Brexit Gamble May May Actually Work

Theresa May's plan for British post-Brexit relations with the European Union comes at least 18 months too late. With only a few months of real negotiations before the UK left, it triggered the worst political turmoil ever to occur in May, questioning his future as prime minister. In addition to all this, it is a plan that the EU is likely to reject.

Believe it or not, it's a progress.

The plan that May sketched – a more complete version is promised in a text to be released on Thursday – is at least a plan. It's something that Britain has missed up to here. And it's a plan for a softer, and therefore less disruptive, Brexit, that does not want many Conservatives. It's good too.

The idea is of an agreement centered on a U.K.-EU free trade agreement for goods. Britain should keep its system of property regulation in line with that of Europe and grant the European Court of Justice at least some role (although no, May insists, "jurisdiction" in the UK) to interpret and apply the rules. British companies would be satisfied with this, but militant Brexiters see red lines crossed. Services would not be covered, however, and the UK would not accept the principle of free movement of people between Britain and the EU – so it would not be "Brexit In Name Only . "

an arrangement that would allow the United Kingdom to collect tariffs on behalf of the EU for goods entering Britain bound for Europe. This perspective is complicated – some say inapplicable – but, with regulatory alignment on the goods, it could avoid the need for a customs border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, or between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. negotiate, albeit with more difficulty, new trade agreements with third parties – what a complete customs union with the EU would exclude.

The plan therefore lies in the middle of the range of possibilities between a hard Brexit (ie a limited free trade agreement such as the one that the EU has negotiated with Canada) and complete adherence to the single market (which means almost all rights and obligations of the EU, including free movement, but not the voice of the EU). option). To be sure, this is the first choice of anyone, and the EU might well dismiss it as an unacceptable "selective selection". It could nonetheless be the best and most plausible alternative to the hardest Brexit of all, who would see Britain leave the union next year without any concessions.

The resignations of David Davis, the minister who was nominally in charge of negotiations on Brexit, and Boris Johnson, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is not a bad thing. Both are in favor of a sharper separation from Europe – Johnson was a leader of the Leave campaign – and none was willing to support a hybrid of the kind that May ultimately advocates. Davis had already been largely cut off from the process, and Johnson, constantly plotting his offer for leadership, had nothing constructive to offer. It's much better for May to get rid of it.

Are these resignations, with others perhaps to follow, signifying a leadership contest that will bring May and his government down? Maybe – but most likely not. There could be enough support for the Conservatives to be called to a vote of confidence towards their leader (48 Conservative MPs should demand it), but it is doubtful that there would be enough votes to defeat her. (which requires a majority of 316). Another factor: Johnson and others who maneuver to shoot him can not be sure of winning a general election, if that is where it ends.

For the moment, the party and the country mostly want to be led – and if May, despite the evidence of the last 18 months, begins to show that she is up to it, she will probably carry it to short term. To establish on a plane and defend it with apparent conviction, which she did for the first time in the Commons yesterday, was a step back in the right direction.

The greatest risk to his leadership and the British economic outlook does not come. from his party but from the EU. All that European negotiators have said up to now suggests that they would consider the hybrid that she proposes as unacceptable. The logic of this position is very debatable. There is no reason for the gap between a Canadian-type agreement and the Norwegian option to be a void. It is in the long-term interest of Europe and Britain to build the closest partnership that the policy will allow. But a marked easing of the EU's position will be necessary even for Europe to call May's plan a basis for negotiation.

If Europe rejects it from the outset, then the position may be desperate. European leaders should think about the consequences. In the UK, May is now seen as having staked out an unpopular compromise. If the EU returns her face and demands, in fact, that the United States accept the terms that she dictates, they could achieve a short-term victory. But in the longer run, that's the prospect that would help most Johnson and the other anti-EU plotters. Maybe the EU should think twice before linking more closely to a spiteful enemy and see if a hybrid deal could be made after all.