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We only get into the purchase of submarines to annoy government treasurers and economic managers. Efficiency and efficiency are bonus additions, but hardly necessary. Witness the evolution of the disaster that is the Australian SEA 1000 Future Submarine program, won by the French DCNS, now Naval Group, in 2016.
From the start, it seemed a daringly singular choice. Australia had avoided purchasing more suitable mid-size submarines from a manufacturer of conventional submarines, instead opting for a nuclear submarine design that would be retrofitted for conventional use. For a country that is the third largest exporter of uranium, it was as ironic as castration suggested.
Australian Prime Minister at the time, Malcolm Turnbull, was confident that a new class submarine, the Shortfin Barracuda, would be. “The Competitive Assessment Process (CEP) provided the government with the detailed information necessary to select DCNS as the most appropriate international partner to develop a future superior regional submarine to meet our unique national security requirements.
Defense Connect noted these high expectations as well, with the Attack-class submarine “expected to deliver a quantum leap in the capability provided to the Royal Australian Navy and its submarine service by leveraging technology and capabilities developed for them. nuclear submarines, implemented on a conventional submarine. Beware of jumping submarines with leverage technology.
This pompous claim of a false strategic value was initially to cost A $ 50 billion. But in May 2018, it became clear that the image was a bit more expensive. Rear Admiral Greg Sammut had to concede to Australian senators at an estimated hearing that an additional A $ 50 billion would be needed to support the submarines for their entire lifespan. In explaining this to Senator Rex Patrick, Sammut had obviously heeded the lessons of the public service obfuscation school. “Most of the detailed acquisition and sustainment costs will be determined during the design process through the choices made, but at this point preliminary estimates of the fleet sustainment costs are in the range of 50 billion dollars at constant prices. ”
Comb through that dull, turgid response, and the implications were ominous. Spending on the submarine program would only increase, with the cost of maintaining naval brutes being two to three times their purchase price. “It is disturbing that the Defense did this,” Senator Patrick noted at the time.
In any other context, this would be considered gross negligence, but defense costs operate in another insensitive area of practice. And just to illustrate this point, over the course of five months in 2020, the submarine project cost Australian taxpayers an additional A $ 10 billion, due to currency fluctuations and a forgetting of the expected start date for the construction of the HMAS. Attack, intended to be the lead boat in the fleet.
The rising cost of the program has also caught the attention of other politicians. One Nation’s Senator Malcolm Roberts may be very picky about issues like climate science, but when it comes to defense spending, his feet are firmly planted. In May 2020, he, in his own words, “took the time to condemn the new contract signed for the construction of 12 new submarines.”
To his fellow senators, he asked if the government had given up on its senses during the COVID-19 era. “In the midst of this pandemic, we cannot afford to make this contract. This money will be much better spent to support Australia’s recovery from the economic downturn, which is caused by this pandemic. By the time these submarines are delivered, they will be obsolete. ”
These are not the only problems associated with this excessively insane exercise. Questions were asked about what has been politely referred to as “the amount of Australian industry content in the program” and about Naval Group’s commitment to developing the Australian industry. Suspicions remain that this is, at bottom, a company run by France, with a duped Australia limping with money.
In January 2020, the Australian National Audit Office weighed in with a report outlining the risks of the SEA 1000 program, even in its early stages. “The decision not to acquire a standard military submarine platform, and instead to hire a ‘strategic partner’ to design and deliver the submarines with a significant contribution from Australian industry, has increased the risk of this acquisition. Delays were already occurring in the design phase; The “contracted milestones” had been extended. ANAO also had a nugget of light: the government’s own Shipbuilding Advisory Board, made up of US admirals previously receptive to the French proposal, suggested that Australia abandon its contract with the Naval Group.
In February 2020, such concerns worried the Defense Ministry and the Naval Group enough to warrant a firm rebuke to opponents in a joint statement. “Sovereign control of the Attack-Class Submarine Fleet and maximizing the participation of Australian industry in all phases of the Attack-Class Submarine Program are contractual objectives in the Strategic Partnership Agreement between Defense and Naval Group. Australian industry would also be “systematically” asked “to identify the appropriate suppliers of the wide range of equipment to be fitted to the submarine, from hydraulic systems to kitchen equipment”.
Defense Secretary Linda Reynolds was not impressed with Naval Group Australia CEO John Davis, who had expressed frank concerns about the project to reporters, generally endorsing the findings of the ANAO report. “I am disappointed with the comments attributed to Naval Group Australia as they do not reflect the strong collaboration between Naval Group and Australian industry on this program of national importance.”
The literature on expert doubt is also growing. A report commissioned by Submarines for Australia, produced by Insight Economics last year, was damning. He noted how Naval Group opposed the incorporation of “Australian content”; a “dangerous capacity deficit” given the delays in the project; and the “questionable strategic value” of the whole effort. Gary Johnston of Submarines for Australia was overwhelming in his criticism: the Franco-Australian contract was based on “abolishing a nuclear submarine by removing the entire base from its top capacity, then charging at least twice as much for a much less capable submarine. . ”
Insight Economics’ suggestion, building on the Department of Defense concerns that a mitigation strategy might be in order, revisited the Collins-class submarine – the current operational submarine platform of the ‘Australia – and modernized it. “Based on the advice of professional experts, we believe that an evolved Collins 2.0 submarine, with comparable attack capability, could be delivered at least five years earlier, at a much lower cost and with 70 % local content. ” Do they dare to dream?
SEA 1000’s effort fails masculinity at worst, a vivid example of Maginot Line thinking: we need it to make a statement, because other countries are playing in the same waters. The tendency for error and clumsiness, especially when it comes to acquiring and maintaining an underwater weapon in defense, is constant. The Collins-class submarine itself, intended to be Australia’s “Holden among Submarines”, should have provided sufficient warning. Instead, it laid the groundwork for yet another colossal blunder, showing defense procurement to be a game for dunces.
Dr Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Fellow at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He teaches at RMIT University in Melbourne. E-mail: [email protected]
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