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Two years ago, I wrote a detailed commentary on the "One Belt, One Road" proposal, projected by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 as a series of logistics connectivity projects in the landmbad Eurasian and the Indian Ocean. Although India has even expressed doubts about some aspects of the proposal, it has been a fierce opponent in the past year. So much so that the Indian media has begun to see this opposition as part of the divide between India and China – along with the border conflict, concerns about China's growing influence in Asia Southern and nascent naval competition in the Indian Ocean. Even with respect to India's participation in the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Qingdao, the main article in the Indian media was that India had been the only member of the SCO to not support this proposal.
In fact, developments relating to the connectivity proposal since its first proposal have forced India to reconsider it.
New Developments
The main developments over the last five years are as follows:
First, the proposal has a new name: OBOR officially became the "Belt and Road Initiative" ( BIS). This is to correct the impression in some circles that the proposal envisioned a single linear connection across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean. It has now been clarified that the BIS will be "a network of regional cooperation and systematic projects of global significance" that will encompbad 65 countries
. This being related to the clarification that the proposal is not a vision, program or strategy; Secondly, the IRB is "much more than just investment and infrastructure projects": BRI is part of "Xi Jinping thinking about socialism with Chinese characteristics". for a new era "and is included in the constitution of the Communist Party of China.
Three, there is now more clarity on the projects included in BRI.In addition to the land and sea" silk "routes between l & # 39; Asia and Europe, six economic corridors are envisaged: China-Mongolia-Russia, the "New Eurasian Land Bridge", a 10,000 km railway link between China and Rotterdam, the China-China corridor Central Asia-West Asia-economy, replicating the ancient Silk Road, the China-Indo-China-China Economic Corridor, the Sino-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the previous economic corridor between Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar.
Four, the BIS now also includes digital connectivity, the "Digital Silk Road." This provides for "blueprints for action." innovation for e-commerce, the digital economy, smart cities and science and technology ".
Finally, China has made considerable efforts to promote this initiative within the international community. In addition to the "Silk Road Summit for International Cooperation" held in China in May 2017, attended by more than 60 countries (India excluded), China joined the European Union, members of the 39, ASEAN and OCS. Regarding the latter, it has entered into IRB-related construction agreements with six Arab countries and obtained affirmative statements from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates. and Oman.
National Initiative
Chinese sources have indicated that these "economic corridors" will not be linear links across Eurasia; instead, there will be many loops and branches, so that no part of Asia or Europe will be excluded from the initiative. Christina Lin emphasized that the IRB is "a very broad, flexible and inclusive cooperation framework" sufficiently "loose and fluid" for different projects to be included as part of the IRB.
Although some issues have been raised in some quarters about the technical and financial viability of some projects and even some of the poorest nations are in a debt trap, there is considerable international support for IRB
Most national leaders and commentators welcome the proposed logistics connectivity projects and note that there is considerable flexibility both for the specific projects envisaged under BIS and the level of partnership that will be inevitable in the implementation of these projects. Chinese sources agreed that all projects should be part of the national development plans of the different countries and will be the result of the collaboration of the partners; BRI, they say, is not "a solo, but a symphony performed by all concerned countries."
While BRI is clearly a Chinese initiative and very important for the projection of China's achievements as a modern influential state in world affairs This is not an exclusively Chinese enterprise: more than 900 Different projects will be grouped together under the auspices of the IRB, which will require active mobilization of technology, management and human resources globally
and Road Initiative to "l & rsquo; Inclusivity "
Above all, the cost of projects taken together is estimated at more than $ 1 trillion. Even with the maximum deployment of Chinese funding, it is estimated that China will provide about $ 300 billion by 2030, only one-third of the required funding; The balance will have to come from other national, regional and international sources, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and regional forums like the OCS. , the Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum, etc. 19659002] All these institutions will insist on the application of their own standards and rules to ensure transparency and sustainability. Thus, in their implementation, BIS projects will be multinational or even global.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
India has two sets of objections to the IRB: one, objections to two aspects of the Sino-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and, secondly, concerns arising from the fact that BRI is indeed the projection of geopolitical interests of China, especially in the Indian Ocean.
