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Although Israel recognizes that the aggression options in Lebanon without answers can go beyond proportionality, they are firmly on the table in Tel Aviv. This means not only that Israelis advocate the possibility of resorting to aggression, but they also indicate the effectiveness and stability that prevent the attack itself.
We are talking here about the destructive and precise combat methods in which the list advances the capabilities of the missiles, the occupation does not reluctantly deny that it is now in Hezbollah and that what prevents it from being used, is the political decision to lead the resistance positioned defensively against attacks.
One of the most important dilemmas facing the Israeli army is the impossibility of winning the wars to come. This is a dilemma that has accompanied all IDF Chiefs of Staff since the failure of the 2006 Hezbollah War, and to the newcomer of current Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi. Kochavi is the fourth chief of staff post-war. Like its predecessors, it has also re-examined the victory, its methods and methods, which clearly shows that this dilemma is one of the most important results of the "lessons learned" of this war: limited military capabilities. Achieve victory against non-state entities, regardless of military balance and physical chances.
This fact is not denied by the occupation and does not hide its negation; Much has been said and written about it and there is no research or study of Hebrew, but rather a constant of the constants of the existing equation.
This is the dilemma of the few years after the war, but it is decreasing. This has led the Israeli army to move away from the triumph of victory to adopt a new meaning: to defeat the enemy by delivering it or writing it, the victory is to reach the enemy. Military objective of the war, regardless of the final outcome of the war itself and its political arrangements. The military establishment advances in advance the failure of the next war towards the political establishment and moves away from the responsibility, although the reality is different, in particular with regard to the military defeat of the enemy, with full and spontaneous political consequences, regardless of the performance of the political establishment and its role, because defeat ends the threat and removes it.
Israel's destructive system evades Hezbollah's subtle destructive power
Nevertheless, the occupation could have moved away from the ordeal of war and its failure and entrap the responsibility for this failure, begun before the beginning of the war, by refraining from initiate it as well as provoke it, which is why Israel has refrained from pursuing aggression in Lebanon. The attack has the potential to provoke a war, with Hezbollah's commitment to react proportionately or beyond.
But what weighs heavily on the occupation is that 13 years after the war, Hezbollah's military capabilities have not only increased quantitatively, but have also developed qualitatively, notably through the possession of destructive capabilities, with negligible margin of error. The occupation opposes its objection, regardless of the development of the corresponding "layers of interceptors". On the basis of this particular factor, which was recently recognized in the Hebrew media, Israel must consider its options long before attacking Lebanon, not only because the initiative to provoke war can provoke war, but it can also take "days". Limited Combat ", or simply an exchange of answers. In particular, the resistance is committed to providing a proportionate response to any attack, but also beyond proportionality, so that it can fully play its role in preventing the attack itself, and not only in which concerns the "public relations reactions" related to the legal image of the resistance, which could have been. The occupation must bet on it to escape the price of its attacks.
Hezbollah's subtle capacity for destruction, averted by Israeli interception systems, would give resistance leaders a range of previously unworkable responses that would allow it to execute two concurrent demands: pay for it. Occupation the price of his aggression first and prevent him from repeating it.
In this context, the Israeli threat of targeting Lebanon with its civilians and its infrastructure, as well as resistance centers to military and civilian resistance, has been thwarted by the threat of Hezbollah against civilians, infrastructure and centers of gravity Israeli military and civilians, although the second threat (Hezbollah) is based on a defensive versus defensive stance. The primary offensive of the enemy, which is the most important in the equation between the two sides.
Thus, the hypotheses of cross fire and limited days of combat, ranging from the circle of the possible to the circle of impossibility, have become almost rebaduring, as in the case of the war as a whole.
Of course, the modest capacity of the enemy to harm is not inferred, it has a tremendous destructive power, especially with regard to distance fire, thanks to the use of air force. But whatever its destructive capacity, the equation relies on Hezbollah's destructive capacity, which has three components: the physical presence of the destructive capacity and its vectors, the ability to injure and to dodge interception systems and, more importantly, the political decision to use them in response.
The central question is whether the enemy abstains from using military force to prevent the precision project
Therefore, the Israeli impulse can be understood by the screams that have reached the UN forum in order to prevent Hezbollah from possessing specific capabilities. But it is not a question of shouting, of its place and of its real potential, but of Israel's refusal to resort to military force to prevent the "project of precision" (the project that led and led to the acquisition of resistance to an arsenal of precision missiles). Does it involve a fear of consequences or "accuracy" preceded the ability to prevent the enemy, or both? In all cases, the "accuracy" has arrived and is positioned in an advanced position in the equation with the enemy.
In the direct military war of 2006, Israel failed – at a minimum – and Hezbollah won out following its failure. Thirteen years later, one of the most important Israeli wars against Hezbollah has been the defeat of the Accuracy project, which will have negative consequences for Tel Aviv and its decisions against Lebanon and the equations between resistance and resistance. strengthening of the Lebanese deterrence capacity. And his level and prevent him from attacking Lebanon.
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