DEBATE: What is the next step for Turkey?

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, image via maxpixel.net

BESA Center online debate n ° 13, July 19, 2018

Q: The fate of Turkey has been badociated with that of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since 2002. After winning several elections and referendums and surviving a coup attempt in July 2016, he is consolidating power in an unprecedented way. The elections of June 24, 2018 were his most recent test, and he succeeded successfully. Despite divisions within Turkish society and critics in the West, Erdoğan continues to lead Turkey by holding more power than any other Turkish ruler for decades. The full impact of this development on Turkey's domestic and foreign policy remains to be seen. BESA joins the debate by asking: Now that Erdoğan has pbaded his most recent electoral test, what is the next step for Turkey?

Respondents: Mark Meirowitz, Katerina Dalacoura, Mark Lowen, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Gallia Lindenstrauss, Efrat Aviv, Vbadilis Nedos, Burak Bekdil

Mark Meirowitz Associate Professor, SUNY Maritime College, New York; BESA Non-Resident Research Associate

Turkey is clearly at a crossroads. With the victory of the reinforced presidency and the majority in Parliament (in coalition with the nationalist MHP party), President Erdoğan and the AK Party now have a tremendous opportunity to make real changes in Turkey. Having devoted so much energy to achieving these milestones, Erdoğan and the AKP can now focus on the challenges and problems of Turkey. The Turkish society that had to go from one election to the next did not help stability. There is now, I believe, the light at the end of the tunnel after the elections. The prospect of the end of the state of emergency is extremely positive.

In addition, the highly effective discussions with the United States on Syria, including the road map for Manbij, should pave the way for an improvement in Turkish-American relations (keeping in mind the fact that That Turkey must focus its energies on improving its relations with the United States, and should beware of relying on Russia to solve Turkey's defense needs). With regard to the relationship with Israel, Turkey and Israel must devote their energies to restoring the progress they have made after resolving their differences following the Mavi Marmara incident by returning ambbadadors and re-establishing good relations.

concerned about the urgent problems of the Turkish economy, which President Erdoğan and the Turkish government must address immediately. Finally, Erdoğan and the AKP have to resist the pressure that the nationalist MHP can exert on key issues (such as how to solve the Syrian / Kurdish problem). With the electoral victory having brought greater freedom of action to navigate the many complex challenges that Turkey faces, Erdoğan and the AKP can accomplish great things for Turkey. I sincerely hope that they will

Katerina Dalacoura Associate Professor in International Relations, London School of Economics

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's absolute victory in the first round of presidential elections on June 24 2018, and the success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won 42.56% of the vote in the parliamentary elections of the same day, increased concerns about the future of democracy in Turkey . There are however some silver liners, one of which is the performance of the opposition parties against the AKP during the election campaign. Over the past 16 years, opponents of the AKP have realized that no "big brother" (neither the army nor the other) would save them from the domination of the AKP and the master political tactician who directs it.

On the eve of the last elections, the Republican People's Party (CHP), the newly created "Good" party (İYİ), the Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) and the small but important Islamist Felicity (Saadet) attempted to bridge ideological and ethnic divides, reach political agreements and lead a dynamic campaign. To defeat the AKP in the next few years, they will have to do more to overcome the dividing line between Turks and Kurds; send strong people to the Islamist camp; expand their activities at the local level throughout the country; and listen to the voters more carefully. But their successes in these elections are already significant: the percentage of the AKP has been reduced and it has lost its majority; he will now have to rely on the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to get things done.

All major opposition parties have won parliamentary representation where some of the decisive political battles of the next five years will take place. Much remains to be done to establish a full-fledged democracy in Turkey, but one of the necessary conditions seems to have been put in place.

Mark Lowen, BBC correspondent for Turkey

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attained absolute power: chief of the executive as well as head of state; and able to appoint ministers and most senior judges, to dissolve parliament and promulgate decrees. Everything from the intelligence agency to the state theater was placed under his control. After ninety-five years of parliamentary rule, the pro-government media call it the "first president" of the new constitutional framework. Turkey is for all intents and purposes in its Second Republic

The opposition calls this "the rule of the one man". The concentration of power in his hands makes him the most powerful leader of Turkey since the founding father of the republic. . His choice of ministers, in particular the provision of finances and treasury by his son-in-law Berat Albayrak, reinforces this impression

The benefit, as far as it is concerned, is a simplified decision-making and less chance of conflict between branches of government. The risk is that Erdoğan no longer has anyone to blame if things go wrong – especially economically. This is now the main concern: rising inflation, the fall of the currency and the drying up of foreign investment. That was the reason the president called early elections in the first place – to ensure victory before an accident. But the changes he has made since his victory have done nothing to calm the markets

The big unknown now is foreign policy: will Erdoğan soften his antagonistic rhetoric towards the world? west and try to repair the traditional alliances of Turkey? from Europe and to Russia and the Gulf. If a financial crisis hits hard, it may face renewed pressure to improve relations with major investors from the Netherlands and Germany.

