[ad_1]
Last week, at its I / O developer conference, Google unveiled its Pixel 3a and Pixel 3a XL smartphones (priced at $ 399 and $ 479 respectively), as part of a new strategy to introduce the purist version of its Android platform at a cheaper price. unconscious and tired consumer
To be honest, the phones look like a very good deal compared to their more expensive counterparts, Pixel 3 and Pixel 3 XL, which were launched in October 2018 and cost between $ 400 and $ 420 more.
Pixel 3a is it so good value for money?
If you opt for the "economical" version of Google phones, you give up the much faster and lighthearted version of Qualcomm's Snapdragon processor from last year, wireless charging, water resistance, screens HDR compatible, sandwich glass construction, improved visual processing for the camera, and you downgrade to a single selfie camera.
But realistically? Pixel 3a is the phone that Google should have introduced in the first place. This is more than enough for what most people need, although the 4GB of anemic RAM remain a major disadvantage, as was the case with the more expensive version introduced the year last.
At $ 399, however, it's not the best value for Android smartphones. For about the same price or less, there are many things from 2018 with better specs from the Chinese competition, although you may have to shop a bit. And the Pixel 3a camera is probably the best in the industry at this price.
I regularly wear a Pixel 3 in addition to my iPhone XS Max, because it allows to take better pictures in close-up and under a dim light for the type of photography that I do. But I doubt that most consumers are getting the most out of the smartphone cameras they already have.
Why Google can not stand out
The value Google is trying to sell with its smartphones is Google itself, not the hardware. As has so well said an Android fan site, it is a "boring" phone.
The purist Google experience is what makes a pixel a pixel, as well as the ability to quickly receive updates and version upgrades. This is a big advantage for software developers who want to use the Android versions as soon as they are available, instead of having to deal with the extremely slow release cycle of most builders OEM.
But any OEM can create an Android device because Android is Open Source. And anyone can create a "Google Experience" phone if they have a license for Google Play components, which include the same apps that Google installs on the Pixel.
An OEM may also choose to release an Android One device, which is actually an OEM version of a Pixel. they can not make any third-party "enhancements" to the operating system and must also accept a strict software update and patch schedule to maintain this certification.
However, most manufacturers have moved away from the Android One program, opting instead for their launcher interfaces and improvements to differentiate their devices in an increasingly standardized smartphone market. With very few exceptions, everyone buys at the same supply chain and uses the same unseizable components; From the consumer's point of view, there is very little differentiation outside the hardware configuration on Android devices.
Google, in fact, is competing with the Pixel. The same Google services used on the Pixel are available to all licensees of the company's Google Play services. This Android OEM partner ecosystem, according to Google, explains why Apple has a natural advantage: it must not differentiate itself from its partners because it has no partner.
Only Apple makes iOS devices. It does not have the diversity of devices and its customers have little choice. There is something to be said about the fact that the operating system is hardware-related, has an update program, and has a routine patch that often outlasts the life of the client. This helps explain why the market used for iOS devices is still pretty strong and why Apple itself is facing growth issues related to the iPhone.
On the other hand, most Android devices never see major updates to their operating system, and the "Toxic Hellstew" of fragmentation is very real. only about 10% of Android devices in the wild have even been updated to Android P, the current version.
Can Google learn from Microsoft?
When introducing its Surface hardware at the end of 2012, Microsoft had to face very similar challenges. At the time, it was doubtful that the company was launching its own devices while many Windows laptops from the Windows partner ecosystem already existed. The detachable / convertible tablet format was not proven and, at the time, the Windows 8 operating system was not optimized, making it a difficult sell.
Flash forward to 2019: The Surface Pro 6, Surface Book 2 and Surface Laptop 2 are by far the best Windows 10 systems in their class. You can argue convincingly that it's even better systems than those offered by Apple with comparable MacBook Pro at the same price. I would not hesitate to buy one now compared to a partner product if I needed a new Windows 10 machine.
The Surface Series offers its competitors a superior faultless experience, with better functionality, battery life and portability than most other Windows laptops on the market. Because of this highly competitive Microsoft product, OEMs also had to improve their game. I think Dell, HP and Lenovo are building much better machines, at least in their business class offerings.
