That Jensen did not investigate his informant is a fairly common practice in the police

After lunch on the 31st day of the second leg, it was finally Thursday in the defenders turn to put his question to Eirik Jensen. Thomas Randby was absent, but did not ask any questions. He spent the next three hours reading aloud in a textbook and a doctoral dissertation.

This was not done in the district court, but sheds new light on parts of Jensen's examination by the prosecution.

informant rules The police are clear and strict. The yard received it with a teaspoon. All informants must be registered, no police officer will meet them alone, the information that will be included in the meetings will be recorded and the distinction between private relations and professional cooperation must be sacred.

Eirik Jensen has repeatedly agreed to the violation of this regulation. Nevertheless, it was considered suspect that his contact with Gjermund Cappelen was very different from the recommended practice.

Jensen's apparent phobia about office work and his consistent and harsher work methods partly explain the context. Nevertheless, it appeared that Jensen had helped to establish rules that he never thought true to himself. "

The actor asked detailed questions around that. Jensen often met Cappelen alone, they exchanged confidential information and only part of the information that Jensen claims to have received should have been recorded in the police files. The former politician has sometimes implied that he was convinced that the world was completely different behind a Bureau desk, compared to what he is on the streets of sources and criminals.

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Jensen has a point here. Randby read out Thursday from two authoritative sources: "The use of police by informants – a necessary evil" by Anders Rasch-Olsen and the thesis "Justiciable police investigations – Some examples and solutions to research "by Asbjørn Rachlew. Both conducted extensive investigations with police informing officers, who delve into all the ethical dilemmas of the practice, in a manner that is appropriate for further discussion. However, the most important aspect for Jensen's defense is the description of the situation.

Breaking the rules about informers is more common than following them. The majority of police officers have unregistered informants. Instructions for training, registration, instructions, logbook and evaluation are generally not followed. With regard to these studies, this part of Jensen's behavior is immediately less suspect.

Rachlew's thesis and Rasch-Olsen's book also detail the mutual benefit relationship between the informant and the police. Those who provide information to the police often do so for their own benefit. Often, informants are recruited at the point of care, receive light treatment, and largely decide who they want to provide information to. Thus, criminal informants may also exclude competitors.

Informants need special treatmentand get it, writes Rachlew. The best informants themselves are involved in a crime, but the workers of these informants must avoid knowing this crime – so as to avoid any conflict with the duty to act.

Rasch-Olsen describes how informant management is vulnerable to various forms of corruption. Informants seek information about police intelligence, sometimes attempt to corrupt the police and want to escape the investigation themselves.

This can lead to a form of corruption that the police can also defend themselves. In the international literature, it is called "nobel sak korrupsjon": the police choose not to react to the offenses committed by informants, who help them solve other problems.

"The leaders legitimize that by saying that the result is better than what you are leaving, the laws are bored and the idea is that the goal is sanctifying the means," Randby told the court.

It's tempting to think further: for example, if you are not aware of suspicions of selling cannabis, take international smugglers of heavier substances.