International panel to criticize FAA approval process for Boeing 737 MAX jets

As part of a dozen findings, said those government officials and industry, the task force is about to call the Federal Aviation Administration for what it describes as a lack of Clarity and transparency in how the FAA delegated power to the aircraft manufacturer evaluate the safety of certain flight control functions. The result, according to some of these people, is that the essential design changes have not received sufficient attention from the FAA.

The report, added those officials, should also blame the agency for sharing data with foreign authorities when it first certified the MAX two years ago, and to rely on faulty assumptions to the scale of the industry on the average driver reaction. some flight control emergencies. FAA officials said they were developing new guidelines for pilot response after two fatalities.

This document, which should be published in the coming weeks, will be the first external external examination of the MAX certification, since the fleet was anchored worldwide in March after the accidents. The planes stumbled after repeated failures of an automated flight control system, called MCAS, which pushed the nose of both aircraft despite the efforts of their pilots to get them out of their steep dive.

The multi-agency group, created by the FAA in April and titled Common Technical Review, is headed by Christopher Hart, former president of the US National Transportation Safety Board. Tasked with reviewing the procedures used to approve MAX flight control systems, participants were also invited to provide high-level recommendations for addressing systemic deficiencies. Members include aviation safety regulators from Canada, China, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, the European Union, Brazil and the United States.

The origin and composition of the task force will likely reflect its specific findings and recommendations for the recasting of current practices and, in some cases, the reassessment and updating of safety rules and standards. techniques that are decades old. Boeing and the regulators seek to restore public confidence in aircraft and put an end to the failures that have disrupted the sector and disrupted the schedules of global airlines.

"We welcome the scrutiny of these experts," said an FAA spokesman on Sunday, referring to JATR and several other external reviews of MAX certification. The agency "will carefully consider all conclusions and recommendations," he added.

A spokesman for Boeing said the company was eagerly awaiting the final report and was "determined to continue to improve safety in partnership with the global aerospace industry," adding that the builder of planes continued to cooperate with the regulators for the return to service of the aircraft.

The details of the almost completed report had not been reported before. According to some officials, the final amendments may change some conclusions, but the general direction and recommendations for radical reassessment should not change.

Initially, the FAA had convened the panel as part of a strategy to promote international consensus. But while Boeing was working on software patches for MCAS and related systems, and the disagreements between the FAA and some of its foreign counterparts erupted in public view, the report has changed. Now, it seems to have turned into a damage control effort partly intended to outline longer-term changes to certification standards and procedures, industry officials said.

The JATR document will not analyze the accidents or proposed patches for MCAS or the changes made to the MAX flight control computers. The FAA emphasized that the advisory group did not have the right to veto changes to the MCAS.

But the report could influence changes to traditional engineering principles that determine the safety of new aircraft models. Software certification controlling increasingly automated and automated interconnected embedded systems "is a whole new set of bullets requiring new approaches," according to a senior safety expert who discussed the report with regulators on both sides from the Atlantic.

Approval of these systems by governments requires not only a verification of the reliability of essential software, but also the ability of average pilots to respond quickly and appropriately to deal with emergencies resulting from mechanical or computer malfunctions.

According to one of the officials, the group should advocate for increased data sharing and transparency among the various governments, especially for the certification of aircraft safety such as the MAX, whose basic design is inspired by previous models.

In addition, the report leader recommends reviewing and updating the FAA's daily certification guidelines and procedures to ensure timely and meaningful involvement of the FAA in new embedded systems, particularly with respect to pilot response times in the event of an emergency related to human presence. computer interactions.

Some of the draft recommendations have already been taken into account in Boeing's pending fixes on MAX's locked-in fleet, the official said.

Increasingly, there is an expectation of radical changes in certification, as more and more signs indicate that Boeing and FAA's short-term plans to choreograph a near simultaneous return of MAX aircraft into many parts of the world are falling apart.

Technical differences have engendered broader political and diplomatic confrontations. The FAA has spent months trying to ensure that MAX jets, once they are allowed to carry passengers, are put in place at about the same time in North America, Europe and other countries. regions. Instead, various foreign authorities establish their own protocols and test schedules.

European regulators recently announced to their FAA counterparts that they would probably not be ready to formally lift the bases in early November, which remains the FAA's informal target.

The United States said over the weekend that he was considering following his own longer schedule. China and India, two fast-growing aviation markets, are also expected to take longer than the United States.

Canadian regulators, for their part, are reporting to the FAA that they will likely require simulator training for pilots before re-commissioning the MAX fleet registered in that country, according to the report. one of the people informed on the subject. It will take more time than the process that the FAA should impose on American airmen. A spokesperson for Transport Canada made no comments.

The break between the FAA and its foreign counterparts highlights the erosion of the stature of the US agency. For decades, the FAA has been the benchmark for aviation safety. He led the way by voluntarily reporting security breaches, analyzing these data and developing concepts to adapt pilot training to actual incidents and accidents.

But now, countries that have used FAA support to emulate such advances are reluctant to accept US audits of the MAX.

Patrick Ky, head of the European Union's Aviation Safety Agency, told the European Parliament this month: "It is very likely that international authorities will want a second opinion" on any FAA decision to lift the basics.

Even after EASA has given the green light, agency officials should press for the fleet to be significantly improved. EASA has proposed to add to the MAX a fully functional third angle-of-attack sensor (which actually measures the position of the nose of the aircraft), thus highlighting the controversy that should revolve around the aircraft in a near future. .

Write to Andy Pasztor at [email protected] and Andrew Tangel at [email protected]