No matter what happens in Helsinki, Putin has already won



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Russian President Vladimir Putin has a flair for discreet drama. When he met Donald Trump last July, his cold gaze on the floor contrasted with the more animated gestures of the American president. And so, when the two will meet again on Monday, Putin should not greet Trump with a bouquet of flowers as he did German Chancellor Angela Merkel in May. But the Helsinki summit will nonetheless be a theatrical power projection contest – and Putin may have already won it.

Putin's game is not so much about the practice of diplomacy as about strike agreements; it is optical, both at home and abroad. Trump often seems to play a similar game, but Putin is by far the most experienced player. The fact that a state summit – the first between the two – occurs allows Putin to present himself to the Russians as indispensable to the US president to resolve the global crises. Russian public television is looking forward to introducing the country's leader – freshly hosted by the World Cup – on a footing of equality with the world's most powerful man.

Moscow's foreign policy advisers believe that Trump is unlikely to make concessions to Trump. major conflicts in which both countries are involved. In private correspondence, they reject rumors of a breakthrough on the Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014 to the United States and global fury; or Trump promising significant support for Russia joining the G-8, the club of industrialized nations from which it was expelled after the invasion of Crimea; or both presidents entering into a lasting agreement with Syria.

Trump could be an atypical American leader. He can even make statements suggesting that he would recognize the Russian seizure of Crimea. But most observers in Moscow agree that – at least in Russia – he is still forced by a Congress and a foreign policy deeply suspicious of Putin.

Moreover, Russia and the United States have diametrically opposed perspectives on Ukraine. what the Kremlin really regards as its sovereign right to weigh in its sphere of historical influence. This point of view, in many ways, underpinned both its annexation of Crimea and its incursion into eastern Ukraine, thus contributing to a conflict that left 10,000 dead. Russian and US officials are approaching bilateral talks on a possible peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine – arguably the best hope of resolving the conflict in this region – describe the talks in private conversations as if the two parties were operating in different realities.

For the moment, it does not seem likely that the two presidents will conclude a meaningful agreement on Syria. Trump may have little sympathy for what remains of the rebels fighting Bashar Assad, who is supported by Moscow. But Trump's main demand on Syria would probably be that Russia reduce Iran's role on the ground. The Kremlin has already accepted that all foreign forces leave Syria, which means that Iranian and Russian forces will leave only when all other foreign forces – from jihadists to Turkish troops – will do so. Both presidents could repeat similar promises next week. But such statements will have no impact on the ground. Russia has no interest in the departure of Iranian forces, which are essential to Assad 's ability to recapture the entire country. And Moscow probably only has a very limited ability to get them off even if she wanted to.

So, if, in principle, the Kremlin could wish for a big market – a Yalta 2.0, as has long been the case – in which the United States would recognize the annexation of Crimea in exchange for Russian support to Iran in Syria In fact, few Russian officials are waiting for such an agreement.

More likely is that Putin will look for something out of Trump: the appearance of being the adult in the room. The model of inflammatory and self-contradictory statements by Trump gives Putin a polite look in comparison. It's just the image that the Russian president wants to project. The choreography can work in several ways: to ensure that Trump drops another flippant remark about the recognition of the annexation of Crimea, stopping the NATO exercises in Europe or the return of Russia in the G8. No matter which one of them would mean that Putin will appear to play the role of the President of the United States. So much the better if Trump makes statements about Eastern Europe or NATO that sordid discord and confusion within western alliances. Meanwhile, there is little harm for Putin if Trump starts talking hard: Putin looks like a statesman next to an unpredictable global leader who comes from to contradict oneself.

An agreement on Syria or a commitment to deepen cooperation in the fight against terrorism, for example. But such agreements would be the type of symbolic understandings that make Putin look conciliatory without too much commitment.

Putin counts for many reasons on optics and the projection of power. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians have felt a palpable insecurity about the country's status as a world power. Putin's support at home depends on his ability to project power abroad. Moscow's disorderly interference in the 2016 US elections, for example, seems to have been intended to prove – with plausible deniability – that it could make life difficult for Hillary Clinton and jeopardize the legitimacy of her victory over deliver the White House to Trump.

The result? The Kremlin manages to portray the United States as dilapidated and dysfunctional, while projecting itself at home and abroad as a force to be reckoned with – a potential fixer of problems that, more often than not, it has contributed create.

In private, Kremlin insiders say that Moscow prefers to deal with Republican presidents, who usually attribute realpolitik above liberal democratic values. Trump has turned out to be neither a business nor a heavy-value artist. But at least Moscow can take advantage of the fact that, whatever Trump is trying to do, Putin already looks better at doing it.

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