13, without Israeli attacks

Yahya Dibok

In those days of 2006, the military leadership in Tel Aviv and its political context were constantly wandering among its military options. At the time, Israel felt the limited capability of the air force and the "distance fire", as ambitious as it is, to achieve the objectives, which required it. to put his option on the ground on the decision table.

Like the air force options, Israel has started to flounder with the activation of ground options and incursions on the ground. Lebanese territory. Instead of defeating Hezbollah, the task entrusted to the troops, the mission turned into a "heroic rescue" mission of firing dead and dead corpses into the rear lines, thus preventing Hezbollah from capturing a soldier. alive or dead.
As in the post-war Hebrew literature, based on the testimonies of officers and soldiers and on the findings of the military inquiry commissions, the elite units and other units, Golani, from Givati, paratroopers and others, have been ordered to control, occupy and "clean" the elements of Hezbollah towns and villages. However, after the friction with Hezbollah, this task was turned into a rescue mission rather than a mission of victory.
If this is the case of the last war and one of the characteristics that left it in its memory, the paradox is that it is always questioned, taken and questioned in Israel, despite 13 years of war. Will the next war fail? Will the same "heroic rescue missions" be repeated?
The answer to the question may be "no" too big. Israel can not afford to repeat the results of the last war, namely the shameful result of the land battle against Hezbollah.
But at the same time, questions fueled by confessions and testimonies of senior Israeli officers about Israel 's ability to fight on the ground are emerging. After years, has he managed to be ready to face direct clashes and incursions into Lebanese territory? Here too, the answer is not great and has been confirmed by a number of senior officials who have examined the restoration and examined the results. In the words of the former head of the Military Intelligence Division, General Amos Yadlin, "the ground combat of the Israeli army could not be a natural reflection of the Israeli public." of justice is a reflection of the general public, who does not want to offer price and losses. "
However, if Israel does not allow itself to fail once again and at the same time recognizes its land options, it is clear that it will not present its forces in Lebanon. It also means that if the war breaks out, it will be enough to activate the aviation and the "firing fight".
And this war – even if it broke out – without the wild options, would not be intended to defeat Hezbollah, which can not be achieved without the earthly option. A war that will focus on air forces and fire at a distance, and the purpose of destruction and abuse and expensive.
In parallel, such a battlefield and its place are the home front on both sides, without exception. On this occasion, it is useful to recall the estimates of the current commander of the IDF internal front, says Major-General Tamir, as it was received yesterday in Haaretz:
"Since 2006, the enemy has developed large-scale missile systems capable of launching large-scale and continuous launches to all parts of Israel." In this context, the enemy has point a concept that goes beyond intimidation to intimidate Israel 's home front and compel it to stay in shelters, to close ports and airports and to break into the security systems. Israeli interception. "
"The terrorist armies around us are developing specific offensive capabilities and aiming to paralyze vital centers of the civilian economy, such as electricity and water, as well as on the military front," he said. said Tamir, who claims to threaten the fragile weapon, the newcomer in the balance of power of Hezbollah. Intelligence Sites and Air Defense Units. "
"The Israeli army is not prepared appropriately, even though all know the changes in the threat on the home front.Since I took charge of this task, I have made some improvements, but up to now, the Home Front's command has not solved all the problems and the road is still long. "
The military rulers in Tel Aviv, as it has been for 13 years, forced political leaders to uphold the most important decision banning the home front. To receive the consequences of the next war, namely to prevent or provoke the outbreak of this war.
This result can be hard and frustrating for some, not only in Israel, but also abroad. But these are the logical calculations of the potential of the Israeli war, proven by conclusive evidence that it has not burst despite the pbadage of 13 years, which has been saturated with incentives for Israel to enter in war.
The result is not the result of a comparison of military and military powers between Israel and Hezbollah. The balance remains undeniably in the interest of the occupation. But in the context of Hezbollah's growing ability to harm Israel, it has reached the level required to prevent its actual outbreak of war, an abstention based exclusively on the losses suffered by Israel if the war broke out without any link , The corresponding price is higher.
But has the war become extinct and excluded? The origin of this question is a feat for Hezbollah against Israel, a double fulfillment when it comes to a place in Israel itself.
The reality of the equation between Israel and Hezbollah is characterized by the aggressive position of the enemy in relation to the defensive positioning of the resistance. This means that Israel's decision to wage war does not concern the "no-choice" war in which Tel Aviv is launching, without, of course, worrying about the price it is likely to pay to following this war.
Second, the purely defensive stance of Hezbollah – with the exception of recent developments in the US attack on the axis of resistance – and he returned to his retirement – he " would also put Israel alone "to evoke the equation of feasibility and cost of any extreme choice that might be presented in Tel Aviv, in the context of the defensive position on the Lebanese side.
Is the 13 years of Israeli abstention from the attack against Lebanon one of the most important achievements of Hezbollah in this war, an achievement that exceeds the potential if the balance of power is recalled between the two parties.
The irony is that the failure of Israel to attack Lebanon over the years is the result of Hezbollah's deception and fear, in a verbal attempt to reverse the equations. In any case, it should act out of fear, anxiety and even honor, no problem, if it deterred Israel and prevented it from launching an aggression against Lebanon. .