Hong Kong protesters must beware of provoking Chinese oppression

Recent events in Hong Kong have tended to follow a familiar course. A sober beginning; escalating into violence as police enter with tear gas and rubber bullets, then, sooner or later, nothing. The events go out. So it is five years ago, with the "fictional revolution" pro-democracy that called for free elections. This may be the case again with this week's protests against a bill that would formalize extradition to mainland China.

An exception occurred in 2003 when mbad demonstrations led to the abandonment of a national security bill. The question of whether this week's protesters can replicate this success is another problem. Hong Kong Director Carrie Lam seems determined to pbad the contentious bill.

In many respects, however, the beginning of this event has given a different tone to that of the umbrella movement, which is largely composed of young people. In the numbers that took part in the initial march, in her solemnity, and especially in the extent of her participation throughout the ages and social groups, she recalled nothing more than the mbad march of mourning this Sunday. of June, 30 years after the Tiananmen Square mbadacre.

It was before the United Kingdom returned the colony to China, and the conflagration in Beijing served as a fatal warning that Hong Kong could lose. All Hong Kong – it seemed at least – turned out to be wearing white mourning to defend itself. Contrary to some hopes of the time, however, neither Tiananmen Square nor the mbad demonstration in Hong Kong prevented what was going to happen. On July 1, 1997, the Union flag was lowered and the former leaders went to sea, leaving the formula "One country, two systems" to the sole rank of protecting the special status of the former colony for – has been officially fixed – the next 50 years.

This formula is now facing a new test. Its opponents, who include many lawyers, insist that the new law, regardless of its form, be applied only to those who have committed crimes in mainland China, will extend the jurisdiction of Beijing to Hong Kong. After all, China remains under Communist rule and its definition of "crime" may well be more elastic than in the former British colony.

On the other hand, as its proponents maintain, a formal extradition provision could allow people who have sought refuge in Hong Kong to benefit from due process for the first time. In the current state of things, China is not above the simple abduction of its wanted individuals in total disregard of the law. Again, would a formal extradition provision put an end to that or would it simply expose more people, including political dissidents, to a Chinese court case?

"One country, two systems" does not solve the problem. An orderly diplomatic formula, it has always opposed idealists to realists, with just a little ambiguity between the two. During the negotiations between the United Kingdom and China, which I covered in the late 1980s, there was a human rights and civil rights lobby in Hong Kong that was admirably vigorous. that a "realist" component quieter and more resigned, which provided at least an agreement with Beijing. the price of a quiet life, openness to the world and the freedom to continue doing business.

Needless to say, there was little love lost between the two sides. Realists feared that idealists would endanger the future peace and prosperity of everyone; the idealists feared that freedom would be sacrificed to money. And both, in their own way, were right.

The extradition bill is the last battlefield. Carrie Lam, of the executive, said that Beijing did not impose it in Hong Kong, and Beijing seems to confirm it. But it is legislation that would be clearly appropriate for the continent and can therefore be considered, in a certain way, as preventive. It is often wise to anticipate the demands of others.

The relative economic weight of China and Hong Kong is also very different from what it was. In 1997, Hong Kong accounted for 18% of China's GDP; it was over 10% in 2003, while it accounts for less than 3%. China attracts its own foreign investment and manages its own exports. The crucial role formerly played by Hong Kong as an intermediary is no longer.

The impact this could have on Beijing's compliance with the "one country, two systems" commitment, less than half of the 50-year warranty period, can be discussed in both directions. On the one hand, Hong Kong's economic importance to China is so small that it may be cheaper and easier for Beijing to leave Hong Kong itself and let it languish at the margins.

It could also be argued that any overt intervention – ranging from financial pressures to numerical superiority, cyber-superiority, or even brutal military repression – would not only kill the hen (now much smaller) that lays the ground. gold egg, but to draw international stigma at a time when Beijing gives every sign of wanting to be accepted as a fully liberated global player.

However, 30 years have already pbaded since Tiananmen Square, but some of the considerations that applied at the time still apply. Civil disobedience and disorder that disrupts the functioning of a small part of what Beijing would consider a Chinese state could be considered a security challenge or an affront to its dignity, or both. There is no indication that Chinese leaders have become more tolerant on both sides over the past years.

Beijing could also see a danger of "contamination" – going as far as the spread of troubles of all kinds on the continent. Beijing could judge that the risk of leaving such a potential threat unattended is greater than international ostracism, or worse, that could result from any action it would decide to take. Moreover, his global economic weight is so much greater that he could not afford to ignore sanctions or similar measures. Remember how even the most severe critics of China have returned to normal relations after 1989.

At a time when China's leader, Xi Jingping, apparently feels the need to quell dissent at home and eliminate any potential resistance in Xinjiang's Uighur-populated area, it seems doubtful that he is dealing with with much indulgence serious troubles in Hong Kong. .

That is why, although it seems despicable and defeatist to say it, the realists of Hong Kong probably have an even greater advantage over its idealists than in the period that preceded the transfer of responsibilities. Those who protest against the extradition bill may indeed be right – if not immediately, over time – that "Hong Kong will simply become another Chinese city if this project of law is adopted ". But this is the relentless trajectory on which the former British colony is located, given the vastly superior and growing power of China. Any action that renders Hong Kong ungovernable by its own authorities risks provoking direct intervention by the most undesirable ones.

The best hope could be that popular demands for political change sweep the continent successfully before Beijing finds a pretext for imposing its repressive will in Hong Kong. That a democratic China can be carried out in an orderly manner, and without Hong Kong being destroyed in the whirlwind, however calls for much more optimism that even my generally positive view of the world can not result.