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India announced three weeks ago its membership in an "elite club of space powers" after destroying one of its own satellites with a missile defense interceptor. With "Mission Shakti", India has become the fourth country to intentionally destroy a satellite in orbit.
Only three other states – the Soviet Union, the United States and China – have deliberately destroyed satellites in orbit. No state has destroyed the satellite of another state. This extraordinary constraint deserves to be preserved and extended.
While India's justification for the test undoubtedly meant appealing to the domestic public and signaling its military strength, India's decision to use its missile defense interceptor against a satellite rather than a missile was wider implications. Since mid-range missile defense systems are designed to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, they also have ASAT capabilities. . This test makes this inherent ability explicit again. Indeed, China used an interceptor to destroy the Fengyun-1C satellite in 2007 and then tested the system against missile targets. The United States did the same the next year by destroying the USA-193 satellite with an interceptor of the Aegis missile defense program.
The Indian government called the Shakti Mission test a leader because its target was so low that all debris would be evacuated "in a few weeks". However, the kinetic energy of deadly shot interceptions can crush debris into a new, higher orbit, which increases the life of debris and allows it to threaten other satellites. Up to now, about 50 traceable debris from the Shakti mission have been identified as reaching climaxes at or above the International Space Station. These are surely accompanied by smaller debris that can not be spotted but that could still be fatal in the event of a collision. On 1 April, NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine criticized the test and said that this type of activity was "not compatible with the future of manned spaceflight". Even "responsible" tests put other users in the space at risk.
The greatest concern, however, is that the use of destructive anti-satellite weapons in more typical orbits can create dangerous amounts of persistent space debris that can threaten the secure use of space for all users. Commercial and civilian interests even dominate in low Earth orbit, where eighty-five percent of satellites are non-military.
Unlike the low altitude of the Shakti test, the destruction of high altitude satellites – which is likely if ASAT weapons are used in military conflict – can create very large amounts of debris that persist for decades, or indefinitely. China's destruction of the Fengyun-1C satellite in 2007 has created thousands of cataloged debris, most of which are still in orbit. The Fengyun-1C satellite was modest in size, about 750 kilograms. The destruction of a large satellite, such as a 10-tonne military reconnaissance satellite, could easily double the number of dangerous debris in low Earth orbit at widely used altitudes.
For these reasons, countries organizing space activities are encouraged not to test or use weapons that generate debris. However, self-interest is not an effective long-term strategy to cope with a growing arsenal of ASAT-ready technologies in the context of increased strategic competition in space. What is the magnitude of the problem? Even setting aside other ways of interfering with satellites and looking only at missile defenses, it is clear that this is a serious problem.
India's essay highlighted what was already evident: missile defenses can be effective anti-satellite weapons. In fact, although technologies developed for long-range missile defenses may not be very effective against ballistic missiles, they could be much more effective against satellites. Missiles are launched with little or no notice and may be accompanied by lures and other countermeasures. Satellites move in traceable and predictable orbits and an attacker can potentially attempt multiple interceptions if the first attempt fails.
The global inventory of missile defenses with the reach of target satellites is considerable and growing. Congress approved the addition of 20 additional interceptors to the existing fleet of 44 medium-range ground defense systems located in the United States. These interceptors can reach any satellite in low Earth orbit. Current US plans include hundreds of SM-3 Block 2 interceptors based on Aegis vessels and capable of reaching the vast majority of low Earth orbit satellites. China, Russia, India and Israel continue to develop their own interceptors for destruction.
It is difficult to test, develop and stock limitless ASATs, not only because of the potential for creating debris that would make the space inhospitable and expensive, but also because satellite attacks can create or worsen Terrestrial crises in ways that are potentially difficult to predict. For example, a space environment perceived as too dangerous and threatening may encourage the "use or the loss" of military capabilities made possible by space means in the approach of a crisis. And of course, as more and more states build and test these weapons, more and more states may decide to join the "elite" club.
We would all be better off with legal and normative constraints in terms of behavior in space and particularly dangerous technologies, including "Hit-to-Killer" missiles. This could increase stability in a crisis, avoid the arms race and provide guardrails to preserve the space environment. The international community has struggled to overcome ideological divisions in the face of this challenge. Under the international code of conduct for activities in space proposed by the European Union – in which states resolved not to damage or destroy satellite except for security reasons, self-defense or to avoid the generation of debris – the Shakti Mission would have been clearly identified as external agreed standards. However, this effort failed in 2015. In addition, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament has not worked for 20 years and the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space has Atmosphere sponsored by Russia and China has not garnered widespread support. . And most recently, on 29 March, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on the Question of Arms Control in Outer Space concluded without reaching consensus on the recommendations.
Much has changed over the decade since China and the United States destroyed satellites. The size and scope of the commercial space sector has increased and the number of operational satellites in orbit has more than doubled. It is possible that the Shakti Mission may serve as a wake-up call rather than an additional step in a preventable process of militarization of the space environment, particularly if it attracts the attention of commercial space actors whose investments and vision are threatened. Reasonable, effective and verifiable standards and limits that allow for a safer and more sustainable space future are possible if the will is sufficient.
Laura Grego is a senior scientist in the global security program of the Union of Concerned Scientists. It focuses its badysis and advocacy on the technical and security aspects of ballistic missile defense and space security.
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