The CPEC, finalized in April 2015 with 51 agreements, consists of a series of road, rail and energy projects, emanating from the newly developed port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, which, together, will be valued at around $ 50 billion. These projects will generate about one million jobs in Pakistan and, once completed, will add nearly 2.5% to the country's GDP.
Gwadar will be developed as a deep-sea port capable of handling 300 to 400 million tons of goods per year. A new 1,100 km highway from Karachi to Lahore will be completed, while the Karakoram Highway connecting Rawalpindi to the Chinese border will be expanded and modernized. Railway lines across the country will be completely improved and expanded, with the road and rail network reaching Kashgar in Xinjiang. Oil and gas pipelines will be built, including a gas pipeline from Gwadar to Nawabshah, carrying Iranian gas.
Most of the money will be spent on energy projects – about 10,400 MW of electricity will be produced between 2018 and 2020, in addition to renewable energy, coal and electricity projects. liquefied natural gas. An 800 km fiber optic link to boost telecommunications in the Gilgit-Baltistan region is already under construction. These projects will promote national economic development through industrial parks and special economic zones.
Chinese spokesmen justified the CPEC as an energy and transportation development initiative aimed at getting Pakistanis out of poverty and opening them a better life. They argue that the CPEC serves the common interests of the countries of the region because it deals with "both symptoms and root causes of terrorism and extremism", which are also consistent with the interests of the region. India
. Its sovereignty since, by improving the Karakoram highway in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, affirms China's support for the illegal occupation by Pakistan of this part of the state of Jammu-and- – Cashmere claimed by India and called "Kashmir occupied by Pakistan". ) in all official Indian documentation. By not discussing the CPEC with India and officially announcing the initiative as a "China-Pakistan" project, China is also perceived as making no effort to accommodate India's interests. in this major undertaking. Once again, India considers the presence of China in Gwadar at the mouth of the Gulf as an indication of its long-term presence in the Indian Ocean, which India considers as an encroachment on its strategic space.
misplaced. First, it is in India 's interest that China invest in Pakistan and, hopefully, keep the country' s youth away from extremism. Again, if it would have been desirable for China to consult India on the activity of the CPEC in PoK, it remains that the final status of this disputed area will ultimately be decided between l & # 39; India and Pakistan when the time is right; therefore, the improvement or expansion of existing logistical facilities in PoK in no way weakens the legitimate and ancient claims of India.
In any case, China seems to want to respond to the immediate sensibilities of India: in April 2017, the Chinese diplomat Liu Jinsong, in his public remarks at the IRB conference in Mumbai, addressed the question of projects in PoK by referring to the agreement of China with Pakistan in 1963, on the basis of which the Karakoram highway was built. Here, China had recognized the PoK as being disputed and had affirmed China's willingness to "reopen negotiations" with "sovereign authority" once the Kashmir dispute settled.
Once again, during an in-camera tank discussion, the Chinese ambbadador went further and said that to gain India's support for the IRB, China could even consider changing the name of the CPEC into a name acceptable to India
The Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean is a serious concern for the United States. India and deserves a detailed review.
The Indian Ocean is important to the economic interests of all the countries that make up its coastline. India is at the center of the ocean: it has a coastline of 7,500 km, 1,200 islands, 13 major ports and an exclusive economic zone of 2.4 million square miles; 90% of its exports are maritime, as are all of its energy imports from the Gulf and Africa. About 10-15% of its population lives on its coastal regions and depends on fishing. Today, out of 800 billion dollars of India 's annual foreign trade, 95% of trade by volume and 68% by value are moving into the Indian Ocean.
India's dependence on oil imports is about 80%. its imports of gas as LNG. In addition, India is a major exporter of refined petroleum products, accounting for 20% of its exports, mainly by sea. India is also a major importer of coal, with imports accounting for 25% of its total consumption.
India also depends on the ocean's fisheries resources: its fishing and aquaculture industry employs 14 million people, placing India sixth overall in terms catching fish. India is also a major exporter of seafood, valued at around $ 2.5 billion a year. The country is a pioneer in deep-sea mining: in 1987, it got the exclusive right to explore four million square kilometers of two mining sites and, in 2014, it got licenses for explore the ridge of the Indian Ocean. cobalt, nickel and copper
China is also interested in the security of the Indian Ocean, since 90% of its foreign trade and 80% of its oil imports are from India. maritime origin. He has a particular interest that the straits of Ormuz and Malacca remain open to maritime movements, without the threat of pirates or hostile action by regional or external powers.
