaborate with Russia and the European Union on this new plan, Fordow could give Fordow more threatening uses.
The second is Arak, where, before the agreement, Iran was building a heavy-water nuclear reactor capable of producing enough military-grade plutonium for a bomb each year. As part of the deal, Iran destroyed the reactor core in exchange for a promise that China and the United States would help oversee the design and construction of a replacement reactor producing significantly less plutonium from the reactor. inferior quality that can not be used for the manufacture of weapons. The United Kingdom has now entered the role of the United States. Iran wants to proceed with the design of the new reactor and its negligible proliferation risk. If China and the United Kingdom withdraw from the project because of the threat of US sanctions, Tehran could simply go back to the old plan. Many ambiguous Iranian statements about spares could be used to rebuild the core of the reactor, but Iran is of course able to take over the project that it has already built and dismantled once. This is why the negotiators insisted not only on the destruction of the core, but also on the reconstruction of the reactor according to a different design.
The latter is the only functioning commercial nuclear reactor in Iran, a project supported by Russia in Bushehr. Bushehr dates back to the time of the Shah, but was disrupted by the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. Russia took power in 1995 and, as US concern over Iran's nuclear program increased, it was a point of contention between Washington and Moscow. Nevertheless, Russia has taken nonproliferation concerns seriously, controlling Bushehr's fuel so that Iran will not be able to divert fissile material from civilian use to military use. Although the United States has never provided specific exemptions, it has never imposed sanctions on Bushehr's Russian partners either.
Even now, supporters of the removal of other exemptions, such as the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, often make an exception for Bushehr, stating that this does not pose a problem of proliferation. They are right, but as with the other two projects, the distinction has to be made elsewhere. If Washington does not provide new exemptions and applies new sanctions, it is unlikely that Russia will comply. Rosatom, Russia's international supplier of commercial nuclear products, an irreplaceable partner of the United States in nuclear safety and security projects around the world, is probably too important for the United States to allow.
It is difficult to predict what will happen if Washington refuses to extend some or all of these waivers. Most of the sanctions re-imposed by the US withdrawal from the Iran-target agreement targeted private sector players, so compliance or violation is not a government decision. Much of nuclear cooperation resides in governments. While some officials may fear US sanctions, would the proud governments that negotiated the agreement really move away from US threats? If they hold their position, would the United States really target the governments some of its closest allies and most important partners?
So why would the United States risk jeopardizing the Iran agreement's progress on non-proliferation – which is being maintained despite tremendous economic pressure on Iran – as well as on a break-up? with our allies?
Simple. Iran is still respecting the agreement. As long as he will continue to do so, a future Democratic president could simply bring the United States back to the deal, thus nullifying the hard work of the Iranian hawks around Trump. Some critics of the Iranian agreement want future presidents to sink. But new Trump sanctions may be canceled from the White House. The only reliable way to end the nuclear deal is to pressure Tehran for it to be violated.
On Sunday, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif reiterated the dark threat that Iran could draw from the nuclear agreement and even the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unfortunately, some of President Trump's advisers and supporters – the proponents of withdrawing waivers of civil nuclear cooperation – prefer a return to an unrestrained Iranian nuclear program rather than a realistic and effective return to diplomacy. the Iran agreement. It is hard to imagine a riskier or crazier base for developing policies in a stressed region.
Jarrett Blanc is Senior Research Scientist in Geoeconomics and Strategy at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was the coordinator of the State Department for Iran's nuclear implementation with President Obama.
Image: US State Department, Flickr
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