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The insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province has been in international spotlight since Islamic State-linked radicals launched their daring attack on the city of Palma in March, killing more than 50 people.
A large Rwandan military and police contingent and troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) entered the theater. These are helping the Mozambican army and police to stem the tide and step up their action in the longer term.
There is also support from the United States and the European Union, mainly in the form of training assistance. This is in addition to the training support pledged by Angola and Zimbabwe as part of the SADC contingent arriving in Cabo Delgado.
But there is a problem.
The combined military response against the insurgents is primarily land, with very limited maritime response capabilities. But the insurgency threat is not confined to the interior. Insurgents stormed and held the port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020 and attacked communities on neighboring islands off Palma, halting its tourist flows.
The fixation on landward efforts ignores the fact that the insurgency also poses a maritime threat. Significantly, the insurgency has hampered the energy sector. This was to make Mozambique a major global energy player following the discovery of large offshore gas fields. The findings have regional and global implications. Mozambique could well become a gas emirate in southern Africa, and the industry’s commissioning could propel Mozambique into the world’s top seven gas-producing countries.
These optimistic prospects all depend on Mozambique’s ability to contain the impact of the ongoing violent insurgency in Cabo Delgado. This prerequisite extends offshore.
Maritime safety
Mozambique’s future economy is highly dependent on maintaining a secure offshore domain. To this end, the government must seize every opportunity to build the capacities and partnerships necessary to maintain the rule of law at sea.
The commissioning of gas production was severely disrupted due to the insurgency. Much of the land activity and infrastructure construction has stalled.
In April, Totalenergies, the French multinational energy company, declared a case of force majeure. This was after insurgents occupied and detained the port of Mocímboa da Praia in 2020 and attacked Palma in early 2021.
The port is important for the delivery of goods by sea and air for ongoing construction projects aimed at developing onshore infrastructure in support of the gas industry. It has since been recovered by Mozambican and Rwandan forces. But given the evolution of risk perception, construction remains at a standstill.
In my opinion, the oceanic territories of Mozambique deserve special attention for three reasons. These are the onshore events spilling out to sea, perceptions of dangerous seas off Mozambique and uncontrolled crime at sea.
Cost of insecurity at sea
First, insecurity on land has maritime repercussions. This is the reality in the waters off Somalia, Nigeria, Libya and Yemen. Poor security governance on land affects the maritime economy, with maritime transport and resource extraction being particularly vulnerable.
This land-sea interaction is a potential risk for Mozambican decision-makers.
Second, perceptions of the dangers in the waters off Mozambique have negative repercussions. This is even more true if international measures are implemented to mitigate a threat to shipping. A high-risk area at sea similar to those off Somalia and Nigeria requires ships to take preventive action. This has multiple ripple effects.
Higher insurance costs are incurred; shipping has to follow longer routes, which increases the cost of doing business; private security personnel are often hired; and the safety and livelihoods of crews are more threatened. All of this is evident in the now operational demarcated danger zone off Nigeria.
Third, the waters off Cabo Delgado must not be allowed to become a playground for criminals to enter and exploit. If not governed, this maritime space offers the possibility for criminal syndicates and insurgents to prosper side by side.
Connecting the Dots: Five Risks to Mitigate
The insurgency caused or exacerbated the following problems:
Transnational criminal syndicates: These are already operating in Cabo Delgado. If the weakness of governance on land is reflected at sea, unions become dangerous competitors, and even more so if they are allied with insurgent elements as in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.
Illegal oil trafficking: Energy infrastructure for gas and oil is difficult to support. Nonetheless, the illegal trafficking of oil from rebel-held territories in eastern Libya shows how cheeky non-state actors can take over or infiltrate energy infrastructure and port facilities and use them to join an illegal industry. .
Attacks against infrastructure and navigation at sea: Sri Lanka is a good example. The Sea Tiger wing of the insurgent Liberation Tigers movement of Tamil Eelam attacked the Sri Lankan navy with suicide ships for several years.
Drone attacks: The recent drone attack on a commercial vessel crossing the Gulf of Oman, with links to Yemen and Iran, must also serve as a warning. There have been allegations of the presence of drones in Cabo Delgado.
Drug traffic: Insecurity at sea off Cabo Delgado threatens to exacerbate the problem posed by drug trafficking networks operating in the area. No effort should be spared to prevent insurgents and smugglers from cooperating. Displaced children in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, learn under a tree. EFE-EPA / Joao Relvas
Overall, the tactics I have described call for a comprehensive response, most likely beyond anything the Mozambican authorities can mobilize on their own.
A few small stages with a maritime vocation took place.
Two small, lightly armed South African patrol boats arrived in the port of Pemba to patrol off Cabo Delgado.
A training team from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime recently arrived to help train Mozambique’s maritime personnel to improve maritime security governance.
The Rwandan military contingent has a limited capacity of small boats to expand its presence off the coast, but only near port patrols.
Fourth – by retaking Mocímboa da Praia from the insurgents in early August 2021, the operation included a surprise attack by a small contingent of Mozambican soldiers from the sea.
In the future: what should happen
The maritime situation in Mozambique should not be allowed to emulate the maritime threats found off Nigeria, Somalia and rebel-held territories in Libya. Allowing this would have disastrous consequences for international shipping and subsequently for Mozambique and the landlocked countries in the region.
It was precisely this threat that underscored the need for cooperation between South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania to prevent piracy from gaining a foothold in Mozambique. The ongoing maritime operations between South Africa and Mozambique must also be maintained.
Cooperation with a wide range of partners to promote longer-term maritime security governance must remain a priority. This is a long-term goal to be achieved in the context of the current armed insurgency, and to be sustained beyond the current volatility.
Stability on land and at sea must be addressed simultaneously.
The South African Navy and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime are the Navy’s first responders and capacity building to arrive. But SADC should seriously consider using its Standing Maritime Committee to help Mozambique. The aim would be to reach a formal regional cooperation agreement in order to guarantee longer-term regional economic and security interests in the southwest Indian Ocean.
Mozambique is unable to contribute significantly to the wider range of maritime security efforts. This is why international partners must play a role.
SADC must now pass the litmus test of stemming insurgent threats to spill over into and threaten the region’s broader land and maritime interests.
Response forces currently fighting insurgents should expand their role offshore to prevent a collapse of security at sea off Mozambique or, at a minimum, such a perception within the international maritime community.
François Vreÿ receives funding from the University of Stellenbosch and the National Research Foundation.
By François Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch University
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