A solution to an unproven value proposition?
I do not think Google was able to do the same thing with Pixel as Microsoft could do with Surface. The value proposition does not yet exist because of the trivialization of the smartphone industry and Android applications and services offered by Google that constitute the intrinsic value proposition of Android as a whole.
Services being the way the company makes the most of its money, they are faced with the real problem of not being able to differentiate themselves with their own branded device, because getting those services in the hands of all with a phone Android is what creates their growth. .
If the goal now is to grow revenue with a device company (exactly the opposite of what Apple does, namely increase revenue from services because device revenues are stable), there must be a differentiator key between Pixel and its competitors. .
The answer, unfortunately, is going to have to be a cannibalizing of the Android partner ecosystem that Google has worked so hard to put in place. One possible approach: Google may deny certain application and service features to OEMs and reserve them for their own devices, as is the case with its Pixel Launcher user interface.
But this could backfire by forcing OEM partners to offer alternative services and applications. Samsung, for example, would probably consider using the Tizen operating system that they are now turning over to the Linux Foundation on several of their high-end devices – they have already abandoned WearOS, the Android version of the smartwatch, Android. This could also require them to consider preloading the suite of Microsoft's Android applications, such as Outlook, which is one of the platform's best e-mail clients. Or even deeper Microsoft partnerships. How about a Samsung Galaxy 365? Not out of the question
Another possible approach: Google could create loyalty programs through which Pixel and other Google device customers (Home, Nest, etc.) achieve some combined value by owning as many of them as possible. 39 Google branded devices. This would amount to creating an Amazon Prime ecosystem, in which the property would have privileges.
To a certain extent, Google is already doing this by offering unlimited cloud backup of the original resolution photos for some Pixel customers (the new 3a phones are apparently exempt from this privilege – they only have the same backup "High quality "than all other Google Photos. But I think society has not gone far enough; it may also be necessary to provide free access to media services and other features to make it more attractive to be a Google device user.
The long-term solution is a reboot of the ecosystem
In the end, the only way for Google to solve this problem is to press the reset switch, which means a reassessment of the functioning of its ecosystem of partners and developers. The partners have managed to make Android the first mobile operating system in the world, but at the expense of Google, which is its own appliance company.
Google is currently developing a brand new mobile operating system called Fuchsia. Its components are fully developed internally, including its core, based on a brand new operating system called Zircon, and not on GNU / Linux and the associated user space libraries used by Android. Like the AOSP of Android, it is also an open source project.
With Fuchsia, Google has the opportunity to completely change the way it licenses its components and maintains relationships with OEMs.
In the Western world, Google's main Android OEM partners are Samsung, LG and Lenovo. In the end, the Chinese domestic market will be controlled by Huawei, Oppo, Xiaomi and others who will not need licenses for Play Services.
If Google allows OEMs to continue to add their value-added components and do not force them to use "Fuchsia One" right from the start, I think that would simply amount to duplicating the current mess. We would end up with a new "Toxic Hellstew" only with Fuchsia replacing Android. And since Fuchsia is supposed to run Android apps with its version of Android Runtime (ART), it's entirely possible that Google just wants Fucshia to be an engine exchange for all concerned parties.
Indeed, I think Google could, in the expectation of that, start forcing OEMs to be licensed with Android One if they license all of them. the stack of Google Play services. At the same time, it may need to reduce the total number of OEM / ODM partners. Thus, every new Android phone marketed in the wild is a Google branded phone, regardless of the manufacturer.
In essence, it would be a return to the style of "Nexus" OEM relationships where the equipment is co-branded. Now, one can argue that the Nexus line has never met expectations because these devices had exclusives and differences between operators that differentiated the Verizon Galaxy Nexus from the AT & T model, for example. It can be assumed that a migration from a national carrier in North America to a global 5G standard (which, in the United States, seems more and more based on Qualcomm) would alleviate this problem in the US. to come up.
Google must make some tough choices, and some of that should look more like Apple. I do not see them as capable of developing their own device business while allowing their partners to continue to maintain their market share.
Should Google perform a complete reset of its ecosystem of partners if it wants to improve its Pixel market share? Talk back and let me know.
[ad_2]
Source link