In terms of internal security, military operations against Kurdish groups in northern Syria and the repression of opponents perceived in the country. The continuation of the Foreign and Interior Ministers does not suggest any major changes.

The "new Turkey" is full of unknowns. As always, half of the country savor it while the other is terrified of it.

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou Lecturer in International Relations, Kadir Has University, Istanbul

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Victory in the First Round of the Presidential Elections in Turkey on June 24 and the AKP-MHP's dominance in Parliament mark the birth of the Second Republic of Turkey, marked by the inauguration of Erdogan on 9 July. After 95 years of variants of a parliamentary system in place with relatively clear separations between executive, legislative and judicial power, the new presidential system involves a concentration of power in the hands of the president. Regardless of Erdoğan's ideological leanings, which involve a mix of conservatism, nationalism and Sunni Islamism, the governance of a country like Turkey has always been a polarizing affair backed by a veneer of security nationalist who has historically perceived the country as facing the challenges of

In today 's increasingly fluid world, where the building of the rules – based international order is being dismantled piecemeal by the powers that created it as a result of the Second World War, the traditional instincts of Turkey. fear of insecurity, encirclement and interference of the great powers in its internal affairs were reinforced. Therefore, on the domestic front, Erdoğan's fight against the secular and western establishment that has formed the political, administrative and economic base of the country will continue in order to ensure the consolidation and legitimacy of the new presidential system. as Erdoğan's hold on power

In terms of relations with the rest of the world, Turkey's new foreign policy will become even more transactional than it already is because the country will continue to seek a greater role in global affairs commensurate with the image and speech of a conservative Islamist leader in defending the national interest. As a result, its relations with traditional allies and partners will become increasingly frayed and difficult to manage.

Gallia Lindenstrauss Researcher, National Security Studies Institute and Visiting Scholar at the Bipartisan Policy Center, Tel -Aviv [19659007] The election results in Turkey, which have consolidated the alliance between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), will mean the continuation of a Severe stance on the Kurdish issue in Turkey and Syria Regarding other areas of foreign policy, while we are witnessing some attempts to reset relations with the United States, there is good reason to believe that many of the sources of tension in bilateral relations exist. relations will remain in place – the S-400 agreement between Turkey and Russia and increasing calls to Congress to stop supplying the F-35 in Turkey, the US rawal ramifications of the The case of Iran, the question of the extradition of Fethullah Gülen from the United States and the plight of US citizens imprisoned in Turkey.

Regarding Turkey's relations with the EU, we do not expect the accession process, and the current Austrian EU presidency can be very difficult for Turkey. With regard to the Israeli-Turkish relations, the tensions surrounding the May 2018 crisis are still in place and the return of ambbadadors to Ankara and Tel Aviv in the short term seems uncertain.

Efrat Aviv Lecturer at the Department of Middle East Studies, Bar-Ilan University; BESA Fellow

The most important result of the Turkish elections is that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will become the first executive president of Turkey with considerably increased powers. The branches of the Turkish government must now begin to implement a series of constitutional amendments approved in a referendum last year. Under the new system, Erdoğan, re-elected, will be able to appoint vice-presidents, ministers, senior officials and high-level judges, dissolve parliament, enact executive decrees, impose state of emergency and enact new laws – something that he was previously able to do only under the state of emergency, but will now have the right to do as executive chairman. AKP supporters believe that the new system will allow Turkey to be governed more effectively and stably in the long run, but ignore the growing authoritarianism of the president and his party. Now that the election results have proven that Erdoğan's domestic and foreign policies are "right", authoritarianism will grow stronger – a danger that it would be unfair to ignore.

The fate of Turkey's volatile economy is critical and will depend a lot on how Erdoğan handles it. Currency depreciation, which has lost about 20% of its value against the dollar since the beginning of the year, as well as rising inflation and the current account deficit, the high exchange rate and high interest rates will remain the most urgent issue. I see no indication that Erdoğan will revisit his populist economic agenda despite his attempts to calm society and the business sector. To quote the latest provocation of Emine Erdoğan, the president's approach is like wearing a Hermes handbag when all you can afford is a Waikiki. Above the economic question is Erdoğan's tough relationship with the West and especially with "fascist and cruel" Europe. I do not expect a change in Erdoğan's foreign "politics", so internal tensions will remain. Once again, Erdoğan believes that his bitter and relentless criticism of the West was an effective tool to help him gain popularity. The election results did not encourage him to change this policy.

