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The first was the Taliban's decision to accept the offer of an Eid of Afghan President Ghani. the cease-fire, followed by the peaceful movement of fighters and soldiers in the territories controlled by the other. The ceasefire lasted 72 hours. The Taliban have chosen not to extend it. The second was the beheading of Taliban commander Mullah Fazlullah, north-east of Kunar, where he was sheltered after fleeing Swat in 2009.
Taken together, these events mark the first major breakthrough since Pakistan Attempts to negotiate High Peace talks in Murree in 2015 before the process is interrupted by news of Mullah Omar's death.
The events of this month of June raise several questions. What motivated the Taliban to accept President Ghani's cease-fire offer, while they were comfortably seated on territorial gains? Why did the insurgents choose not to extend it, while Kabul has explicitly stated its willingness to do so? What are the implications of the three day ceasefire on the Islamabad equation with Kabul?
Their responses require an understanding of how the ceasefire was achieved. The Taliban's decision to publicly and positively respond to Kabul's bid on June 9 was the result of a foreclosure process. First there was the concession descent in Kabul with a February peace offer from President Ghani. This involved recognizing the group as a political actor and legitimate political opposition; agree to review the constitution of Afghanistan; and remove the Taliban commanders from the UN and other international sanctions lists. Then, the initial reluctance of the Taliban to accept the offer had to be overcome.
A combination of behind-the-scenes mediation and sustained pressure from an invigorated aerial campaign this summer worked to recalibrate the calculation of the direction of the insurgency. A coalition aircraft made 726 sorties in May, the highest since the start of the Taliban's summer offensive. The targeting of the Taliban's revenue-generating infrastructure, including weapons caches and transit facilities, has increased the opportunity costs of the insurgency not to make concessions policy. A fatwa launched by religious earlier this week condemning militant violence prompted the Taliban to take a conciliatory note when the ceasefire was extended.
The last strategic factor was a realignment of American, Chinese, Afghan and Pakistani objectives. tandem parties see the end of stalemate as necessary to repair bilateral communication and advance the cause of peace. Significantly, Islamabad's sustained military and diplomatic action against the Afghan establishment coincides with concerted action by the Washington and Rawalpindi military commands to save Pakistan-US relations. This could only be done by formally recognizing Pakistan's grievances with regard to its national security concerns emanating from Afghanistan.
Pakistan's commitment to close the border also required greater security badurances from Kabul. The result: Political cooperation should be conditioned by a trilateral reciprocity measure. On the basis of information provided by Islamabad on the location of the TTP-JUA targets in Afghanistan, the US decision to target Fazlullah, a fugitive who had always been within range of the United States, moved from the choice to the US. strategic imperative
. to convince the Taliban of a ceasefire beyond the expected 72 hours indicates an unresolved stumbling block: the Taliban's desire to see the issue of foreign forces in Afghanistan appear at the top of the Political Agenda of Kabul. Future negotiations should, at the very least, give confidence that international forces will permanently oust while simultaneously securing the seven guarantees offered to the Taliban as part of the Kabul process.
On paper, the cease-fire demonstrates the sincerity of both The intention of the main negotiators, which allowed Ghani to win a brief national victory, gave war-weary fighters an early taste of what integration and eventual peace might look like. It is also important that Pakistan reaffirms its commitment to function as one of the growing channels between the Taliban and a government in Kabul which, until February, was publicly divided on the issue of peace. This is a significant measure of confidence that should foster greater confidence in overcoming the strategic disconnect between the two countries.
The brief ceasefire offers two solutions. The first is to consider this as a strategic end, which is less useful because it is a shortcut, and neither side is still there for peace to be viable. The Taliban have made it clear that the priority given to foreign forces is a prerequisite for any new negotiations. It is also unclear whether Pakistan has the necessary political capital with the Taliban to convince them of the merits of a second consecutive ceasefire without consideration for the opposite of the insurgency. A second way to conceptualize the recent breakthrough is to view these future ceasefires as tactical means that can encourage direct negotiation between Kabul and the Taliban, thereby giving legitimacy to Kabul as a Taliban negotiating party. tried to resist
. It can also affect the cohesion of the Taliban enough to understand the logic of a political settlement. It is unlikely that the force will deter the Taliban for two simple reasons: motivated by devotion and an ideological casus belli that remains unchanged, the Taliban are unlikely to react to unsuspecting reinvention of the wheel without their main grievance being addressed. . But sustained peace interludes, such as those at Eid weekend, as well as safe areas that allow for the free pbadage and mix of fighters and civilians, can instill socialization standards that increase the rate. of francisationalisation. From this point of view, the ceasefire, while ephemeral, could serve as a model for future negotiations based on further discussion of the grievances filed.
Finally, for peace to break out, collective action with Kabul and national capacity building, and constituencies – including within its powerful Tajik factions – are the only real formula that can work. In the meantime, the Ghani administration must continue to ensure that the contours of a possible peace framework in no way undermine hard-won gains in women's rights and their basic protections. . A regulation that leaves out, or excludes women from the room, will not cut it. Finally, the clarity of the United States' strategic intent and the duration of its military footprint in Afghanistan are necessary to alter the Taliban's calculation of peace.
The former burden of Pakistan in waiting to deliver the Taliban run its course. The burden of peace must be shared equitably. The challenge now is to stay on course. And to avoid the curse of the regional train.
The writer works for the Jinnah Institute and is pursuing a PhD at Yale. Twitter: @fahdhumayun
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