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On Thursday, the ticket vendor informed Ticketmaster that he had been a victim of a hacker attack for a long time and that personal information or payment information from customers could be stolen.
DNB and its IT provider Evry confirm to Dagbladet that Norwegian Ticketmaster customers attempt fraud due to data attacks. Evry, who is responsible for monitoring fraud and card transactions in DNB, said he discovered the hacker attack on Ticketmaster about two weeks ago.
– At that time, we discovered unusual usage patterns on some cards and then contacted customers to check their usage. As the use proved unfamiliar to customers, we analyzed the history of the respective cards and discovered that there was consistent historical use on Ticketmaster, says Evry, product manager. at Kjell-Rune Vilhelmsen
. Be careful: name, address, e-mail, phone number, payment information and login information. The attack may affect customers who bought tickets in September 2017 and June 23, 2018.
DNB customers suffered
DNB, information director Even Worveld says that there have been attempts of fraud on the part of DNB. He says he has had a close dialogue with Evry in recent days, after Ticketmaster published information and scope
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– Such scams are unfortunately occurring all the weather. DNB has set procedures and still calls the customer and asks if it is true that the person has used his card at a particular place and if the fraud test is confirmed, we freeze the transaction for the money do not go away, "said Westerveld. DNB customers have received an email regarding the hacker attack on Ticketmaster Thursday
– Our advice to customers is always to track and block the cards they suspect a fraud or are contacted by Ticketmaster.
– Irresponsible
The Ticketmaster attack hits up to five percent of ticketing customers worldwide. In Norway alone, five million tickets are bought each year. Despite the fact that DNB's customers are affected, the bank did not want to give information about attempted fraud
– It would be irresponsible to ask anyone who has already bought a ticket from TM to block cards as long as we did not have any information on the extent or if the Norwegians were at all affected, "said Westerveld
– Should you be wider with a view to l & 39; global and local scale?
– We have "We have not received a lot of questions about it from customers and we think we handled it well," says the information manager of DNB
– For security reasons, we do not want to go into detail. Such events, says Vilhelmsen in Evry
Dagbladet also tried to comment on the Norwegian Ticketmaster, Kristian Seljeset, who does not wish to comment. It refers to Ticketmaster International's press service. The International Press Office does not answer the questions either, but refers to the press release of yesterday
Dagbladet asked Ticketmaster the following questions:
- How can this happen if long time?
- How many Norwegians
- Why do you have to pay a "third party provider" while that is your responsibility?
- What type of customer information was potentially stolen from Norwegian customers and users?
- Did Ticketmaster control the attack and the information?
– Criticism
– He is absolutely critical, says Gisle Hannemyr, about Ticketmaster's handling of the customer's personal information and payment information.
He is a lecturer in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Oslo, and is an expert in privacy and information security.
How can this happen? Hannemyr explains this:
– Ticketmaster used an external Javascript provided by an external company called Inbenta Technologies on its web pages. The files that formed this program were stored on the Inbenta servers, and were downloaded directly into the browser's "Inbakt". of the user on the Ticketmaster website.
This technique is called Content Delivery Network (CDN)
– No Control
According to Hannemyr, it is not uncommon to use Javascript this way. What did not go with Ticketmaster, according to Hannemyr, was that Ticketmaster had no control over the contents of the script but left the responsibility of securing the script to Inbenta
– Javascript provided by Inbenta was at a moment compromised by unknown, and modified so that this script sends data that has been exposed to the browser – including credentials and payment information – to these unknown persons. Because the program was "integrated" directly into Inbenta's server browser, Ticketmaster did not control the contents of the script.
Inbenta published a statement on the piracy scandal on its websites.
There are those who must Ticketmaster They believe they have acted irresponsibly by "cooking" the script on a payment page.
Inbenta writes that they would have advised Ticketmaster to do it – if they had known about it.
Between Two Chairs
Gisle Hannemyr believes that the hacking scandal could occur because the responsibility for data security has not been clarified.
– Ticketmaster assumes that Inbeta is responsible for the script and assures that it is safe to use anywhere. Inbeta, in turn, assumes that Ticketmaster does not use the script on sensitive data pages – such as payment information. This script falls between two chairs, and no one watches for any hacking.
Hannemyr also points out that the CDN technique, used by Ticketmaster, is far from unusual.
– It is not unlikely that similar vulnerabilities are found in other javascript because there is none. This can be a reminder that if you use CDN, you should review this – or find ways to ensure the use of such a technique.
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