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As president, Barack Obama overturned a plan to punish the attacks on the chemical weapon of Syrian dictator Bashar Assad, before giving a "distorted" account of the decision, according to the new brief. a senior advisor.
"The way Obama characterized what had happened also seemed to underestimate the long-term negative effects of the events of the red line, which, in my opinion, undermined his credibility as president and undermined the influence of the United States, "said the former US ambassador to the United States. Nations Samantha Power writes in his book The education of an idealist.
Power, 48, was the top US diplomat at the United Nations throughout Obama's second term – including during the weeks of debate on how to respond to Assad's use of chemical weapons during the civil war in Syria. She recalls being surprised by Obama's initial decision to order a military response and an even bigger shock during his last-minute change of course. But it was his retrospective defense of politics during an interview that provoked a private reprimand.
"After reading his comments, I emailed him an invitation to reconsider the" distorted "account L & # 39; Atlantic of what happened in August and September 2013, "writes Power.
On August 21, 2013, an attack killed about 1,400 people. It had taken place a year to the day, at Washington time, from the moment Obama had called the use of chemical weapons "red line", which would have "enormous" "It was about to impose these consequences," said Power, because he "concluded that not reacting forcefully was more expensive than risking military action. "But when he had the opportunity to strike, he knocked out his national security team by deciding to seek congressional approval."
"And so for me to press the pause button at that time, I knew it would cost me politically," Obama told the president. AtlanticJeffrey Goldberg. "And the fact that I was able to get away from immediate pressures and think about what was in the US interest, not only vis-à-vis Syria, but also vis-à-vis our democracy, was as decisive as me. we did – and I think ultimately it was the right decision to make. "
Ben Rhodes, Obama's assistant advisor for national security, said the remarks, pointing out that the president "was completely comfortable" with the historic decision. But Power viewed this independent image as a facade.
"Obama's retrospective embrace of withdrawing from his planned air strikes seemed to me a defensive overestimate – a belief that, in my opinion, came from years that had been personally blamed for the carnage in Syria." she writes. in public when he felt most conflicting inside. "
Power, who was working for Obama while he was in the Senate before following him into the executive branch, sent a private letter to the president asking him to come back on his remarks.
"When you decided to go to Congress in August 2013, you did not expect or want to fail," she wrote. "By getting Congress behind you, you expected to have a thicker base to support an unpredictable intervention."
Obama praised his willingness to resist "the machinery of our national security apparatus," but Power describes him as a strong supporter of the strikes. He planned to order the air strike on August 25, but UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon refused to remove a team of inspectors from Syria until they completed an investigation. on previous chemical weapon attacks. Obama thought that this investigation was not necessary, but he feared that Assad would grab the inspectors if the attack took place while they were in the country. He felt that his hands were tied for days.
"Obama was full of frustration," writes Power.
But Obama changed his plans almost as US inspectors left Syria. When Susan Rice, National Security Advisor at the White House, announced the news to Power, the stakes were clear for both.
"He will fight like crazy to get this permission," Rice said in Power's speech. "He's betting on his presidency and our reputation in the world about it."
The power described Obama as motivated, at the decisive moment, by a combination of confidence that he would win the congressional vote and fear that the Republicans "attack his presidency as illegal and illegitimate" – and even maybe even be impute – he's ordering air strikes unilaterally.
"To overthrow ourselves in public seemed confusing to us and it revealed how strongly the President was forced into domestic foreign policy," she wrote.
Power acknowledges that very early in her tenure as a Cabinet official, she was too shy to voice her objections.
"In just a few weeks, I would feel comfortable putting forward a point of view in Cabinet discussions on any subject," she wrote. "But that fateful day, less than a month after I took office, I felt that I had just been parachuted into a conversation in the middle of a sentence."
Thus, a cabinet consisting of three former senators – Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry – fueled a mistaken consensus that Obama would be in able to mobilize the support of a majority of Congress. At the end of this effort, Obama's interest in conducting a punitive strike has also declined.
"I did not think we could call this chapter pride in the annals of American foreign policy," says Power.
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