The growing polarization within Turkish society is worrisome, as are social problems such as violence against women, abuses of life and violence. children, mbad arrests and unfair trials. Apply the death penalty after the elections. This will put the government in a difficult position internationally by drawing criticism, particularly from the West, on human rights and democratic norms in the country. The conditions of human rights in Turkey will certainly worsen. For example, lawsuits such as the one against the farmer protesters who participated in the recent "potato protest" in Adana – the complaint on the grounds that they had insulted Erdoğan – are likely to be more frequent from now.

The current foreign policy does not have any unified doctrine or ideology, but is based on immediate interests and needs, the Turkish involvement in Syria will continue and Erdoğan's fight against the PKK will be strengthened, in particular because of the alliance of the AKP with MHP. Erdoğan must continue to implement the policies that he has followed in recent years in order to remain the ally of MHP. Certainly, the emergence of Muharrem Ince indicated that there could be a credible alternative to Erdoğan, surpbading the current CHP leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. But Ince has no official position within the CHP and the opposition as a whole does not seem strong enough to confront Erdoğan, especially not as executive chairman.

Vbadilis Nedos Diplomatic and Defense Correspondent, Kathimerini Athens

Does Turkey have an Ataturk of the 21st century? A large part of the Turks, especially those who feel increasingly alienated or even separated, would find it very difficult to accept this. Others think that it is probably very specific in concrete terms. But all would discover similarities. In the elections of June 24, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan managed to consolidate his power not only for another five years, but for an unpredictable period.

This makes Erdoğan the master of the game. He makes the rules, he bypbades the rules, he breaks the rules, then he goes back to the rules. In terms of the internal balance of power, it seems that it will not be questioned because the old Kemalist order is without teeth. So, the answer to the question "what comes next" can only be solved with another set of questions. Can pro-Western and clear parties and actors have an influence in Turkish society? Is there an opposition (politically) able to put an end to the authoritarian epidemic?

On a geopolitical scale, the question is whether Turkey can: a) be effectively re-engaged and fully engaged in the West; b) deepen new partnerships with Russia and Iran, or c) try to balance them all. At the same time, it is projecting power in both the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean, creating tensions with all coastal states. The current "hunting expedition" for natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean will test the determination of the Ankara power projection in the region as it will cause friction not only with the riparian states but also with the western powers. who have presences and economic interests.

Burak Bekdil, columnist based in Ankara, member of the Middle East Forum, and regular contributor to the Gatestone Institute and Defense News

24 June more than 56 millions of Turks went to the polls to elect their president and their deputies. The election results pleased (and saddened) all players. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won the presidential race with 52.6% of the vote, up slightly from 51.8% in 2014. More than 25 million Turks supported their support for the highly Islamist man who has been leading Turkey since 2002.

Erdoğan and the Development Party (AKP) won 42.6% of the vote, compared to 49.5% in the last parliamentary elections in November 2015. But the AKP, in alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), won 344 seats in the new 600-seat house, a clear majority. The MHP, whose popularity has been estimated at 7-8% in polls, has won a surprising 11.1%, another winner and now the indispensable partner of the Erdoğan coalition. It should be noted that without the MHP in alliance, the Erdoğan AKP would fall short of a parliamentary majority with its 293 seats.

The Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) is another winner since it crossed the national threshold of 10% for parliamentary representation (with 11.7% of the national vote). The Kurdish bloc is now the third largest power in the Turkish parliament.

Finally, the main presidential rival of Erdoğan, Muharrem Ince of the main opposition People's Republican Party (CHP), a secular social-democratic group, was also he took a surprising 30.6 % of the national vote (against 52.6% of Erdoğan), significantly higher than the 22.6% of his party. Ince may not have challenged Erdoğan as he claimed, but it has turned out to be his only serious challenge in the future.

The Turks chose to continue with Erdoğan, making at the same time a clear choice to mix his neo. – NATO Islamism with Turkish ethnic MHP nationalism. This Islamist / nationalist bloc now represents 53.7% of Turkish voters. This same ideological mix will guide Turkey's foreign policy in the years to come.

View PDF

Broadcasting Twitter : #Besaonlinedebates # Erdogan #Turkey #USA # Israel #Syria # Mediterranean # Greece

@BosporusReport
@marklowen
Comment from: @DTriantaphyllou
@GLindenstrauss
[19659006] @NedosVbadilis
@tzogopoulos