In recent years, India's security concerns have grown exponentially. considers that the expansion of the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean goes through economic commitments, the construction of ports and pipelines, and the deployment of its navy, and considers the IRB as an integral part of this company. Chinese commentators have striven to badert that the IRB is promoted in a spirit of "peace and cooperation, openness and inclusion, mutual learning and benefit. mutuel "and that it has a purely economic content. Chinese President Xi said, "Instead of looking for any sphere of influence, we call on all parties to join the circle of friends for the Belt and Road Initiative."
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that "is not a geopolitical tool". One commentator, Liu Zongyi, categorically stated that the BIS "is a cooperative geo-economic, not geopolitical or geostrategic" design. Another commentator, Minghao Zhao, wrote that China seeks to move from "politics between nations" to "politics between networks" and focuses on "connectivity" rather than "control"
. Naval commentator Gopal Suri points out that the Chinese investment in the development of new ports along the coastline of the Indian Ocean, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the East African coast , with the establishment of its first naval base in Djibouti, Affirm that the Chinese Navy "strategically places the emphasis on establishing a permanent presence in the region of the ocean Indian (IOR) in a not too distant future. "
China clearly has legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean. well-being as it is the case for India. As China expands its naval power and political influence, it would be futile to imagine that it can be excluded from this space of such crucial importance. The challenge for India is to ensure that its own interests are safeguarded. Here, it should be noted that India reacted effectively to China's incursions into the Indian Ocean
Modi announced in 2014 that maritime safety would be a priority concern for his government. This has given a big boost to the national shipbuilding industry that is currently building 40 warships. India has also increased its naval capabilities by acquiring the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier, the MiG29K aircraft, the Chakra nuclear submarine, the indigenous construction of Kolkata-clbad destroyers, the Talwar-clbad frigates and Shivalik, anti-submarine warships and the Sumitra clbad. patrol boats, with a wide variety of landing craft. India's proactive approach has also included important commitments by the Prime Minister with the island nations of the Indian Ocean coastline.
Thus, Gwadar is not the perceived threat in some sections of the Indian opinion: India is well placed in Chabahar. 80 km away; It also has close ties with Oman and enjoys access to Omani ports on the Indian Ocean coast and to other important ports of IOR.
To meet the Chinese challenge, India has also strengthened its cooperation with regional and extra-regional naval powers. , since the incursions of the Chinese Navy into the Indian Ocean and the consolidation of the Chinese naval presence through a series of ocean bases and facilities are a legitimate concern not only for India but for several littoral countries of the Indian Ocean. This goal has been achieved through closer defense cooperation with the United States and increased naval cooperation with Japan, Australia and Indonesia. These are vague arrangements and do not constitute "alliances", but they can be quickly improved if the need actually feels.
Thus, what was generally considered as an aggressive posture of China provided its own solution: India got insurance for its interests by "external balancing", it is to say described by the commentator S. Kalyanaraman as "the establishment of cooperation with one state to deter or defeat a threat posed by another"
The commitments of the main actors of the Indian Ocean indicate that a strategic balance has now been established in the region, with the United States and its allies, India, Japan and Australia, able to set limits to Chinese ambitions. So while China has remained steadfast and unwavering with regard to its claims and interests in the Western Pacific, clear controls of reality in the Indian Ocean in terms of opposition have made both conciliatory and cooperative. , which she is now seeking as partners in pursuing her ocean – scale land and sea projects that are part of the IRB. India is the most important country among those who have been courted by China.
Chinese writings have often confirmed it. Tingyi Wang of Tshingua University, while noting that Chinese officials pointed to "the particular importance of India" in the initiative because of its location at the intersection land and sea routes envisaged in BRI, pointed out that India had "apprehensions", especially because of the CPEC. He denies that China has the interest or ability to contain India, and rather sees a relationship of cooperation and competition between the two Gulf countries in the areas of energy security, economic ties and regional security. over time "a broader geo-economic transformation is taking place in Asia and the Indo-Pacific region."
