Nigeria has democracy but not development. How to fix it



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After struggling for 39 years to develop fertile ground for democratic governance, Nigeria reached a turning point in May 1999 when it became the fourth largest democracy in the world. This happened after 16 years of brutal military rule.

Despite complaints of fraud by the political opposition in every election held since 1999, local and international election observers have viewed each of Nigeria’s general elections as relatively free and fair.

Economically, Nigeria is now the largest economy in Africa and the 26th globally. It now attracts more foreign investment than in the military era.

Overall, the Nigerian democratic experience appears to be a long way off.

But has democracy led to development in Nigeria? Award-winning international political economist Omano Edigheji, in his new book, Nigeria Democracy Without Development: How To Fix It, strongly argues that the Nigerian democratic experience is tainted with monumental flaws. This despite the modest progress it has made.

The book offers interesting details and finely argued conjectures about the paradoxical relationship between democracy and development in Nigeria.

In this review, I organize the main ideas of the book into three parts:

  • the paradox of democracy without development in Nigeria;
  • explanations of democracy without development in Nigeria; and
  • paths to democracy with development in Nigeria.

The paradox of liberal democracy

The book demonstrates that Nigeria continues to face enormous development and institutional challenges. This despite the implementation of Western liberal democracy and good governance reforms driven by donors. The challenges include human capital deficits and extreme poverty. This is due to underinvestment in health, education and infrastructure. For example, Nigeria’s Human Development Index value for 2020 was 0.539, placing the country in the low human development category.

Of all African countries, Nigeria faces the most significant challenges in reducing poverty and inequality due to rapid population growth. Over 40% of Nigerians (83 million people) live below the poverty line of $ 1.90 per day.

Another 25% (53 million) are vulnerable. Yet the combined wealth of Nigeria’s five richest men is $ 29.9 billion. According to a recent report by Oxfam International, the combined wealth of Nigeria’s five richest men could end national poverty. The implication here is that democracy has led to a massive increase in poverty and economic inequality in Nigeria.

The book points to another major challenge: the high unemployment rate, which has been rising steadily since 1999. At 33%, Nigeria’s unemployment rate is one of the highest in the world. Youth unemployment is higher than that of older workers. This means that the risks of violent conflict and civil unrest are particularly high.

And despite anti-corruption campaigns, Nigeria is still seen as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Nigeria was ranked 149th out of 180 countries in 2020, the second lowest in West Africa after Guinea-Bissau.

Then there is the security issue. Bandits, separatists and Islamist insurgents increasingly threaten the government’s grip on power. Mass kidnappings, killings, mutilations and other forms of insecurity are on the rise across the country. This is true even in the most stable regions of the country.

Overall, the book empirically demonstrates that the democratic experience of the past 20 years has had negative results on Nigerians. Nigeria’s corrupt political elites (with few exceptions) have benefited greatly from the democratic experience. Not the masses.

Explanations of democracy without development

Edigheji focuses on structural and agent-based factors as likely explanatory factors for Nigeria’s undeveloped democracy. Specifically, Edigheji focuses on two main explanations that explain democracy without development: poor leadership and weak institutions. In this, it goes beyond the conventional argument that the prospects for democracy and development in a postcolonial country are invariably linked to its level of economic development, political culture and social makeup.

First, he accuses the undeveloped Nigerian democracy of two factors. It is about the absence of an ideology of development nationalism and the preponderance of a politics without principles. The ideology of development nationalism is not only about national identity, consciousness or a sense of belonging to a particular nation. Instead, it is based on the need to catch up and overcome underdevelopment, dependence on foreign countries and poverty.

The ideology of development nationalism, Edigheji argues, can only be promoted by developmentalist or patriotic elites. This is because they do not engage in a policy of personal enrichment that undermines the collective national interest. Instead, they make the necessary sacrifices to achieve their collective goals.

Developmentalist elites have a common vision of national development. This includes massive investments in the provision of public goods. These include education, health care and infrastructure, or national policies, such as international trade and monetary policy.

Nigeria’s political elites since 1999 have not been developmentist. They have been rent-seeking and predatory.

The second factor contributing to democracy without development has been the capture of the state. This has been achieved through non-merit-based recruitment and promotion of civil servants, the core of which is the civil service.

The efficient and effective management of the public service is essential for sustainable and equitable economic development. This is underscored by the experiences of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and the Tigers’ economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam).

In the 1960s and 1970s Nigeria had one of the best and most meritocratic public services in Africa. It was mainly composed of career civil servants. They progressed according to qualifications, performance and seniority.

Today, however, Nigeria has one of the worst public services in Africa. Recruitment and promotion have become politicized and racialized, especially since 1999. The result has been that the best and brightest Nigerians are no longer in the public service.

Recruitment and promotion not based on merit has resulted in ineffectiveness in the civil service, low levels of economic development and increased corruption.

Paths to Democracy with Development

For Nigeria to overcome its development and institutional deficits, Edigheji advocates for a democratic developmental state. The term developmental state was coined during much of the 1980s and 1990s to describe countries that had experienced rapid economic growth through state-led interventions. These include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam.

Edigheji sets out some of the key elements of a democratic developing state:

First, Nigerian politics must be led by developmental elites whose politics are rooted in the people and political parties on the basis of ideology.

Second, political elites must transform the structure of the economy. They can do this by promoting human capital development, infrastructure development and industrialization. They must also tackle the challenges of insecurity, corruption and climate change.

But the achievement of these goals depends on inclusive political and economic institutions.

Unanswered question

Despite the book’s enormous contributions, some questions remain unanswered. These include the relevance of the developmental state model as a panacea for Nigeria’s challenges.

The first question centers on understanding the processes that produced developmental states. How did developmental states manage to develop economically? What worked, what didn’t and why?

The second focuses on the opportunities and lessons that Nigeria can learn from developmental states elsewhere. Would a developmental state model work in Nigeria? If yes, how ?

Overall, the book convincingly explains why democracy has failed to produce inclusive development in Nigeria. It offers insightful insight into what the country needs to do to overcome its development and institutional deficits. It is a very enlightening and pleasant book to read. It is a valuable book for students, academics, policy makers, politicians and development practitioners who wish to understand the political dynamics of Nigeria. It is also an important contribution to the literature on the challenges of democracy and development in the countries of the South.

Ayokunu Adedokun is not working, consulting, owning stock, or receiving funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has not disclosed any relevant affiliation beyond his academic position.

By Ayokunu Adedokun, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and International Development, Leiden University

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