[ad_1]
The collapse of the opposition in southern Syria is the final destruction of the rebellion originally constituted against President Bashar Assad. It's also a demonstration that the United States under President Donald Trump is no more invested in shaping results in Syria than its predecessor, and marks the potential end of the diplomatic pact that allowed the Turkey to retain a certain sphere of influence. Syrian Government Coalition
Turkey has waived its decision to overthrow Assad in the summer of 2016 as part of a strategic rebadessment aimed at countering the People's Protection Units (YPG), a Syrian Kurdish force which was gaining strength as a result of its partnership with the United States against the Islamic State (ISIS). Turkey is settling directly in Syria and to avoid fighting on all sides, the boss of Assad, Russia, will abandon his activities and Turkey will restrict his support to the rebels in the city of. Aleppo, a resistance pocket eradicated in December 2016
It is after the fall of Aleppo that the process of Astana began, with the participation of Turkey, Russia and Russia. Iran, ostensibly to tactically manage the conflict and reduce violence. In September 2017, four "de-escalation zones" were demarcated – in Ghouta, north of Homs, Deraa and Idlib. As with the previous ceasefires, this turned into a mechanism to sequence the Assad war.
The "de-escalation zones" were liquidated one by one. Ghouta was defeated in April. The Houla-Rastan-Talbiseh region of Homs collapsed in May. And in June came the turn of Deraa.
In theory, Deraa should have been a huge challenge. The rebels had resisted much more successfully than the infiltrators of the jihadists and had regrouped into a unified structure, the Southern Front, under the leadership of the United States, a model of what the United States could have to strengthen their allies and defeat the radicals in Syria. he had chosen so. Israel has also supported some of these rebel factions and their civilian supporters.
Yet, Deraa has wrapped up quickly. After a ruthless air campaign in the eastern countryside, the city of Deraa itself fell two weeks ago to the pro-Assad coalition, and Israel evacuated many "White Helmets" from the Syrian civil defense, medical first aid . Several scattered outposts remain along the Israeli and Jordanian borders, plus an enclave held by the Islamic State
The rebels of southern Syria have long been barred by their so-called supporters in Jordan and the United States to fight Assad. and Washington cut supplies last year. Demoralized, hungry for resources and infiltrated by government spies the Southern Front could not stand alone for long.
One could have expected the United States to intervene, however. The United States had been the guarantor of the "de-escalation zone" since June 2017 and while the regime's coalition was preparing the offensive, Washington said three times that it would protect the cease-fire in the United States. the region. The United States then changed its mind and declared that the rebels were alone
. Israel's decision to stay away is even more puzzling. Russia promised that Iranian troops would not enter the region, but Russia's weak stance and the nature of the Assad regime, broken and entangled in Iranian Shiite militias, meant that this promise was not made. Was not credible. Even though the appendices of Iran had been kept away from the offensive itself, Iran would have occupied the space afterwards. In fact, Iran has not even waited so long.
The result is that Russia has orchestrated the suppression of the great powers that could actually stand in the way of the pro-Assad coalition, and the US has actually repeated its "red line" disaster. " never traced the line as clearly as President Barack Obama did during the 2013 attacks on nerve agents, but the precedent will probably have the same effect.
US allies now understand that it There has been no significant change in US policy to be a more reliable partner.This leaves those who wish to continue to resist Assad vulnerable to recruitment by extremists.It leaves Jordan, Israel and Turkey more dependent than ever before. of Russia – an abominable situation under all circumstances and all the more serious as Moscow can not provide what these states need, even if it wishes [19659009] .Assad's coalition will then go. The likely answer is Idlib, the final "de-escalation zone", which is occupied by Turkish observation points. Russia and Iran have encircled Idlib and the swarming zone of jihadists, providing a pretext for an attack that will blunt the international outcry.
Michael Dempsey of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote that Idlib would be next. Turkey's presence in the region is very limited, said Mr Dempsey, and Russia's political interest in maintaining relations with Turkey will not be enough to stave off an Iranian offensive between Assad and Iran. Iran. Dempsey concluded: "It's only after Idlib will be safe, probably next year, that Assad will finally focus on" the US-backed YPG zone in New York. l & # 39; is. "
It is quite possible that Dempsey is right." Assad's promise to recapture every inch of Syria "should be taken seriously.
Assad a reported to Over the last few days that an Idlib offensive is going on.The complication is that if Turkey chooses to stay on its positions, it is not clear that the regime's coalition has the strength to force Turkey to leave, pro-Assad forces have proved unable to stop Turkey in Afrin, and Ankara has publicly called Idlib a "red line." Turkey clearly has security interests to respect this rhetoric: to prevent the influx of two million additional refugees that it can not cope with, a flow that would include jihadists and a void in Idlib that would probably be partially filled by the YPG. [19659002] Maybe Turkey will accept she that the Assadists go to The Assadists' hands mediate the "mediation" mediated by Russia, which prevents refugees and ostensibly keeps the YPG away. But given Turkey's imbrication in adjacent areas, it's unwise to give up Idlib and, again, Turkey probably has the advantage of avoiding this result.
Isolated as the United States, he is clearly the most powerful opponent. the pro-Assad coalition and defended his area with lethal force, even against the Russians. But politically, the United States is more open to an exit mediated by Russia. Trump's obvious penchant is to leave Syria as soon as possible and YPG's partner, already part of the pro-Assad coalition, is now seeking a public meeting with Assad, including an apparent offer of badistance in an offensive. d & # 39; Idlib. If the pro-regime coalition can take back the East by negotiating an American exit and combining with the YPG forces, this makes an Idlib offensive more viable.
The concern that the United States will end up imposing sanctions on Turkey now seems to be coming true, making US-Turkish normalization, and a united NATO front in Syria, seem more distant. Without such unity, Russia seems ready to separate the allies and allow the Assad-Iran system to reconquer all Syria.
[ad_2]
Source link
