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The question whether Case 3000
will conclude in indictments
is intriguing, but it is not the most important thing about this affair. When it comes to suspicion of any kind of wrongdoing, the question justifiably is a criminal offense. This is naturally the bread and butter of police investigators and the prosecution. However, the issues raised by the submarine affair concern a completely different matter, just as important: The method in which decisions of far-reaching security consequences were made.
There are at least six issues at hand. The first concerns the question of whether Germans were made aware that Israel was interested in acquiring an additional three submarines, for a total of nine, but that the decision was changed by the opposition Minister of Defense Moshe Ya'alon who decided that the three additional submarines would replace three older submarines.
PM Netanyahu (Photo: Amil Salman, Reuters)
Nine submarines are far beyond our need and ability to maintain. So how did such an intention come about?
The second issue is why should such a decision be made so early, years before the existing submarines become obsolete? How does the cabinet approve the army's multi-year plan, the Gideon program, and shortly afterwards come up with such a decision, above and beyond the framework of that plan.
The third issue relates to the defense of the defense of the prime minister, without his knowledge, to the use of submarine detection capabilities. This is similar to the prime minister's request for another F-15 squadron from the United States without the knowledge of the defense minister, the chief of staff and the command of the air force.
Considering all three of these issues, it is worth emphasizing that the purpose of a multi-year plan for the defense is to obtain maximum security from a given budget. It is possible and necessary to argue about the optimal balance, but it is unreasonable to make some sporadic decisions, and it is impossible to decide internal discussion among the Israeli decision-makers.
The fourth issue is more troubling: the cancellation of the tender for the purchase of ships to protect Israel's naval economic zone and the unilateral decision to purchase these ships from Thyssenkrup, which, unlike for submarines, has no obvious advantage in this field.
Thyssenkrup shipyards (Photo: EPA)
It turns out that eventually, large and more expensive. True, there are situations in which the transaction is likely to occur (the GTG transaction for example), but in such cases the other state of the art. That is not what happened here, and it is apparent that it has been applied to the puzzling decision.
The fifth issue concerns the unusual request by the German company for the Histadrut Labor Union that the navy shipyards be privatized.Considering that the shipyard is the property of the IDF, it is highly unusual, to say the least, for property purchase negotiations to take place behind the landlord's back. Who was aware and who collaborated with this?
The sixth issue, and the most troubling of all, is the claim that an Israeli official told German Chancellor Angela Merkel that Israel had no objection to selling advanced submarines to Egypt without the knowledge of the defense minister.
There may be no question in this matter, but should these matters be investigated through the criminal prism? Does the police have the necessary data, experience and motivation to examine this?
These are issues of foreign policy and security, and the way in which the Israeli government operates, including the boundaries of responsibility between the various parties.
Without underestimating the severity of the criminal suspicions, it seems that the most important are the issues reviewed in Case 3000 – the matters of military-strategic procurement and the manner in which they are made – the less interest they raise.
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