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Studies have shown that terrorism does not end with a military approach. A coercive counterterrorism strategy has often produced negative results by fostering more violence and creating a humanitarian crisis.
Non-military approaches are increasingly adopted as a more practical way to eliminate the root cause of terrorism and produce a peaceful, long-term outcome. The approach is characterized by political negotiations and grassroots development. De-radicalization, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration programs are also included.
In 2015, Nigeria adopted a non-military approach in its counterterrorism efforts. This followed criticism of its predominantly military approach. The idea was to supplement his over-exploited firepower in the northeast region.
I conducted a study as part of the growing debate about taking a non-military approach to counterterrorism in Nigeria.
In particular, I focused on the deradicalization program adopted by the Nigerian government to counter Boko Haram.
The design and implementation of the program has come under heavy criticism for its structural weakness and its contribution to the problem of violent extremism.
In my article, I recommend steps that can be taken to strengthen the de-radicalization process. I also highlight the problems and challenges of de-radicalization and reintegration programs for ex-terrorists in the northeast region of the country.
Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Program
Nigeria’s soft approach to resolving the conflict in the northeast region began in 2013. The Goodluck Jonathan administration negotiated with Boko Haram leaders and created a framework for amnesty and disarmament.
But the movement was frustrated because the group’s leaders rejected the amnesty. Despite the refusal, a new agency called “Countering Violent Extremism” was created. It was codenamed “National Security Corridor”. Its objective was to tackle the root causes of recruitment into Boko Haram and to create a process for the rehabilitation of defectors from the group.
In an effort to keep its promise to eliminate terrorists in the northeast region, the Buhari-led administration has made changes to the country’s security architecture. These included the overhaul of the national security corridor. It also led to a new de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration program.
Dubbed “Operation Safe Corridor”, the program identified two categories of defectors: “high risk” and “low risk”. High-risk deserters, considered the most hardened combatants, would be prosecuted even after defection. People at low risk were classified as those with a less vicious record. The plan was for them to undergo an intensive program of deradicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration.
The exercise plotted was a 52 week program. It included deradicalization therapy, vocational training and basic education. Religious re-education before reintegration into society has also been included.
The program is carried out in two different rehabilitation camps: a camp in Mallam Sidi, Gombe State and the Bulumkutu Rehabilitation Center in Maiduguri, Borno State.
The Mallam Sidi camp has male defectors. Maiduguri camp is reserved for women and children.
Data available at the time of research (2019-2020) shows that 601 repentant terrorists have so far graduated from Mallam Sidi camp, while 1,935 have been released in Bulumkutu women’s camp.
Challenges of Nigeria’s DRR program
Our research identified a number of major challenges in the reintegration of ex-Boko Haram combatants.
The first was the lack of community engagement. Affected people in the conflict-affected region are not significantly involved in the program. This led to a deepening of negative perceptions of communities about the program.
This led to a total rejection of the rehabilitated defectors. We found that the reinstated former terrorists were still perceived as dangerous and unsuitable for society by those around them.
Experiences in Germany, the UK, Norway and Sweden have shown that a successful deradicalization program must be inclusive and, in particular, must take into account the community.
Second, we found that there were not enough structures for true reconciliation and forgiveness. For example, the program does not address the horrific experiences of victims at the hands of people who have repented. This has led to a growing belief that the government pays more attention to repentant terrorists than to their victims.
Failure to address this concern has thwarted attempts at genuine reconciliation and forgiveness. These are necessary for the success of the program.
Third, we found that there was a lack of preventive measures to prevent radicalization.
Many de-radicalization programs include preventative strategies to discourage easy recruitment into terrorism by targeting potential recruits and not just combatants. The UK’s CONTEST (Counter-terrorism Strategy) has four strategies, one of which is to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.
The Nigerian agenda does not target people who are not yet terrorists, but who may have been exposed to terrorist ideologies.
The fourth problem was the lack of public confidence. A continental survey of public trust in 37 African countries showed that Nigerians trust state institutions the least. This means that new government programs are viewed with great suspicion.
This mistrust extended to the results of the program. People did not trust the claim that the ex-terrorists had been rehabilitated and were fit for reintegration.
For their part, voluntary defectors are cautious about the government’s promises. This makes them reluctant to drop their guns and embrace new life.
The fifth problem we identified was the weakness of the post-reintegration engagement plan. An amnesty program implemented in the Niger Delta includes a plan to economically engage defectors after rehabilitation. This was not provided for in this program.
This is a major shortcoming given the state of the economy. The Nigerian economy suffers from growing unemployment and high poverty rates. Growing insecurity has further compounded the problem in the informal sector where rehabilitated individuals are expected to integrate.
Reintegration without a substantial plan for economic empowerment could render the whole effort unnecessary. It could also bring ex-terrorists back to armed groups.
Finally, we identified the lack of oversight as a problem. Similar programs have shown the possibility of recidivism by so-called rehabilitated individuals. This has led to the establishment of sophisticated monitoring systems to keep these people under surveillance after their reinstatement. While Nigeria is currently trying to update its national database, the lack of a reliable database currently makes it difficult to keep tabs on ex-terrorists.
Go forward
De-radicalization and reintegration programs are globally recognized as a useful means of combating terrorism. They can also produce lasting peace. However, they must be really implemented to be effective.
The problems identified in the current program need to be seriously addressed. While the government is doing its part, citizens should also buy into the program. No major war has ended without negotiations and concessions. The Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars are examples of this. They ended with political negotiations and reintegration programs for rebel leaders and their soldiers.
Hakeem Onapajo receives funding from the American Council of Learned Societies through the African Humanities Program.
By Hakeem Onapajo, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of the Nile in Nigeria
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