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It was a relationship characterized by bitterness and incomprehension. It all started with a poorly negotiated agreement – mediocre, that is to say from the point of view of the European Union – between Brussels and AstraZeneca for the supply of COVID-19 vaccine doses. Less stringent in terms of sanctions and consequences than the deal between the UK and AstraZeneca, the EU version was indeed the poor cousin, giving the company great leeway in terms of production schedules and delays. . While the UK government managed to insert the corresponding clause allowing it to terminate the deal and invoke punitive clauses against AstraZeneca, the EU contract does not mention it. But in August 2020, EU negotiators ignored this, starry-eyed at the company’s pledge to deliver 300 million doses of their COVID-19 vaccine, with the possibility of getting 100. additional millions. The result was an unfinished deal based on gentlemanly promises.
Delays and supply problems duly manifested. In January, the pharmaceutical company informed the European Commission that it would ship fewer doses to the OR than initially promised. “While there is no expected delay for the start of our vaccine shipments if we receive approval in Europe,” said an AstraZeneca spokesperson, “initial volumes will be lower than initial forecast in due to reduced yields at a manufacturing site within our European supply chain. . In the first three months, 30 million of the initial 90 million shots were delivered to the EU. Few improvements were made in the following quarter: 70 million doses out of 180 million promised.
Delays and supply disruptions resulted in a slow vaccination effort in the EU and also helped unravel relations between the bloc and the UK. EU officials watched, envious and angered by the UK’s comparatively more effective and faster vaccination campaign.
It is precisely this latitude in the behavior of the company that is today challenged in the courts. The European Commission is suing AstraZeneca, arguing that the company has neither fulfilled its obligations under the vaccine supply contract nor has an appropriate plan for the timely delivery of doses. “Our priority,” wrote Stella Kyriakides, EU Commissioner for Health and Food Safety, “is to ensure that COVID-19 vaccine deliveries take place to protect the health of people. [EU citizens]. ”
In court, Rafael Jafferali of the EU said: “We are demanding deliveries by the end of June and we also demand with immediate effect the use of all the plants listed in the contract.” A central argument is that AstraZeneca preferred not to use all of those mentioned (four are mentioned, two of which are located in the UK); the EU’s argument is that the company was required to use all plants. Failure to do so would put him in breach of contract.
AstraZeneca Hakim Boularbah’s brief showed how far apart the parties are in terms of understanding the contract. “There is no obligation to use the factories,” came the argument. The point is crucial, given that the company only used sites in Belgium and the Netherlands, sparing the UK companies run by Oxford Biomedica and Cobra Biologics. Nor was there any recourse to the Catalent plant in the United States, mentioned in the contract as a possible “back-up supply site”.
Whatever the merits of the EU’s legal arguments, some countries in the bloc have been wary of taking the company to court. Germany and France expressed doubts. As one diplomat explained Politico, “What concrete can we do if AstraZeneca says, ‘Take a closer look at our production sites: we just don’t have vaccines’?” There were also questions about the enforceability of any decision. The whole process risks becoming an empty display of ineffective anger.
Then comes the issue of bad publicity. Reluctance to take COVID-19 vaccines is a widespread sentiment within the bloc. Reliability and trust are already tested. A number of European diplomats fear the lawsuit could further tarnish a company that is already struggling in terms of branding.
Much of this can be attributed to the sabotage efforts of various leaders within the Union itself, including French President Emmanuel Macron, who struggled to withstand shots on goal on the AstraZeneca vaccine. At the end of January, he judged the vaccine to be “near effective” for people over 65. The following month, he changed his mind. Result: the confidence of the French in the vaccine, as well as in much of Europe, was shattered.
This markedly sour note perpetuates the deeply disunited situation in efforts to combat the global pandemic. Vaccine patriotism and parochialism continue to limit access. Pharmaceutical giants continue to maintain IP protections even as they struggle to maintain supply. And the EU’s own measure of negotiating and planning competence was deemed insufficient.
Dr Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Fellow at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He teaches at RMIT University in Melbourne. E-mail: [email protected]
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