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For decades, Djibouti has benefited economically from stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But as the two countries normalize their relations, financial losses could push Djibouti to disrupt peace, writes Kelsey Lilley of the Atlantic Council.
Ethiopians and Eritreans celebrate the speed of a rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Asmara, two long-time enemies. Closer links between the two, although not necessarily an agreement, could open a new era of peace and prosperity for the Horn of Africa, revive a thriving business relationship and allow Ethiopia landlocked to access a new port. Unfortunately, nearby Djibouti – which has successfully operated its mainland on the Red Sea to offer both port access and military bases to foreign countries – is likely to lose. At the very least, this tectonic shift will reduce the revenue available to President Ismail Omar Guelleh, in power since 1999, and undermine his grip on the country. At worst, Djibouti could turn out a spoiler, which would threaten the prospects for regional peace as well as longstanding U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa.
For decades, Djibouti was the undisputed winner of the hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the latter's international isolation. The country of just under one million people has unique geostrategic advantages in New Jersey: its coastline stretches across the Red Sea and the Aden Gulf, a crossing point important for energy supply and global trade. While ports exist in Sudan, Somaliland and Eritrea, Djibouti's developed facilities, political stability and a favorable investment climate have proved more attractive than elsewhere in the region. As a result, Djibouti enjoys a near-monopoly on the transportation of goods to and from landlocked Ethiopia.
The United States also has longstanding security interests in Djibouti, including the only US military base on the mainland – an essential component of United States Anti-Terrorist Operations in East Africa and in the Arabian Peninsula. About 4,000 US military personnel are stationed at the US base, which extends to the nearby airport used to launch both armed drones and reconnaissance drones. operating in Somalia and Yemen. Stressing the strategic importance of the country for the Pentagon, US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis visited Djibouti in April 2017, a few months before the opening of the first Chinese military base abroad. In addition, France, Japan, Italy and Saudi Arabia have bases of different sizes and capabilities in Djibouti.
Ethiopia and Djibouti have always maintained close political and economic relations through mutual necessity. When the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea erupted in 1998, Ethiopia lost access to the port of Eritrea, an existential crisis for a landlocked country. Since then, Ethiopia has largely relied on Djiboutian ports to process its imports and exports: 95% of Ethiopian imports transit through Djibouti. Djibouti also relies on its largest neighbor, from where it imports fresh water and electricity. The profits derived from the use of Djiboutian ports by Ethiopia – estimates of one billion dollars a year – are a key source of Guelleh government revenue. But Ethiopia finds this arrangement deeply wrong and is interested in more diverse and better offers for port access. The United States, too, is deeply dissatisfied with Guelleh's partnership. Specifically, his penchant for extracting expensive rents from as many foreign military as possible, including the permission of a Chinese military base a few miles from US one, left the United States unhappy.
Eritrea and Djibouti have a more recurrent history, and unresolved tensions could flare up again. The western border of Djibouti with Eritrea has been militarized since the end of the border clashes in 2008. Qatar has attempted to negotiate the dispute, and even managed to facilitate a prisoner exchange in 2016 before withdrawing its soldiers from the Eritrean-Djiboutian border The decision to side with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ( UAE ) in the Gulf crisis
The benefits of Djibouti on maritime transport and property directly complements the strict political control of the country. The Chinese would pay $ 20 million a year until 2025 for their base, but this figure does not include more than $ 1 billion in Chinese loans. Americans pay about $ 70 million a year for at least another six years, and the French pay another $ 30 million a year for their military installation. These benefits contribute to what appears to be a booming economy: Djibouti's annual GDP growth is expected to remain around 7% in the near future. But despite the ostensible wealth of Djibouti, most of the country remains desperately poor, underdeveloped and subject to Guelleh's authoritarianism. Nearly a quarter of the population lives in extreme poverty and Djibouti is an abysmal country of political rights and civil liberties.
The Ethiopia-Eritrea peace talks are bad news for Guelleh, who has staked out her role as a port of choice for economic giants like Ethiopia. Assuming that standardization efforts continue, Ethiopia may soon have the option of using the ports of Eritrea, which are closer and more convenient than Djibouti. Although it is unlikely that Ethiopia will completely stop using Djiboutian ports, it will have options – and will therefore be less inclined to settle for port usurious usage rates. Eritrea could even prove to be a welcoming partner for foreign military forces, as the country previously allowed the UAE to use its port of Assab to continue the war in Yemen. However, one of the main obstacles to leaving Djibouti from Ethiopia is the need to repay nearly $ 3 billion in Chinese loans for the new Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway.
Finally, if foreign military follow the Ethiopian example Guelleh will quickly lose a key source of income, making the quadrennial president vulnerable to long-standing grievances over his government's corruption and repression. Once his resources have dried up, the little political support that he has been able to cajole or co-opt will likely follow.
In recent years, the growing interest of UAE in the Horn of Africa adds new complication to the plight of Djibouti. UAE acquired rights to a naval base in Eritrea, a military base and a commercial port in Somaliland and a multipurpose port in Puntland. But relations between Djibouti and the UAE have been strained since February 2018, when the Djiboutian government canceled the contract of the Dubai-based Dubai Ports World ( DP World) for the first time. operation of the main maritime terminal of Djibouti. . Early reports suggest that the UAE could have even played a role in the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The growing partnership of UAE with Ethiopia – which recently acquired a 19% stake in the port of Berbera alongside DP World and Somaliland – is also a proof outstanding regional diversification.
It is unfortunate that Guelleh perceives normalization with Eritrea as a zero sum game, he has reasons to be nervous that Addis Ababa and Asmara are warming each other up. The more they normalize relations, the sooner Djibouti's strategic advantages disappear – and with them the treasury of Guelleh. The resolution of a decades-long conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea would strengthen global regional stability and open new doors for trade and economic prosperity. But there are real losers in this scenario and the opportunity to ruin well-deserved peace should be carefully considered.
The opinions expressed in this article belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the editorial line of Peacebuilding Deeply.
This article was originally published on the Atlantic Council blog AfricaSource and is reproduced here with his permission.
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