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Narendra Modi and Hbadan Rouhani in Tehran, photo via Wikimedia Commons
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 898, July 18, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The withdrawal of the United States from the Iranian nuclear agreement is expected to Hit hard for India's strategic investments in energy-rich Iran and landlocked Afghanistan as China's strategic footprint increases. Maintaining good relations with Riyadh and Tehran will also be more difficult for New Delhi. Iran 's dilemma materialized at the wrong time for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as India prepares for legislative elections in less than a year. The pressure exerted by the Trump administration on the Modi government to stop all oil imports from Tehran is expected to complicate India 's diplomatic relations with Iran. It remains to be seen how India will secure its interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia without Iranian support.
Following the withdrawal of US President Donald Trump from the 2015 Joint Action Plan, the Iranian nuclear drama continues to unleash geopolitical reconfigurations
Washington's latest decision to postpone the inaugural high-level dialogue 2 + 2 with New Delhi, scheduled for July 6 in Washington, does not help the generally favorable atmosphere of Indo-American relations. The 2 + 2 dialogue format was one of the main conclusions of Modi's visit to the United States in June 2017. Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman were to visit Washington to discuss with their counterparts, Mike Pompeo and James Mattis
The postponement comes at a time when New Delhi was asked to "reset" Iranian oil imports by 4 November. This difficult message was delivered by Nikki Haley, the United States Permanent Representative to the UN. his recent visit to India. It is not clear if the sudden decision of the Trump administration is linked to India 's reluctance to reduce oil supplies from Iran, but it clearly indicates the likelihood that it will be destroyed. uncertainty that characterizes Indo-American relations regarding Iran.
he begins to impose severely punitive sanctions. India is also facing tremendous pressure following the Trump Administration's emphatic message to all US allies and partners to stop all oil imports from Tehran. Trump wants to see visible steps taken in this direction as a result of the US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal. Given the enormous geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges for India in Iran, it is a serious challenge for New Delhi.
Trump's message to India is clear. As Haley told New Delhi, "The Tehran regime is the hidden – and sometimes not so hidden – force behind most of the conflicts in the region … a nuclear weapon threatens us all. " In an interview, Haley reiterated the message: "I think that for the future of India, we will encourage the future to rethink their relationship with Iran." In this line of thinking, the United States have their most enthusiastic partner in Saudi Arabia, close ally of India. in the Middle East
New Delhi has so far been able to maintain warm ties with Riyadh and Tehran, although it means walking on a tightrope. Iran is currently the third largest supplier to India after Iraq and Saudi Arabia. India would prefer to maintain this course of pragmatic and balanced engagement, which allowed it to play skilfully the geopolitical needs of both parties in a very unstable region. However, things will not stay the same post-nuclear retreat. The rapidly changing geostrategic dynamics of the region makes the pursuit of such a policy much more complicated.
Modi supported the Iranian nuclear deal. During the visit of Iranian President Hbadan Rouhani to India early in 2018, the joint statement reflected New Delhi 's support for the full implementation of the agreement. After the signing of the agreement in 2015, India has strengthened its commercial, economic and strategic engagement with Iran. Indian companies now fear that their ties with Iran will be put to the test.
Moreover, Indo-Iranian ties are not limited to oil and business. New Delhi believes that India's strategic ambitions in Central Asia can not be achieved without Iranian support. India's commitment to build the Iranian port of Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman, connecting India to Afghanistan, through which it can access the island of Iran. Central Asia and Eurasia bypbading Pakistan, is a good example
. against Islamist terrorist groups centered on India, which are the biggest obstacle to a cordial relationship between Islamabad and New Delhi. Regional trade and connectivity have been the main victims of Pakistan's anti-India strategic culture as well as deep Afghan-Pakistani animosity. Therefore, India's immediate challenge is to improve its energy security and ensure regional connectivity in order to reach landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asia by developing the port of Chabahar. This is also important for the Afghan economy, as it would reduce Kabul's dependence on foreign aid and put a major brake on the illegal trade in opium.
Even in urging India to reduce its dependence on oil, Port of Chabahar. However, Washington's view on Chabahar is not surprising, as it is intimately linked to the continuation of the US war effort in Afghanistan. Although India's strategic community has often projected the Chabahar port as India's geopolitical response to China's backed Gwadar port in Pakistan, the reality is somewhat different. As Iran has accepted China's mbadive participation in economic development, there is no indication that Tehran would allow the port of Chabahar to be used for any purpose other than trade
. The new defense connections of India with Iran. In February this year, New Delhi and Tehran pledged to strengthen maritime cooperation. Attempts are also underway for regular and institutionalized consultations between Indian and Iranian agencies on terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, drug trafficking and cybercrime. These interactions will now be the subject of close scrutiny by the Americans.
If the Saudi-Iranian competition intensifies, this will likely lead to further radicalization of Islamism in South Asia, with a likely overflow effect on India. If Tehran decides to increase its support for the Taliban insurgency, it will be a blow to regional peace and security. The Taliban have historically been considered by Tehran as one of Iran's enemies. During its initial military campaign to take control of Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban targeted the Afghan Shiite population because of their religious affiliation. Iran was also part of the regional group – including India and Russia – which supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. However, with the advent of ISIS in Khorasan Province (ISKP), Iran sees the utility of its longtime rival as a partner. According to reports, Tehran would provide small arms and training to the Afghan Taliban. For its part, the Taliban tried to show solidarity with the Afghan Shiites when they were targeted by the Sunni ISKP.
Post-nuclear withdrawal, Tehran could pursue more vigorously the policy of refusal of a US military coalition victory in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan becomes a theater of confrontation between the US and Iran, a politically negotiated settlement with the Taliban will become even more difficult. Afghanistan could also witness a new rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. One can not expect the Trump administration to remain a silent spectator in the face of a possible Iranian disruption. The regime change in Tehran may be the ultimate goal of President Trump, but the US options for military action against Iran on Afghan soil are currently limited because of the Pakistani factor
despite the promise of Islamabad to crack down on terrorists on Pakistani soil. Americans in Afghanistan, the Trump administration has not been able to carry out the main punitive measures that she had suggested might be in sight. The United States is worried that draconian measures may push Pakistan to respond by closing vital supply lines on its soil used by the US military in Afghanistan. Islamabad is aware of its ability to use supply lines as a powerful lever and Washington's inability to find alternative routes to Central Asia.
Remains to be seen how New Delhi and Kabul will continue to work with Iran rich in energy despite the sanctions regime. If the two have no choice but to reduce their economic commitments with Tehran, this will radically change the geopolitical landscape of the region.
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Vinay Kaura is Assistant Professor of International Affairs and Security. Studies and Coordinator of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at the Sardar Patel Police University, Security and Criminal Justice in Rajasthan, India
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published thanks to the generosity of the Greg Rossler family
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