Sun Yang wrote that, given the alliance led by the United States, it went in the Indo-Pacific sense. India seems to be the only way to change the situation and make a breakthrough. "He then argues his proposal: first, India will not be able to prevent the Chinese presence in the region of the ocean Indian, and second, "the status of India and its foreign policy strategy would never allow it to become a strong supporter of the In the same vein, Ouyang Guoxing argued that". given the geostrategic location of India and its political and military supremacy in the region, the Chinese Navy "will not become a predominant threat to India in the coming decades". And will remain focused on the western Pacific rather than on the Indian Ocean. It recognizes the need for India and China to find ways to promote dialogue on maritime security, starting with non-sensitive areas and progressively moving towards secure military cooperation.
Mao Jikang regards India as the "key [for] OBOR [now BRI] initiative in South Asia," and recommends that China do more to gain support from India by responding to India's concerns regarding China's hegemonic interests in the region by working more closely with India India's IOR projects and the vigorous pursuit of maritime safety cooperation with the United States. India on the basis of the common interest for the safety of international shipping lanes.
The Way Forward
and the financial and other resources needed to carry out its various projects, this is not the case. is not and can not be an exclusive Chinese company, although Chin A leaders can view the concept as reflecting the emergence of their country on the world stage.The IRB has a truly global character and needs the pa voluntary participation of several nations to take shape.
Again, China is not the only nation to seek a new role in international affairs; Several countries such as Japan, Korea, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are also part of the Asian Resurgence. These changes in the global order, while reflecting national economic success, also pose new challenges as these nations compete to define their role and occupy their legitimate space in the new order. This scenario calls for a mutual compromise based on commitment, consultation, trust and consensus building, not confrontation and the pursuit of hegemony
In the emerging global order , China and India, major players sharing the strategic space in Eurasia and the Indian Ocean, are likely to have both competitive and convergent interests. This will be the main challenge for leaders and diplomats in both countries to strengthen cooperation and resolve disputes.
The above discussion showed that in the Indian Ocean, India has responded effectively to the perceived encroachments of China and strategic balance of power has been put in place. In my opinion, this gave India the opportunity to re-examine some of its positions that had been adopted when doubts and divergences were at their peak.
The IRB is one of those issues that calls for a fresh look. The terrestrial and ocean connectivity envisioned by the BIS has the ability to alter global linkages in a way as dramatic as the age of exploration in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century. The Portuguese academic, minister and travel writer, Bruno Maçães, noted in his new book, The Dawn of Eurasia, that once these projects are completed, "we will no longer have the chance". Europe on one side and Asia on the other, but A single continent, more and more interconnected. "
India was at the center of the transactions of the old roads of the silk and spices, and was the darling destination of early voyages of exploration and trade. India simply does not have the option to ignore the IRB now.
Like all major initiatives, the IRB has several shortcomings, but with consultations, these can be handled effectively. Given the broad international support, many IRB projects are already underway; some have even been completed. India will be one of the main beneficiaries of these links, especially when it will merge its own Chabahar proposals with other Eurasian projects. It's only through participation that India can ensure that its interests are safeguarded: sulking in the margins is not an option in such crucial areas for India .
India has secured its security interests in the Indian Ocean in the littoral, and with engagements with extra-regional powers; it must now serve its long-term economic and political interests by actively participating in ocean connectivity proposals and addressing the region's security challenges, particularly in West Asia. The accession of India to the BRICS, the SCO and the Indian Ocean Rim Association and its strong commitments with Russia and China offer India the opportunity to participate in the event. opportunity to play an important role in the definition and development of the new world order. , the remarks of the Chinese diplomat at the BRI conference in Mumbai last year are noteworthy: "The sky and the ocean of Asia are big enough that the dragon and the elephant can to dance together, which will bring a real Asian age. " [19659060] In an arrangement with The Wire
Talmiz Ahmad, a former diplomat, holds the Ram Sathe Chair for International Studies, Symbiosis International University, Pune, and is a consultant publisher, The Wire .
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