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The Third Visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Japan from October 28 to 29 on the Occasion of Its Fifth Annual Summit with His Counterpart, Shinzo Abe, Reinforces the One and Only "Strategic Special Partnership" and global "of India. From the personal chemistry between the two leaders to the depth and breadth that bilateral cooperation acquires, it is clear that Japan and India are becoming de facto allies like no other power in Asia.
Modi and Abe oversee negotiations for a new military logistics pact called ACSA (Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement), which would provide Indian and Japanese navies with mutual access to maintenance and refueling facilities. This agreement is comparable to the logging agreement protocol (LEMOA) that India signed in 2016 with the United States.
Such landmarks in defense diplomacy indicate that India, under the Modi regime, overcame past blockages related to the conclusion of alliance-type agreements. Abe has invested heavily in his relationship with Modi because he views him as a particularly daring actor, willing to strengthen defense and economic coordination with Japan over former Indian prime ministers.
United Against China
In 2007, Abe had asked India to participate in a "quadrilateral" mechanism involving Japan, Australia and the United States in order to contain China's growing power in Asia. Upon his return to power in 2012, Abe launched the concept of a "democratic security diamond" involving the four countries in order to "protect the common maritime resources from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific" of the Authoritarian China.
But the Indian government of the day, led by Manmohan Singh, hesitated for fear of being angered by China and the United States was overwhelmed by other priorities. The idea of a quad was to wait until 2017 to be relaunched, although doubts about its operational capacity remained in place despite the strategic reversals of US President Donald Trump.
Unlike the East Asian countries where the Japanese colonizer's history limits convergence, the Indians see Japan as a formidable catalyst for economic modernization and technology that can allow India to become a reality. a middle-income country. China's commercial and military expansion of President Xi Jinping hinders India, but Abe's Japan takes its place as a "normal" Asian power with a proactive military and foreign aid profile is welcome .
Indeed, Japan does not claim an inch of Indian territory and does not intend to curb its growth in global multilateral institutions or in South and Southeast Asia. Due to its small size and non-hegemonic outlook on China, a strong Japan is good news for India.
While Modi and Abe embrace each other as comrades grappling with a common enemy, they envision concrete infrastructure projects to be implemented jointly in countries such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and India. Myanmar. Japan's commitment to the development of maritime infrastructure in East Africa and the Middle East offers other sites where twinning with India is a win-win for all.
The Asia-Japan Growth Corridor (AAGC) sponsored by Japan and India did not spark the same buzz as China's mbadive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but it must progress to create a balanced Indo-Pacific that avoids the dreaded scenario of Abe "Chinese Lake".
Abe's ardent nationalist goal of reviving Japan's lost military power and his quest for a free and open match (FOIP) is Modi's vision. The mutually shared apprehension of the Chinese giant has been the tacit but obvious glue that binds them together.
The Trump Factor
Given that the United States is also petrified by China's abrupt rise, it is badumed that they would unite in Japan and India. But in recent times, this simple training has been mixed by Trump's erratic and unstrategic foreign policy.
Just before hosting Modi, Abe traveled to China for a historic state visit and pleaded for a "new dimension" in a "new era" of cooperation between Japan. and China. The thaw between his traditional rivals, Japan and China, is taking place in the shadow of Trump, whose commercial war and declared desire to pull American troops out of East Asia and to reduce US military activities in this region have scared Tokyo.
Trump's chaotic positions force the Big Three of Asia – China, Japan and India – to recalibrate their intricate triangular links.
If China and Japan put aside their historical animosity and try to get closer, India seeks to reconcile with China to avoid escalating territorial conflicts.
The recent launch of a Sino-Indian partnership for the training of Afghan diplomats suggests that the Trump Factor creates new opportunities, in which Asian actors feel that it is more rational to be able to do so. hear between them instead of wagering on American warranties to be on the same side one Asian side against another.
That being said, the essential model of partnership between Japan and India to counterbalance China remains. It depends on the geography and the nature of the Chinese regime and its ambitions of world domination. Trump could perhaps soften the logic centered on China in the quasi-Japan-India alliance. But Modi and Abe are facing the long-term horizon, where China inevitably weighs.
(The author is professor and dean of the Jindal School of International Affairs)
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